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ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENTATION 
Christopher ]. Peters* 
This Article sets forth an interpretive theory of adjudicative lawmaking 
according to which, under certain conditions, such lawmaking ensures con-
structive participation through interest representation and thus is not inher-
ently nondemocratic. The author contends that the idea of "judicial activ-
ism, " courts deciding issues better left to political processes or substituting the 
personal "values" of judges for law, is based on the incorrect assumptions 
that courts are unconstrained and nonrepresentative. Instead, when adjudi-
cation operates in an archetypal way, it produces law in a manner similar to 
the parliamentary legislation process. Courts making law are constrained by 
the process of participatory decision making-the production of judicial deci-
sions through voluntary, self-directed debate among litigants. Moreover, ad-
judicative lawmaking occurs through the operation of interest representa-
tion-the binding of subsequent parties by precedent only to the extent that 
they are similarly situated to the original parties. The conditions necessary 
for adjudicative lawmaking to function democratically are that litigants par-
ticipate to a significant degree in the production of binding decisions, that 
precedential decisions bind only future parties who are similarly situated to 
the parties to the original action, and that the conduct of the original liti-
gants meet at least a threshold standard of adequacy. The author examines 
adjudicative lawmaking from the perspective of proceduralist and function-
alist democratic justificatory theories and then demonstrates, using case law 
and current controversies, that a threat to adjudicative legitimacy arises 
when the potential binding effects of a decision extend beyond its particular 
facts. The author concludes that in our concern over judicial decisionmak-
ing, we should monitor the decision making processes used by courts to ensure 
that adjudication follows or simulates common law processes, thus rendering 
it democratically legitimate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution preserves our liberties by providing that all of 
those given the authority to make policy are directly accounta-
ble to the people through regular elections. . .. But ... judges 
are, as they must be to perform their vital role, un elected, unac-
countable, and unrepresentative .... 
Robert Barkl 
The democratic integrity of law ... depends entirely upon the 
degree to which its processes are legitimate. 
Robert Bar~ 
It is something of a risk to begin an article with two quotations from 
Robert Bork's book The Tempting of America; people might make assump-
tions about one'sjurisprudence or one's politics. I have taken the risk for 
two related reasons. First, these particular quotations nicely frame, in a 
point-counterpoint fashion, the issues I want to discuss in this Article. 
Second, Judge Bork's book itself stands as one of the most salient recent 
examples of a prevalent, fundamental, almost instinctive belief about ad-
judication that it is my core project to undermine here. 
That belief, which is implied by the first quotation excerpted above, 
is this: that courts act in an inherently nondemocratic way when they make 
law (or when they invalidate law created through supposedly more demo-
cratic means-the phenomenon with which The Tempting of America is 
chiefly concerned). If courts inherently act nondemocratically when they 
1. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America 4-5 (1990); see also Vander Jagt v. 
O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J., concurring) ("All of the 
doctrines that cluster about Article ITl ••• relate in part ... to an idea, which is more than 
an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and 
prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of 
government.") . 
2. Bork, supra note 1, at 2. 
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legislate, then, in a polity in which lawmaking is supposed to be demo-
cratic, courts inherently act illegitimately when they do so, to some extent 
at least. My primary goal in this Article is to demonstrate that the assump--
tion of adjudicative lawmaking's inherent nondemocracy is, in an impor~ 
tant way, quite wrong, and that the conclusion of illegitimacy therefore 
cannot be drawn from it. Courts need not act nondemocratically when 
they make law, and so we need not worry quite so much about whether 
they act legitimately when they make it. 
The second quotation from Judge Bork's book, on the other hand, 
expresses on its face what could be considered the underlying premise of 
this Article: "The democratic integrity of law ... depends entirely upon 
the degree to which its processes are legitimate."3 The quotation seems 
to suggest that from the standpoint of democracy (and this is a key quali~ 
fier), laws have legitimate authority if, and only to the extent that, they 
are created in a "democratic" way-through "legitimate processes"-with~ 
out regard to what the laws actually say or do. As the reader will discover, 
this premise forms a crucial foundation for the conclusions I will draw 
here. 
I am afraid, however, that Judge Bork intends his statement to con~ 
vey a rather different idea than this. Bork goes on to explain what he 
means by "legitimate processes": 
Ajudge who announces a decision must be able to demonstrate 
that he began from recognized legal principles and reasoned in 
an intellectually coherent and politically neutral way to his r~ 
sult. Those who would politicize the law offer the public, and 
the judiciary, the temptation of results without regard to demo-
cratic legitimacy.4 
As this passage reveals, Bork is not concerned with the democratic legiti~ 
macy of the lawmaking processes that judges use; indeed, as I have hinted 
already, Bork believes that any sort of judicial creation oflaw is inherently 
illegitimate from the standpoint of democracy, that when courts make law, 
"[a] judge has begun to rule where a legislator should."5 Bork is con~ 
cerned in this excerpt, rather, with preserving a certain conception of the 
proper judicial function by maintaining the separation between judicial 
lawmaking and judicial law-declaring. Lawmaking, Bork believes, is what 
elected legislatures do in a democracy. In contrast, courts simply declare 
what the law already is by "beg[inning] from recognized legal principles 
and reason[ing] in an intellectually coherent and politically neutral way" 
to reach a preordained result. 6 
What Judge Bork's account fails to recognize is that the same kinds 
of "processes" that make the activity of the "legislator" legitimate in a de-
mocracy, that justify democratic parliamentary legislation, also can make 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 1. 
6. Id. at 2. 
1997] ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENI'ATION 315 
adjudicative lawmaking legitimate in a similar way. When the right kind of 
process is in place, adjudication need not be thought of as inherently 
nondemocratic, and thus the tenuous distinction between lawmaking and 
law-declaring need not be clung to so desperately in order to preserve ad-
judicative legitimacy. That is the fundamental message of this Article. 
The salient fact that will animate my discussion here is simply that, 
despite Judge Bork's wishes, courts do make laws (or, if you prefer, rules) 
that govern us-that adjudicative lawmaking is, as Cardozo remarked, 
"one of the existing realities of life."7 My project will be to offer a demo-
cratic justification of this reality, one that proceeds from a descriptive 
account of how adjudication typically functions. As such, my project dif-
fers dramatically from that of Judge Bork, who is concerned not with justi-
fying adjudicative lawmaking but with denying that it is capable of 
justification. 
Adjudicative lawmakingB occurs in two basic types of circumstances. 
First, courts make law, in Holmes's phrase, "interstitially"9-acting not on 
a grand scale, but moving rather "from molar to molecular motions,"lO by 
filling in gaps where the legislature cannot act, has not yet acted, or has 
acted only ambiguously. Virtually everyone concedes that necessity legiti-
mizes courts' rulemaking within such gapsll (although not everyone 
agrees that it is rule making rather than rule-declaring that courts are doing 
7. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the]udicial Process 10 (1921). 
8. I try to avoid the phrase "judicial lawmaking" because, as I hope to make clear, the 
law produced by courts is authored in large part by the litigants themselves through the 
adjudicative process, and to somewhat less significant a degree by judges than is commonly 
assumed. See infra Part II.A. 
9. Southern Pac. Co. v.]ensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes,]., dissenting). 
10. Id. 
11. The idea of courts as gap-fillers, stepping in to create law in specific circumstances 
where the legislature cannot efficiently act, began at least with Aristotle, who wrote in the 
Nicomachean Ethics: 
[A]ll law is universal, but in some areas no universal rule can be correct ... . 
Hence whenever the law makes a universal rule, but in this particular case ... the 
legislator falls short, and has made an error by making an unconditional rule ... 
it is correct to rectify the deficiency ... [by doingl what the legislator would have 
said himself if he had been present there, and what he would have prescribed, 
had he known, in his legislation. 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 144-45 (Terence Invin trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1985). 
Similarly, in the Rhetoric, Aristotle wrote of the criminal law: 
[T]here are two kinds of right and wrong conduct towards others, one provided 
for by written ordinances, the other by unwritten. • .. [The latter kind] makes up 
for the defects of a community'S written code of law. . .. Its existence partly is 
and partly is not intended by legislators ... intended, where they find themselves 
unable to define things exactly, and are obliged to legislate as if that held good 
always which in fact only holds good usually; or where it is not easy to be complete 
owing to the endless possible cases presented • . .. [A] lifetime would be too 
short to make out a complete list of these [cases]. If, then, a precise statement is 
impossible and yet legislation is necessary, the law must be expressed in ,vide 
terms ••.• 
Aristotle, Rhetoric 80 (W. Rhys Roberts trans., Random House 1st ed. 1954). 
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there). Legislatures, after all, can neither predict every future situation 
that will require the application of a rule nor formulate rules both com-
prehensive and specific enough to cover all situations. Inevitably a great 
many disputes will arise that are not clearly and noncontroversially gov-
erned by an existing statute. Courts are needed to decide these disputes 
as they appear-that is, to establish rules (however tentative) to govern 
them, at least until the legislature steps in with a different rule. 
Second, courts make law when they invalidate statutes or other acts 
of democratically elected bodies as contrary to values or standards that 
have been agreed in advance to be fundamental rules of the polity-that 
is, on the ground that they are unconstitutional. Although debate rages 
over just how, when, and to what extent this checking power should be 
exercised, no one seriously contends anymore that the power does not or 
should not exist.12 It is difficult to deny that some process independent 
of ordinary politics is needed to define constitutional values or standards 
and to correct democratic legislation when it fails to accord with them. 
Courts, because they are supposed to be much less subject to political 
pressures than legislatures and to make decisions in a very different 'way 
than legislatures do, are thought to be particularly well-suited to these 
twin functions of definition and correction. As Judge Bork asserts, 
"[f] ederal judges, alone among our public officials, are given life tenure 
precisely so that they will not be accountable to the people."13 
Adjudicative lawmaking, then, typically is justified as necessary for 
two purposes: to fill legislative gaps and to check legislative excesses. We 
tend to accept both justifications grudgingly, and with some angst. Both, 
after all, assume significant pathologies in the process of democratic legis-
lation. Either the majoritarian legislature is undereffective because it can 
Others who have acknowledged the necessity of courts (or similar officials) 
articulating law in the absence of clear legislative direction include writers as diverse as 
Holmes, see Southem Pacific, 244 U.S. at 221 (Holmes,]., dissenting);John Austin, see John 
Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 35-36 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., 1995); 
Cardozo, see Cardozo, supra note 7, at 14-16; Ronald Dworkin, see Ronald Dworkin, Law's 
Empire 313-17 (1986); Edward Levi, see Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal 
Reasoning 28-32 (1949); and Justice Scalia, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law As a Law 
of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1182-83 (1989). There are, of course, many more 
examples. 
12. Well, almost no one. Lino Graglia has argued, at least, that the power of judicial 
review does not come from the Constitution, and although he seems to accept that it is 
here to stay in some form, he is not happy about that fact. See Lino A. Graglia, In Defense 
of Judicial Restraint, in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint 135, 137-42 (Stephen C. 
Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982). 
Acceptance of judicial review was not always the rule. ThomasJefferson, for instance, 
disapproved of the practice. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge Spencer Roane 
(Sept. 6, 1819), in Thomas Jefferson: Writings 1425, 1425-28 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 
1984) [hereinafter Jefferson, Writings]; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie 
(Dec. 25, 1820), inJefferson, Writings, supra, at 1445, 1445-46. JudgeJohn B. Gibson of 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court famously argued against it in his dissent in Eakin v. Raub, 
12 Sergo & Rawle 330,346-58 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson,J., dissenting). 
13. Bork, supra note 1, at 5. 
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act only generally and cannot anticipate every contingency that might 
arise, or it is all too effective, threatening to overwhelm the rights of the 
minority or to undermine some other basic tenet of the polity. In either 
case it is, paradoxically, precisely the nondemocratic nature of courts that 
is assumed to provide their legitimacy. Courts are flexible enough to ap-
ply general principles to specific cases in ways the cumbersome legisla-
ture cannot; they are neutral enough to recognize and override the mo-
mentary passions of the majority in the name of deeper commitments. 
This presumed nondemocracy of adjudication thus places adjudica-
tive lawmaking in tension with itself. Such lawmaking is necessary to solve 
problems with parliamentary legislation, and it can claim some legitimacy 
through this necessity; but at the same time (and for the same reasons) it 
is seen as essentially nondemocratic, a perception that worries us greatly. 
We vi~'l adjudicative lawmaking as a necessary evil, and we continue to 
hold out "democratic" lawmaking-legislation by representatives who 
are "directly accountable to the people"14-as our ideal. We wish we 
could rely entirely on the latter. 
The traditional anxiety over the perceived nondemocracy of adjudi-
cative lawmaking becomes most salient, at least in the public eye, when 
charges of something called '~udicial activism" are leveled by critics like 
Judge Bork. No one is really sure just what judicial activism means, or 
rather everyone who uses the term has a different idea of what it means. I5 
14.Id. 
15. See, e.g., Bradley C. Canon, A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism, in 
Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, supra note 12, at 385, 385-89 (identifying 
numerous senses in which term judicial activism" has been used, articulating six 
"dimensions" along which activism should be assessed, and identifYing two "basic concepts 
of judicial activism" underlying the dimensions: "significant Court-generated change in 
public policy" and the "perception ofiIIegitimacy"); Arthur S. Miller, In Defense of Judicial 
Activism, in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, supra note 12, at 167, 167 (adopting 
definition of judicial activism as courts' "'propensity to intervene in the governing 
process'") (quoting Robert G. McCloskey, The Modern Supreme Court 338 (1972»; 
Daniel Novak, Economic Activism and Restraint, in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, 
supra note 12, at 77, 77-78 (defining judicial activism by contrasting it with "judicial self. 
restraint," which includes deferences to other branches, lack of "result-orientation," 
respect for precedent, and avoidance of "political" questions); Marvin Schick, Judicial 
Activism on the Supreme Court, in Supreme Court Activism and Restraint, supra note 12, 
at 37,37 (understandingjudicial activism as deciding "cases that once upon a time ... were 
thought to be beyond the pale of judicial power"); Harold]. Spaeth & Stuart H. Teger, 
Activism and Restraint: A Cloak for the Justices' Policy Preferences, in Supreme Court 
Activism and Restraint, supra note 12, at 277,278-79,282,287-88,294 (defining judicial 
activism as lack of judicial deference, respectively, to regulatory agencies and states, and as 
increased allowance of access to federal courts); Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme 
Court: Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?, 47 Md. L. Rev. 118, 121-22 (1987) (describing 
"extreme" judicial activism as "the belief that law is only policy and that the judge should 
concentrate on building the good society according to the judge's own vision"); William 
Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1992) 
(contrasting two notions of judicial activism: judicial overturning of statutes or precedents 
based on constitutional values, and implementation of "expansive remedies" by federal 
courts); Sanford Levinson, Raoul Berger Pleads for Judicial Activism: A Comment, 74 Tex. 
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The term, however, seems to me to have two primary connotations which 
go hand-in-hand (and indeed these are the two senses in which Judge 
Bork seems most often to use it). 
The first connotation of judicial activism is that of courts deciding 
issues they should not decide, issues that should be left to the "political 
process"-of courts stepping in where there has been no legislative fail-
ure of the kinds described above. On this view, judicial activism occurs 
when, in the words of Mark Tushnet (himself no critic of judicial activ-
ism), a court "substitutes the judgment of unelected judges for those of 
elected decisionmakers."16 This may happen, for instance, when a court 
elevates to the constitutional level an issue that belongs in the realm of 
ordinary politics. Bork believes lWe v. Wade17 is an example of this kind 
of usurpation: In that case "the Supreme Court[] ... ma[de] abortion a 
matter of constitutional right, thus largely removing the issue from state 
legislatures, where it had rested for all of our history."IB When courts 
become activist in this way, Judge Bork laments, "a major heresy has en-
tered the American constitutional system. "19 
The second primary connotation of judicial activism is that of courts 
implementing their own personal ideology or "values" through their deci-
sions rather than simply declaring what "the law" is. This is what Bork 
calls "the politicization of the law,"2o the reduction of the law "to a tame 
instrument of a particular political thrust."21 When a judge allows her 
personal predilections to dictate her decision, anti-activists contend, she 
is rejecting legal reasoning itself: "This results-first, premises-to-follow 
form of legal 'reasoning' is to law what Robert Frost called free verse, 
'tennis with the net down.' There are no rules, only passions. "22 
Underlying both of these senses of political activism is the assump-
tion that courts are fundamentally unconstrained, at least from a practi-
cal standpoint, and a corresponding fear of what unconstrained courts 
might do-a fear, in the spirited words of the anti-activist scholar Lino 
Graglia, of "tyranny."23 Anti-activists claim that courts should leave im-
portant decisions to legislators because they are democratically elected, 
L. Rev. 773, 776-78 (1996) (contrasting two notions of judicial activism: lack of deference 
to legislative judgment and expansive interpretation of constitutional text); Mark V. 
Tushnet, Comment on Cox, 47 Md. L. Rev. 147, 147-53 (1987) (listing and explaining six 
different meanings of judicial activism: willingness to render advisory opinions; readiness 
to overturn precedent; substitution of judicial for legislative judgment; constitutional 
nonoriginalism; support for an activist government; and simple blameworthiness of 
decisionmaking). 
16. Tushnet, supra note 15, at 149. 
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
18. Bork, supra note 1, at 3. 
19. Id. at 4. 
20. Id. at 2. 
21. Id. at 3. 
22. Id. at 264 (citing Robert Frost, Address at Milton Academy, Milton, Mass. (May 17, 
1935». 
23. Graglia, supra note 12, at 135. 
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are "directly accountable to the people,"24 and thus cannot get away with 
acting in 'ways of which the people disapprove. They argue that courts 
should refrain from imposing their own values because their values are 
not subject to oversight by the people. The anti-activists' motivation is a 
fear of the judiciary's godlike powers "in a nation founded on the revolu-
tionary principle that the people are capable of governing themselves 
and need not be governed by an elite";25 it is a distrust, shared by 
Learned Hand, of rule by "Platonic Guardians."26 
Opponents of judicial activism, then, adopt the traditional assump-
tion that adjudicative lawmaking is essentially nondemocratic. I think 
this assumption is wrong, at least much of the time, and it is my intention 
in this Article to demonstrate how it is wrong. My thesis is simply that 
under certain, paradigmatic conditions, adjudication produces law 
through a process of representation that is akin, in crucial ways, to the 
process at work in parliamentary legislation. This adjudicative process-
what I will call adjudication as representation-imbues adjudicative lawmak-
ingwith the same kind (although perhaps not the same degree) of"dem-
ocratic" legitimacy that parliamentary lawmaking possesses; it renders ad-
judicative lawmaking legitimate in a way that is independent of the needs 
to fill legislative gaps and to check majoritarian excesses. As such, the 
existence of adjudication as representation should ease our angst about 
the prevalence of court-created laws in an ostensibly democratic system. 
More particularly, recognizing the existence of this form of legitimacy 
should help us understand and work through some of the more vexing 
contemporary issues involving adjudication.27 
I will proceed as follows. In Part I, I will articulate and discuss the 
two different (but not necessarily incompatible) types of theories offered 
in support of the legitimacy of democratic government. First are theories 
that democratic processes have inherent value apart from the substantive 
quality of the laws produced by them, what I will call proceduralist theories. 
Second are theories that democracy produces laws of better substantive 
quality than alternative forms of government, what I will call functionalist 
theories. Both proceduralist and functionalist theories, I will point out, 
are characterized by a strong preference for government through the par-
ticipation of the governed and a correspondingly strong dislike of govern-
ment by fiat. This distinction is the essence of democratic legitimacy, 
either from a proceduralist or a functionalist perspective. 
24. Bork, supra note 1, at 5. 
25. Graglia, supra note 12, at 135. 
26. Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 73 (1958). 
27. I tentatively assess three such "vexing issues" in this Article: the debate over 
whether courts should articulate general rules, the problem of judicial review, and the 
issue of how justiciability doctrines should be applied. See infra Part IV. As we will see, 
these three difficult areas share crucial features that are relevant to the theory I outline 
here. 
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Part I also shows how systems of lawmaking in a representative de-
mocracy serve the goal of participatory government on both a 
proceduralist and a functionalist approach: they do so through the twin 
mechanisms of electoral coercion and interest representation. The con-
cept of interest representation as a means of ensuring constructive partic-
ipation, and thus of imbuing laws with democratic legitimacy, will be-
come important in the context of adjudicative lawmaking. 
In Part II-the theoretical meat of the Article-I will explain how 
adjudicative lawmaking can, under certain conditions, claim democratic 
legitimacy by ensuring constructive participation through interest repre-
sentation. The process resulting when these conditions are present I will 
call adjudication as representation. The necessary conditions are essentially 
those of traditional adjudication in the common law mode: significant 
litigant participation in the decisionmaking process and fact-specific, 
case-by-case decisionmaking. 
In Part 111, in order to amplify and clarify my description of adjudica-
tion as representation, I will offer some basic examples of adjudication as 
representation in action, looking in some detail at a string of common 
law cases and then, in a bit less depth, at lines of statutory interpretation 
cases and constitutional cases. In Part IV, I will briefly examine three 
current controversies in American adjudication from the perspective of 
adjudication as representation, with the intent of suggesting ways in 
which that theory might help us resolve them. Specifically, I will look at 
the debate about whether courts should articulate general rules, at the 
issue of the appropriate scope of judicial review, and at the question of 
whether justiciability doctrines should be strictly or liberally applied. As it 
turns out, these three issues have some important features in common, 
and the theory of adjudication as representation has something interest-
ing to say about each of them. 
Finally, in the Conclusion, I will take up briefly the subject with 
which Judge Bork is primarily occupied in his book, so-called 'Judicial 
activism." I will offer a conception of judicial activism that, consistent 
with the theory of acljudication as representation, is more concerned with 
the procedure by which courts reach decisions than with the substance of 
the decisions they reach. My discussion here will echo, in the context of 
adjudication, the theme that Judge Bork himself has sounded in the con-
text of parliamentary legislation: that "[t]he democratic integrity of law 
. . . depends entirely upon the degree to which its processes are 
legitimate."28 
I. THE LEGITIMACY OF DEMOCRATIC LAWMAKING 
[I]n the United States ... [t]he people take part in the making 
of the laws by choosing the lawgivers . . . . The people reign 
28. Bork, supra note 1, at 2. 
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over the American political world as God rules over the uni-
verse. It is the cause and the end of all things; everything rises 
out of it and is absorbed back into it. 
Alexis de Tocquevilfe29 
So Two cheers for Democracy: one because it admits variety and 
two because it permits criticism. 
E.M. Forstefl° 
321 
In order to understand how adjudicative lawmaking can be seen as 
legitimate, as possessing "democratic integrity,"31 in the same way that 
democratic parliamentary lawmaking can, we must first consider why 
democratic parliamentary lawmaking itself is seen as legitimate. What ba-
sic properties of parliamentary lawmaking legitimize the authority of a 
democratic regime to coerce its citizens by means of law? 
This question has been answered in two different ways, by two differ-
ent kinds of justificatory theories of democracy. The first kind can be 
described as proceduralist theories. Proceduralist theories emphasize the 
value that may be derived from (or, what amounts to the same thing, the 
evil that may be avoided by) the very process of citizens participating in 
their government. Proceduralism is indifferent to the substantive deci-
sions produced by a particular governmental arrangement, caring only 
that, according to some particular substantive moral theory, the proce-
dures used to produce those decisions either are inherently good or pro-
mote good effects. ProceduraIist justifications of democracy thus locate 
the value of that form of government not in the quality of the substantive 
legislation it generates, but rather in the inherent fairness or justice of its 
system of substantial and equal participation in legislation by the 
governed. 
The second kind of democratic justificatory theory can be described 
as functionalist theories. Functionalist theories focus on the quality of the 
substantive governance provided by democracy. They hold that democ-
racy, because of its characteristic aggregation of diverse interests and 
viewpoints in the decision making process, is a good way (or at least the 
best possible way) to produce the best substantive rules to govern society. 
They posit that objectively better decisions are more likely to be gener-
ated by a form of government that, like democracy, takes into account the 
interests and opinions of all of its citizens, than by a form of government 
that restricts participation to, for instance, a privileged few. 
These uvo kinds of theory, proceduralism and functionaIism,32 
might perhaps better be thought of as tendencies rather than full-blown 
29. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 60 (George Lawrence trans. &J.P. 
Mayer ed., 1969). 
30. E.M. Forster, Two Cheers for Democracy 70 (1951). 
31. Bork, supra note 1, at 2. 
32. What I call here "functionalist" and "proceduralist" theories generally correspond 
to what Robert Bone has called, respectively, "outcome-oriented" and "process-oriented" 
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theories, as strains of thought animating the. work of many who have writ-
ten about democracy. Calling them "theories" might be read to imply 
that they tend to be comprehensive and self-contained, which usually is 
not the case. More often, several varieties of prbceduralism or functional-
ism-sometimes varieties of both proceduralism and functionalism-ap-
pear as themes or assumptions in the work of a single theorist. Indeed, it 
might sometimes be helpful to think of proceduralism and functionalism 
more as ways of categorizing goals or ends of democracy than as independ-
ent ways to justify democracy; this will help explain accounts of democ-
racy that justify it by reference both to procedural and to functional 
values. 
For the same reasons, proceduralism and functionalism should not 
be seen as mutually exclusive. They are not necessarily so, as my discus-
sion of them below will make clear-although they may be so, depending 
upon the variety of proceduralism or functionalism to which one adheres. 
And, as this Article proceeds, it will be important to remember that in 
one sense both proceduralism and functionalism are "procedural," or 
process-based, theories of legitimacy. This is because, although the goals 
of each theory are different, the theories share an exclusive focus on the 
decisionmaking processes used to reach those goals. 
Let me describe briefly what I mean by this. As we shall see, func-
tionalism cares about results, abo~t outcomes, about the substantive qual-
ity of government decisions, but it cares about them only in a general 
sense. Functionalism does not assess the democratic legitimacy of a partic-
ular decision by asking whether the substantive outcome of that decision 
is good or bad. Such teleological assessment is the project of moral theo-
ries that exist apart from theories of democracy: egalitarian theories, for 
instance, or utilitarian theories, or rights-based theories. 
Rather, functionalism, like proceduralism, measures the democratic 
legitimacy of a particular decision according to the process that was used 
to produce it. Thus a functionalist democrat would consider a law pro-
duced by representatives in a deliberative body who have been elected by 
universal suffrage to be a democratically legitimate law, regardless of its 
substance, and would consider a law declared by a dictator or an absolute 
monarch to be democratically illegitimate, regardless of its substance. 
Functionalism, like proceduralism, is concerned entirely with whether 
the processes of decisionmaking are legitimate, not with whether any given 
decision produced by those processes is legitimate. Its difference from 
proceduralism lies in the reasons why it believes a certain kind of process 
to be legitimate, that is, reasons having to do with the quality of the deci-
sions that kind of process tends to produce. 
participation theories. Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in Court" Ideal and Nonparty 
Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 193, 201-02 (1992). By Professor Bone's description, an 
outcome-oriented theory is any theory that "evaluates participation for wbat it adds to the 
quality of the outcome," id. at 201, while a process-oriented theory is any theory that 
"assumes that participation has value apart from its effect on outcome quality." Id. at 202. 
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In other words, both strains of democratic justificatory theory, 
proceduralist and functionalist, justify democracy solely by reference to 
its decisionmaking processes. (Indeed, it is accurate to say that both 
strains of theory see democracy as a particular kind of decision making 
process.) It is just that functionalism values those processes because it 
believes them to produce good laws, while proceduralism values those 
processes because it believes them to produce or preserve goods wholly 
apart from the quality of the laws they create. 
Of course, a democratic theorist, functionalist or proceduralist, 
might believe a particular government decision to be illegitimate be-
cause, for instance, its substantive outcome is the violation of rights guar-
anteed by a constitution. If so, however, the theorist is not claiming the 
decision to be democraticaUy illegitimate; she is claiming it to be illegiti-
mate by some other criterion or criteria, in this case the explicitly 
nondemocratic criterion that the decision impairs rights protected by a 
constitution from ordinary democratic processes. (We might prefer to 
think of such criteria as metademocratic rather than nondemocratic: they 
reflect a commitment to democracy on a higher level, that is, to limits on 
everyday democracy that themselves have been imposed through a demo-
cratic, supermajoritarian process of constitutional authorship and 
amendment.) The theorist is simply asserting that a law that is democrat-
ically legitimate can nonetheless be ultimately illegitimate because it vio-
lates certain nondemocratic or metademocratic norms. The theorist's 
criteria of democratic legitimacy still have everything to do with the 
processes by which the law was produced. 
In this Part, I will flesh out the concepts of proceduralist and func-
tionalist theories in a bit more detail. My aim will be fairly simple: to 
support the largely intuitive notion that both types of theory see the par-
ticipation of the governed in lawmaking as the core value animating dem-
ocratic legitimacy. Then I will relate how representative democracy im-
plements the value of participation through two related mechanisms: 
electoral coercion and interest representation. All of this will set the 
stage for Part II, where I will offer a theory that adjudicative lawmaking, 
because it allows constructive participation through interest representa-
tion under certain conditions, often can claim democratic legitimacy in 
the same way that parliamentary lawmaking can. 
A. Proceduralism: Legitimacy Through Process 
Another name for positive freedom is self-government. 
Frank Michelman33 
Proceduralist theories of democracy treat the very act of individual 
control of or consent to the process of government-the very act of indi-
33. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-
Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 26 (1986). 
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vidual participation in the process of government in some way-as morally 
valuable. This is what makes such theories proceduralist: They value the 
process of democracy, because it allows individual participation; but they 
care little for the end results of democracy, that is, the substantive legisla-
tion (and other governmental decisions) produced by it. 
Proceduralist theories differ from one another according to the ways 
in which each believes participation to be morally valuable. Some see 
participation as valuable in itself, as an expression or necessary corollary 
of fundamental moral principles. These I will call deontological 
proceduralist theories, and they come in several colors. Others see par-
ticipation as valuable because it promotes certain beneficial results (but 
not results connected with the substantive decisions produced by par-
ticipatory government). These I will call consequentialist proceduralist the-
ories, and they too appear in more than one variety.34 The two categories 
of proceduralism share a lack of concern with the quality or type of sub-
stantive decisions that democratic government produces; they value that 
form of government on other grounds. 
1. Deontological Proceduralism. - Deontological proceduralism values 
democratic government because of a belief that its participatory process 
is an inherent good. The dominant strain of deontological procedural-
ism is autonomy-based proceduralism, which values individual autonomy 
for its own sake and sees democratic government as a necessary manifes-
tation of that autonomy. Autonomy-based theories hold that individual 
autonomy is promoted to the degree that individuals are allowed to par-
ticipate in shaping the world around them and is retarded to the degree 
that individuals are not allowed to participate in this way. The connec-
tion between individual autonomy and democratic government seems 
rather intuitive, but it will be helpful to examine it a bit here in order to 
demonstrate the crucial role of participation in autonomy-based theories. 
Individual autonomy, or the ability to act free of constraint by 
others-in Kant's words, to "seek [one's] happiness in whatever way 
[one] sees fit"35-has both negative and positive dimensions. Its negative 
aspect is freedom from constraint by others; its positive aspect is freedom 
to shape the conditions under which one lives one's life. Autonomy-
based theories of democracy hold that democratic government promotes 
both dimensions of freedom.36 
34. Compare the distinction I have drawn elsewhere between consequentialist and 
deontological theories of justification. See Christopher J. Peters, Foolish Consistency: On 
Equality, Integrity, and Justice in Stare Decisis, 105 Yale LJ. 2031, 2039-44 (1996). 
35. Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: "This May be True in Theory, but it 
Does Not Apply in Practice," reprinted in Kant: Political Writings 61, 74 (Hans Reiss ed., 
H.B. Nisbet trans., 2d ed. 1991) (1793) [hereinafter Kant, Theory and Practice]. 
36. Of course, something that promotes positive freedom necessarily will also 
promote negative freedom, and vice versa. But it is useful to divide freedom, or autonomy, 
into these two dimensions to demonstrate the nuanced implications of autonomy-based 
theory for participatory government. 
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Democracy can be said to promote negative freedom in two ways. 
First, it ensures that no individual will have disproportionate power over 
her fellow citizens. According to autonomy-based theorists like Locke, 
Rousseau, and Kant, the crucial problem of human interaction without 
government-in what each called "the state of nature"37-was the prob-
lem of one individual's coercion by another without a neutral authority to 
which she could appeal.38 Locke referred to this as the problem of "every 
Man's being Judge in his own Case":39 the strong individual could de-
prive the weak individual of his freedom40 with impunity, because "he 
who was so unjust as to do his Brother an Injury, will scarce be so just as to 
condemn himself for it."41 The cure for "the Inconveniences of the State 
of Nature"42 was, of course, government; but not just any kind of govern-
ment would do. An absolute monarchy, for instance, replicated the 
problems of a state of nature because it allowed one individual-the 
monarch-to serve as judge in his own case.43 What was required was a 
system of government in which all agreed to be bound equally with each 
other-in which, in Kant's words, "no-one can put anyone else under a 
legal obligation without submitting simultaneously to ... be put under 
the same kind of obligation by the other person."44 This system was de-
mocracy-in which every citizen has an equal voice in determining what 
the laws will be.45 
Democracy promotes negative freedom in a second way under au-
tonomy-based theories: it transforms every act of government coercion 
into an act of constraint by the individual's own consent. The essence of 
democracy is that each individual consents to be ruled ''by the will and 
determination of the majority"46_a fair agreement because every individ-
ual has an equal chance of being a member of the majority with respect 
to any given issue. If an individual has consented to rule by the majority, 
37. See, e.g., Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, excerpted in 
Kant: Political Writings, supra note 35, at 93, 97 n* [hereinafter Kant, Perpetual Peace]; 
John Locke, Two Treatises of Government 304, 309-1S (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1963) (1690); Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract 17 (Willmoore 
Kendall ed. & trans., 1954). 
3S. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals § 44, excerpted in Kant: Political 
Writings, supra note 35, at 131, 137-3S [hereinafter Kant, Metaphysics]; Locke, supra note 
37, at 316-17,367-69,374-76; Rousseau, supra note 37. at 6-S, 17. 
39. Locke, supra note 37, at 369. 
40. For Locke, freedom was bound up with the idea of property. See, e.g., id. at 
327-44. 
41. Id. at 316. 
42. Id. 
43. See id. at 317-1S, 369-74. 
44. Kant, Perpetual Peace, supra note 37, at 99 n*; see also Locke, supra note 37, at 
376 ("[E]very Man, by consenting with others to make one Body Politick under one 
Government, puts himself under an Obligation to every one of that Society .... "). 
45. See Kant, Perpetual Peace, supra note 37, at 99 n*; Kant, Theory and Practice, 
supra note 35, at 74-79; Locke, supra note 37, at 374-77. 
46. Locke, supra note 37, at 375 (emphasis omitted). 
326 COLUMBIA LAW REWEW [Vol. 97:312 
she necessarily has consented to whatever particular decisions the major-
ity might make, even if those decisions are harmful to her personal inter-
ests, to what Rousseau called her "private will."47 Thus her freedom is not 
really being restricted by government at all: she has acted autonomously 
in granting her general consent to all specific limitations on her auton-
omy that government may impose in the future.48 
Note that both aspects of democracy's promotion of negative free-
dom incorporate a strong preference for government through participa-
tion over government by fiat. Democracy's allowance of an equal voice to 
each citizen in the creation of the laws supposes that every individual has 
an opportunity to participate in legislation and that no one individual or 
group of individuals is allowed to legislate by ukase. Democracy's produc-
tion of consensual legislation through majority rule supposes that every 
individual, through participation, has the opportunity to be among the 
majority with respect to any given issue and that no one individual or 
group is entitled to permanent majority status. 
The other dimension of autonomy, the positive dimension, is free-
dom to shape the conditions under which one lives one's life. It is fairly 
clear how a system of democratic government can be thought to promote 
this aspect of freedom. Part of an individual's life in a polity always will 
be regulated by government. To the extent the individual can participate 
in determining what this regulation looks like and the circumstances in 
which it will take effect, that individual participates in shaping part of her 
own life. Democracy is a form of government that allows this kind of 
participation; as such, it promotes the positive autonomy derived from 
the ability to shape the conditions of one's life. 
This line of thinking appears most clearly in Kant, who identifies as 
an "a priori principle" the principle of "freedom of every member of soci-
ety as a human being."49 According to Kant, this principle of freedom 
can be expressed in the following formula. No-one can compel 
me to be happy in accordance with his conception of the welfare 
of others, for each may seek his happiness in whatever way he 
sees fit, so long as he does not infringe upon the freedom of 
others to pursue a similar end which can be reconciled with the 
freedom of everyone else within a workable general law .... 50 
This vision encompasses a positive notion of autonomy as freedom affirm-
atively to shape one's life, to "seek ... happiness in whatever way [one] 
sees fit"51 (as well, of course, as a corresponding negative notion of free-
dom from constraint by others). For Kant, self-government actuated this 
47. Rousseau, supra note 37, at 24. 
48. See generally Kant, Metaphysics, supra note 38, §§ 43-49, at 136-43; Kant, Theory 
and Practice, supra note 35, at 79-87; Locke, supra note 37, ch. VIII, §§ 95-122, at 374-94j 
Rousseau, supra note 37, bk. 1, ch. VI, at 17-21j ch. VII, at 22-27j bk. 4, ch. II, at 168-70. 
49. Kant, Theory-and Practice, supra note 35, at 74 (emphasis altered). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
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kind of positive freedom because it permitted each individual to partici-
pate in shaping the rules of conduct that best promoted her own notion 
of happiness. Kant contrasted self-government with '''paternal govern-
ment," or government by "despotism": 
A government might be established on the principle of benevo-
lence towards the people, like that of a father towards his chil-
dren. Under such a paternal government (imperium paternale), the 
subjects, as' immature children who cannot distinguish what is 
truly useful or harmful to themselves, would be obliged to be-
have purely passively and to rely upon the judgement of the 
head of state as to how they ought to be happy, and upon his 
kindness in willing their happiness at all. Such a government is 
the greatest conceivable despotism, i.e. a constitution which sus-
pends the entire freedom of its subjects, who thenceforth have 
no rights whatsoever. 52 
Democracy for Kant, then, was valuable not only as a solution to the prob-
lem of external constraint on freedom, but also as a vehicle for the ex-
pression of positive, internal human freedom-the freedom to "seek hap-
piness" however one chooses, to distinguish for oneself "what is truly 
useful or harmful. "53 
Like democracy's promotion of negative autonomy, its promotion of 
positive autonomy relies upon the availability of individual participation 
in government. Participation is the only way to effect the individual's pos-
itive freedom to shape her own life; its alternative, rule by fiat-no matter 
how benevolent the head of state-denies this freedom because it inevita-
bly treats individuals as "immature children." 
Autonomy-based theories of democracy, then, emphasize how the 
democratic process of government promotes both negative and positive 
dimensions of individual autonomy. This process is valuable in itself be-
cause it allows the governed.to participate in the authorship of the laws 
that govern them. 'For this reason autonomy-based theories are 
proceduralist theories. 
2. Consequentialist Proceduralism. - Consequentialist proceduralism, 
like deontological proceduralism, holds that the participatory process of 
democracy is valuable quite apart from the substantive quality of the deci-
sions produced by that process. Unlike de ontological theorists, however, 
consequentialist theorists do not believe the value of the process is inher-
ent or logically entailed by some fundamental moral principle. Instead, 
they contend that the democratic process is valuable because it produces 
morally valuable effects (but effects having nothing to do with the quality 
of the legislation the process generates). 
Consequentialist proceduralism focuses on the positive influences 
the very process of participatory government is likely to have on individu-
als or on society at large. This strain of theory began with the ancient 
52.Id. 
53.Id. 
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Greeks. In his Politics, for example, Aristotle equated the ideal individual 
with the ideal citizen; the fullest conception of Aristotelian humanity was 
bound up with participation in politics, and as such required a demo-
cratic polity. In a nondemocratic polity there were two kinds of individu-
als, "ruler and ruled," and each required "different sorts of knowledge" in 
order to fulfill his role properly.54 But in a democracy everyone was a 
"citizen," one "who shares in the administration of justice and in the 
holding of office,"55 and thus every individual "should have both sorts of 
knowledge"-that is, that of the ruler and that of the ruled-"and share 
in both."56 Democracy thus encouraged, indeed forced, individuals to 
broaden their understanding, to attain knowledge "from both points of 
view."57 Aristotle also equated the good life with I'well-doing," with "the 
life of action,"5a by which he meant a life connected in some way to polit-
ical activity. Thus democracy, with its processes of participatory govern-
ment, was in the Aristotelian view a means of improving the character of 
the' individual and leading him toward the good life. 
Rousseau, while an autonomy-based theorist in many respects, also 
believed in the consequentialist, humanistic benefits of democratic gov-
ernment. He famously saw majority rule as a mechanism by which the 
majority, faced with a dissenter, could "force him to be free."59 Part of 
what he meant was that the process of participating in democratic delib-
eration could teach the individual to abandon her dprivate will" and 
adopt a concern for the common good-that the individual could be, in 
Carole Pateman's analysis, "'forcibly' educated through participating in 
decisionmaking."6o This is reminiscent of Aristotle's confidence that the 
democratic citizen would be forced to consider things dfrom both points 
of view," that of the private individual and that of the public citizen. 
John Stuart Mill, too, often took this sort of consequentialist ap-
proach to democracy. For Mill, a "[c]riterion of a [g]ood [fJorm of 
[g]overnment" was "how far [it] tend[s] to foster in the members of the 
community the various desirable qualities, ... moral, intellectual, and 
active."61 The good individual for Mill possessed "industry, integrity,jus-
tice, and prudence";62 these "active seJf,.helping" qualities were sub-
merged "by the government of one or a few" but were encouraged, even 
54. Aristotle, The Politics 103-04 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1946). 
55. Id. at 93. 
56. Id. at 104. 
57. Id. at 105. 
58. Id. at 287-89. 
59. Rousseau, supra note 37, at 25. 
60. Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory 26 (1970). 
61. John Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861), reprinted 
in John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representative 
Government 187, 198, 208 (H.B. Acton ed., J. M. Dent & Sons 1972) [hereinafter Mill, 
Representative Government]. 
62. Id. at 201. 
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necessitated, by self-government.63 In a system of self-government the in-
dividual was required to make choices, and "[t]he mental and moral, like 
the muscular powers, are improved only by being used" in this way.64 As 
such, Mill's "ideally best Form of Government" was a democratic one, 
"one in which the whole people participate."65 
As in de ontological theories, participation thus plays a crucial role in 
these kinds of consequentialist theories of democracy. It is the very fact 
of participation that serves to educate and edify the individual, to incul-
cate the right moral values and a sense of the common good. Thus the 
participatory processes of democracy are at least as important as its sub-
stantive results, objectively advantageous though those results might be. 
Results are only part of the story; as Mill sneered, the concept of a "good 
despotism," one that produces good laws, implies "a radical and most per-
nicious misconception of what good government is."66 
A related form of consequentialist proceduralism defends democ-
racy because it indirectly benefits not just individuals, but society at large. 
The best-kno'wn example of this variety of theory is probably 
Tocqueville's.67 For Tocqueville, the benefits of democracy were realized 
"in an imperceptible and almost secret way. . .. [I] ts good qualities 
[were] revealed only in the long run."68 Tocqueville found democracy in 
America to be inefficient, cumbersome, and shortsighted; administration 
was "unstable" and politicians were eminently "corruptible."69 But de-
mocracy worked nonetheless. Its "true advantages," according to 
Tocqueville, were its unintended consequences: 
Democratic freedom does not carry its undertakings through as 
perfectly as an intelligent despotism would ... but in the long 
run it produces more; each thing is less well done, but more 
things are done. Under its sway it is not especially the things 
accomplished by the public administration that are great, but 
rather those things done without its help and beyond its sphere. 
Democracy does not provide a people with the most skillful of 
governments, but it does that which the most skIllful govern-
ments often cannot do: it spreads throughout the body social a 
restless activity, superabundant force, and energy never found 
63. Id. at 231. 
64. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1861), reprinted in Mill, supra note 61, at 69, 126. 
65. Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 217, 234. Carole Pateman 
describes the participatory nature of both Rousseau's and Mill's conceptions of democracy 
in Pateman, supra note 60, at 22-35. 
66. Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 217. 
67. My discussion of Tocqueville's theory here follows the much more extensive 
treatment in Stephen Holmes, Tocqueville and Democracy, in The Idea of Democracy 23 
(David Copp et al. eds., 1993). 
68. Tocqueville, supra note 29, at 231. 
69. Id. at 196-230; see also Holmes, supra note 67, at 26-29 (canvassingTocqueville's 
identification of defects inherent to American democracy). 
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elsewhere, which, however little favored by circumstance, can do 
wonders.70 · , 
Democracy for Tocqueville was a good thing, that is, because it ener-
gized "the body social," producing in tum a prosperity and abundance 
impossible in nondemocratic regimes. And this energy came from the 
very process of participatory politics. As Stephen Holmes summarizes 
Tocqueville's views, "[b]y electing their rulers and indirectly making their 
laws, democratic citizens produce mediocre governance and shoddy legis-
lation. But they simultaneously transform themselves into more ener-
getic and active individuals .... "71 The zeal for political activity gener-
ated in the individual by democratic government, the enthusiasm for 
shaping the conditions of one's life through politics, transferred readily 
to the private realm, generating vigorous activity and enlightenment. "It 
is ... not the elected magistrate who makes ... democracy prosper, but 
the fact that the magistrates are elected."72 
There are other, similar consequentialistjustifications of democracy. 
Democracy has been thought, for instance, to protect against the rise of 
tyranny by encouraging citizens' awareness of public affairs7s and to avoid 
violent factionalism by allowing citizens to "blow off steam" through elec-
toral participation.74 Any theory that, like these, values participatory gov-
ernment as a means of producing good effects aside from the substantive 
legislation it generates is a consequentialist theory as I conceive them 
here. Like deontological proceduralists, consequentialists favor govern-
ment through participation over rule by fiat, although they do so for 
somewhat less obvious reasons. They care little about the quality of the 
legislation produced by democracy; indeed, with Tocqueville, they might 
believe democracy to be particularly ineffective in this regard. But they 
find it valuable nonetheless . 
. B. Functionalism: Legitimacy Through Results 
Democracy means government by discussion .... 
Clement Attlee75 
70. Tocqueville, supra note 29, at 244. 
71. Holmes, supra note 67, at 34. 
72. Tocqueville, supra note 29, at 512. Another, somewhat less important beneficial 
side effect of participatory government was, according to Tocqueville, that it encouraged 
respect for and obedience to the law. Se~ id. at 240-41. 
73. See David Copp, Could Political Truth Be a Hazard for Democracy?, in The Idea 
of Democracy, supra note 67, at 101, 112; Holmes, supra note 67, at 32-33. 
74. See Holmes, supra note 67, at 31-32 (describing Tocqueville's views to this 
effect). 
75. Clement Atdee, Speech at Oxford Uune 14, 1957), quoted in Lord Atdee on Art 
of Being Prime Minister, Times (London), June 15, 1957, at 4. My use of this quotation is 
somewhat disingenuous: Atdee's full statement was "Democracy means government by 
discussion, but it is only effective if you can stop people talking." Id. 
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Wholly apart from any proceduralist arguments, the legitimacy of 
democratic government also might be traced to the quality of the sub-
stantive decisions which that form of government is thought to produce. 
Democratic government can be valued because it generates legislation 
through a process of reasoned deliberation and negotiation among a 
wide variety of viewpoints and interests, thus increasing the likelihood 
that its laws truly will serve the common good in comparison with, say, 
laws generated by a single homogeneous elite. This kind of justification 
of democracy can be found in strong form in, among other places, the 
thought of our own Founders, particularly Madison and Jefferson; the 
writings of our eclectic friend John Stuart Mill and of John Dewey; and 
the descriptions of "deliberative democracy" espoused in its most articu-
late form by the contemporary constitutional scholar eass Sunstein. 
The basic reasons why democracy is thought to function well as sub-
stantive government, to produce decisions of high quality, are inter-
twined with and dependent upon one another. They are, respectively, 
that democracy allocates decisionmaking power to those most interested 
in the decisions; that it allows a diversity of interests to assert themselves 
in government; that it permits the participation of the most talented deci-
sionmakers in government; and that it produces decisions through a pro-
cess of reasoned deliberation. As we shall see, each of these reasons, like 
proceduralist theories, relies upon the participatory nature of democracy. 
1. Allocation of Decisionmaking Power. - The functionalist argument 
from the proper allocation of decisionmaking power begins with the 
premise that the best decisionmakers are those individuals whose inter-
ests will be affected by the decisions. AsJohn Stuart Mill put it, the "prop-
osition-that each is the only safe guardian of his own rights and inter-
ests-is one of those elementary maxims of prudence, which every person 
... implicitly acts upon."76 John Dewey similarly described the demo-
cratic ideal as in part "the conception of a social harmony of interests in 
which the achievement by each individual of his own freedom shoult;! 
contribute to a like perfecting of the powers of all,"77 and proclaimed 
that "[p]ers<?nal responsibility[] [and] individual initiation ... are the 
notes of democracy."78 "The man who wears the shoe," wrote Dewey, 
"knows best that it pinches and where it pinches."79 
From this premise, that the individual is the best "guardian of his 
own rights and interests," springs the idea of participatory government. 
76. Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 224. 
77. John Dewey, Intelligence and Morals, in Ethics (1908), reprinted in John Dewey: 
The Political Writings 66, 69 (Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro eds., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1993) 
[hereinafter Dewey, Writings]. 
78. John Dewey, The Ethics of Democracy, in The Early Works (1967), reprinted in 
Dewey, Writings, supra note 77, at 59, 61. 
79. John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, reprinted in 2John Dewey: The Later 
Works 1925-1953, at 235, 364 (Io Ann Boydston ed., S. DI. Univ. Press 1984) (1927) 
[hereinafter Dewey, The Public]. 
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If each individual knows best how to protect her interests, then the way to 
ensure that government decisions will protect the interests of as many 
individuals as possible is to involve those individuals in the making of 
those decisions. Any other system of government is likely to go wrong 
because it necessarily involves decisionmaking by one person or group of 
people about the interests of others, and, in Mill's words, "no intention, 
however sincere, of protecting the interests of others can make it safe or 
salutary to tie up their own hands."80 But participatory government over 
individuals is government "by their own hands";81 as such, it is govern-
ment by those best able to govern. It is, on this view, simply a matter of 
government by the most qualified. 
Herbert Spencer neatly articulated the allocation of power argument 
in favor of democracy: 
The rationale of the matter is simple enough. Manifestly, on the 
average of cases, a man will protect his own interests more solici-
tously than others will protect them for him. Manifestly, where 
regulations have to be made affecting the interests of several 
men, they are most likely to be equitably made when all those 
concerned are present, and have equal shares in the making of 
them .... The general principle is that the welfare of all will be 
most secure when each looks after his own welfare; and the prin-
ciple is carried out as directly as the circumstances permit. 82 
On this view, democracy improves the decisionmaking competence of 
government by constituting it so that it operates through the mechanism 
of "each [individual] look[ing] after his own welfare." Participatory deci-
sionmaking shifts power to those best equipped to use it: the individuals 
who will be affected by the decisions. 
Note the functionalist emphasis of this argument. The point is not 
simply to leave individuals as much as possible to their own devices; it is to 
produce the best substantive governance for all, to ensure "that the wel-
fare of all will be most secure,"83 that the common good will be served. 
For Mill this meant "Progress";84 for Dewey it meant an ongoing process 
of experimentation producing successively greater quantities of social 
harmony.85 Note also the distinction between the functionalist argument 
from allocation of decisionmaking power and the consequentialist ver-
80. Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 226. 
81. Id. 
82. Herbert Spencer, Representative Government-What Is It Good For?, in The 
Man Versus the State 331, 375 (LibertyClassics 1981) (1892). 
83.Id. 
84. See Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 200-06. 
85. See John Dewey, Creative Democracy: The Task Before Us, reprinted in Dewey, 
Writings, supra note 77, at 240 [hereinafter Dewey, Creative Democracy]; Dewey, supra 
note 77, at 66-76;John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action, reprinted in 11 John Dewey: 
The Later Works 1925-1953, at I, 41-65 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., S. III. Univ. Press 1987) 
(1935) [hereinafter Dewey, Liberalism]; John Dewey, The Economic Basis of the New 
Society, reprinted in Dewey, Writings, supra note 77, at 169; Dewey, The Public, supra note 
79, at 351-72. 
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sions of proceduralism we examined above: Where those proceduralist 
theories focused upon the indirect, nonpolitical benefits of the very pro-
cess of participatory government-its development of individual charac-
ter, its invigoration of society-the argument from allocation of power 
focuses on the substantive legislative benefits likely to arise from democ-
racy, on the quality of the political decisionmaking democracy is suited to 
produce. 
2. Assertion of a Diversity of Interests. - Closely related to the argu-
ment from allocation of power is the argument from diversity of interests. 
In a democracy, the argument goes, better government decisions will be 
produced than in a system of rule by the few because, simply, more voices 
will be heard in the decisionmaking process. The element of broad par-
ticipation in decisionmaking ensures that a variety of interests and view-
points will be represented. This in turn increases the odds that the result-
ing decisions will truly serve the common gOOd-by avoiding the effects 
of shortsightedness, serving more than merely the interests of narrow fac-
tions of society, appreciating and addressing a variety of interlocking is-
sues, and so on. 
The argument was famously expressed by Madison in The Federalist 
No. 10. Arguing in favor of a large, diverse democracy, Madison asserted: 
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct 
parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties 
and interests, the more frequently will a mcyority be found of 
the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals com-
posing a mcyority, and the smaller the compass within which 
they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute 
their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere and you take in a 
greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable 
that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to in-
vade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive 
exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their 
own strength and to act in unison with each other.86 
Here Madison emphasized the checking function of diversity: The partic-
ipation in government of "distinct parties and interests" ensured that gov-
ernment decisions would serve the common good rather than any narrow 
"plans of oppression" devised by self-interested factions. Mill saw some-
what more positive advantages to diversity. For him, the point was less to 
avoid the dominance of factions than to allow every voice to be heard and 
to contribute to the debate about the common good: 
I know not how a representative assembly can more usefully em-
ploy itself than in talk, when the subject of talk.is the great pub-
lic interests of the country, and every sentence of it represents 
the opinion either of some important body of persons in the 
nation, or of an individual in whom some such body have re-
posed their confidence. A place where every interest and shade 
86. The Federalist No. 10, at 127 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
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of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately 
pleaded ... is in itself, if it answered no other purpose, one of 
the most important political institutions that can exist anywhere, 
and one of the foremost benefits of free government. 87 
Similarly, Dewey saw democracy as a process of identifying "more numer-
ous and more varied points of shared common interest"88-as contribut-
ing to a better understanding of the common interest through the partic-
ipation of a variety of individual interests. In a democracy, experts might 
make the particular decisions, but "the masses . . . have the chance to 
inform the experts as to their needs;"89 the political processes of par-
ticipatory government "involve a consultation and discussion which un-
cover social needs and troubles. "90 
The functionalist argument from diversity of interests thus takes the 
argument from allocation of power one step further. It recognizes not 
only that the functionally best government is self:.government-because 
the interested party knows best what her interests are and how to serve 
them-but also that overarching social policy, because it must address a 
variety of concerns, is best made by taking into account a variety of indi-
vidual interests. The argument values participatory government not only 
because it confers decisionmaking power on those affected by decisions, 
but because it confers power on everyone affected by decisions. 
3. Participation of Talented Decisionmakers. - A third functionalist ar-
gument in favor of democracy is that it permits the most able and tal-
ented members of society to participate in making social decisions. Part 
of this argument is simply the argument from diversity rom a different 
angle: In allowing the participation in government, through suffrage, of 
the entire spectrum of individuals affected by government, democracy 
also allows those individuals possessing special capacities for policymak-
ing to influence the decisional process. Thus Mill extolled democracy as 
an organisation of some part of the good qualities existing in 
the individual members of the community for the conduct of its 
collective affairs. A representative constitution is a means of 
bringing ... the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest mem-
bers, more directly to bear upon the government, and investing 
them with greater influence in it, than they would in general 
have under any other mode of organisation.91 
Indeed, Mill favored improving democracy by allowing the votes of "wiser 
and better men" to count for more than the votes of others, with occupa-
tion and education serving as the tests of wisdom and virtue. 92 
87. Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 259. 
88. John Dewey, The Democratic Conception in Education, reprinted in Dewey, 
Writings, supra note 77, at 110, 110. 
89. Dewey, supra note 79, at 365. 
90. Id. at 364. 
91. Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 209-10. 
92. Id. at 306-14. 
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Dewey similarly viewed democracy as a means of allowing the particu-
lar talents of individuals to influence government, although he did not 
endorse Mill's suggestion of plural voting. For Dewey, democracy was "a 
claim that every human being as an individual may be the best for some 
particular purpose and hence be the most fitted to rule, to lead, in that 
specific respect."93 As such, it stood in stark contrast to aristocratic gov-
ernment, which "always limits the range of men who are regarded as par-
ticipating in the state."94 In this sense, participatory government was ef-
fective not only because it incorporated a wide variety of views in the 
decisionmaking process, but because it incorporated a wide variety of tal-
ents as well. 
This aspect of the argument from participation of talent thus focuses 
on the base of the decisionmaking pyramid, on the incorporation into 
government of individual talent through the process of universal suffrage. 
A second aspect of the argument focuses on the top of the pyramid, on 
the individuals actually elected to public office. It holds that democracy 
is likely to produce better decisions because it allows its statesmen and 
policymakers to be selected on the basis of merit rather than birth, 
wealth, or some other arbitrary criterion. Thomas Jefferson gave charac-
teristically eloquent voice to this position in a letter to his friend and rival 
John Adams: 
I agree with you that there is a natural aristocracy among men. 
The grounds of this are virtue and talents. Formerly bodily pow-
ers gave place among the aristoi .... There is also an artificial 
aristocracy founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue 
or talents . . . . The natural aristocracy I consider as the most 
precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, and gov-
ernment of society. . . . May we not even say that that form of 
government is the best which provides the most effectually for a 
pure selection of these natural aristoi into the offices of govern-
ment? The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in 
government, and provision should be made to prevent it's [sic] 
ascendency .... 
I think the best remedy is exactly that provided by all our 
constitutions, to leave to the citizens the free election and sepa-
ration of the aristoi from the pseudo-aristoi, of the wheat from 
the chaff. In general they will elect the real good and wise.95 
Mill similarly saw democracy as a means of promoting meritocratic 
government but, in a typically reformist mood, thought that a system of 
proportional representation was necessary to ensure it.96 
93. John Dewey, Individuality, Equality and Superiority (1992), reprinted in Dewey, 
Writings, supra note 77, at 77,77-78. 
94. John Dewey, The Ethics of Democracy, reprinted in Dewey, Writings, supra note 
77, at 59, 61. 
95. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in Jefferson, 
Writings, supra note 12, at 1304, 1305-06. 
96. See Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 277-93. 
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The functionalist argument from participation of talent thus values 
participatory government for two related reasons. It holds that broad 
participation through suffrage ensures the contribution of individual tal-
ent to the pursuit of the common good. And it posits that participatory 
suffrage promotes the selection of officials based upon merit and not 
upon wealth, birth, or other criteria that are irrelevant to good 
lawmaking. 
4. Decisionmaking Through Reasoned Deliberation. - A final functional-
ist argument in favor of democratic government, one that relies to a great 
extent upon the previous three, is that it forces government decisions 
ultimately to be made not upon the basis of individual interests or "naked 
preferences" but through a process of reasoned deliberation, of interplay 
among a variety of ideas and viewpoints and eventual agreement on the 
best course of action. This argument from deliberation incorporates the 
ideas of allocation of power to interested individuals, diversity of interests, 
and participation of talented decisionmakers into a theory about the na-
ture of both electoral and representative decisionmaking. The theory 
holds that antithesis ultimately produces a better consensus, that the 
clash of differing, even opposing interests and ideas in the process of 
decisionmaking, because it forces proponents of each position to present 
reasoned arguments in favor of it, creates decisions that are better for 
having been subjected to this trial by fire. Thus better representatives are 
elected when the election is hotly contested, and better laws are enacted 
following vigorous parliamentary debate. 
Cass Sun stein is perhaps the most influential contemporary expo-
nent of this theory of deliberative democracy. He states the argument 
this way: 
[A] large point of the system [of representative democracy] is to 
ensure discussion and debate among people who are genuinely 
different in their perspectives and position, in the interest of 
creating a process through which reflection will encourage the 
emergence of general truths. A distinctive feature of American 
republicanism is extraordinary hospitality toward disagreement 
and heterogeneity, rather than fear of it. The framers believed 
that a diversity of opinion would be a creative and productive 
force .... 
. . . Public deliberation may reveal the truth or falsity of 
factual claims about the state of the world or about the likely 
effects of policy proposals. Through confrontation among peo-
ple who disagree, errors of fact may be revealed as such.97 
97. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech 241-43 (1993) 
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter Sunstein, Democracy]. For a similar exegesis of Professor 
Sunstein's views on delibt.rative democracy, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 
17-39 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Constitution]. 
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Sunstein's version of deliberative democracy draws upon the thought 
of the American Founders, who similarly believed in the power of discus-
sion and deliberation in a representative democracy,98 and of John 
Dewey,99 who in his later writings strongly emphasized democracy's delib-
erative component. Dewey-who, as we have already seen, was fond of 
broad, quotable aphorisms about what "democracy is"-saw democracy as 
in part the method of "persuasion through public discussion carried on 
not only in legislative halls but in the press, private conversations and 
public assemblies."loo It was "[t]he substitution of ballots for bullets, of 
the right to vote for the lash ... [of] the method of discussion for the 
method of coercion."IOI The "democratic faith" was, for Dewey, a "faith 
in the possibility of conducting disputes, controversies and conflicts as 
cooperative undertakings in which both parties learn by giving the other 
a chance to express itself."102 The process of deliberation had to be more 
than merely a clash of competing viewpoints; it had to be characterized 
by reasons offered by either side, by "science" and "intelligence."103 But 
when these conditions were present, deliberation produced better deci-
sions not only from the legislature, but from the electorate itself: "[T] he 
act of voting is in a democratic regime a culmination of a continued pro-
cess of open and public communication in which prejudices have the op-
portunity to erase each other; ... [and] continued interchange of facts 
and ideas exposes what is unsound and discloses what may make for 
human well-being."104 
The functionalist argument from deliberation thus relies upon the 
participation of a diversity of affected interests ,to produce government 
decisions that account for and synthesize those interests through a 
method of reasoned discussion, of eliminating prejudice and blind self-
interest, exposing error, and producing consensus. It favors participatory 
government over government by fiat because, simply, the former is more 
likely to get it right. lOS 
98. See Sunstein, Constitution, supra note 97, at 20-24; Sunstein, Democracy, supra 
note 97, at 242 (citing The Federalist No. 10 (James Madison), No. 81 (Alexander 
Hamilton) ). 
99. See, e.g., Sunstein, Democracy, supra note 97, at 248 & n.17. 
100. John Dewey, Democracy and Human Nature (1939), reprinted in Dewey, 
Writings, supra note 77, at 219, 228. 
101. Id. 
102. Dewey, Creative Democracy, supra note 85, at 243. 
103. Dewey, Liberalism, supra note 85, at 50-51. 
104. John Dewey, John Dewey Responds (1950), reprinted in Dewey, Writings, supra 
note 77, at 246, 248. 
105. Of course, we may have reason to suspect that visions of democracy as 
characteristically deliberative might on occasion be overly optimistic. Public choice theory, 
for example, has called into question the model of democratic politics as a process of 
reasoned deliberation and compromise among a variety of equally motivated, equally 
powerful interests. See, e.g., Russell Hardin, Public Choice Versus Democracy, in The Idea 
of Democracy, supra note 67, at 157 (summarizing public choice critique of democ~cy); 
cf. Thomas Christiano, Social Choice and Democracy, in The Idea of Democracy, supra 
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C. Participation and Representation 
[M]anifestly, where those concerned are so numerous and so 
dispersed, that it is physically impossible for them all to take part 
in the framing of ... regulations, the next best thing is for citi-
zens in each locality to appoint one of their number to speak for 
them, to care for their claims, to be their representative. 
Herbert SPencer106 
[I]t may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the 
representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the 
public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, con-
vened for the purpose. 
The"Federalist No. 10 (James Madison)1°7 
If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of Representatives 
from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves and a 
particular class of society? I answer: the genius of the whole 
system .... 
The Federalist No. 57 (James Madison)1°B 
We have seen, then, how both proceduralist and functionalist theo-
ries of democracy value the individual's participation in government. 
Proceduralists value participation for its own sake; they hold that the abil-
ity of the governed to participate in government decisionmaking gives 
expression to fundamental values or serves important ends. In contrast, 
functionalists value participation because they believe that a participatory 
process of decisionmaking generates decisions that are substantively bet-
ter than those that would be generated by a process of decisionmaking by 
fiat. 
But, referenda and the occasional New England town meeting aside, 
we do not have a system of direct public participation in lawmaking in 
place in the United States. Instead we have a system of representative 
government. In our system, most citizens "participate" in government 
only at the polls, by voting for representatives who then convene and 
make the laws. How does this square with th~ emphasis placed by both 
proceduralist and functionalist strains of democratic theory upon par-
ticipatory government? 
That question, as the first two quotations opening this section sug-
gest, has been answered in two different ways. To an extent, how it is 
answered depends upon whether one's justification of democracy is 
note 67, at 173 (defending democracy against public choice critique). But the point of the 
argument from reasoned deliberation is not that democracy always functions perfectly (or 
even particularly well) in this regard; it is, rather, that democracy typically functions better 
in this regard than other forms of government, like dictatorship or oligarchy. 
106. Spencer, supra note 82, at 375. 
107. The Federalist No. 10, at 126 Games Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
108. The Federalist No. 57, at 345 Games Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
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proceduralist or functionalist, but this need not be so. Both approaches 
justify the institution of political representation as a solution to a prob-
lem; the approaches differ in their identification of the problem. 
By the first approach, representation is necessary to solve the simple 
problem of the unwieldiness, in Spencer's terms, the "physical[] imp os-
sib [ility] ,"109 of rule by direct popular democracy in a large and populous 
state. Because it is a practical impossibility for every citizen of the United 
States to vote on every legislative issue, the next-best procedure is for 
every citizen to vote for a representative, with the winning representatives 
voting on every legislative issue. The principle of participation is imple-
mented by proxy, "as directly as the circumstances permit."110 The values 
attached to or served by participation are, as we shall see in the next 
section, preserved by the fact that everyone may participate in deciding 
who will represent them and in replacing those people if they do not 
represent well. 
By the second approach, representation is necessary to solve the 
problems of lawmaking quality that would arise from direct popular de-
mocracy, even assuming that form of government to be practically feasi-
ble. Madison's argument in The Federalist No. 10 exemplifies this position. 
In Madison's view, direct democracy would be susceptible to the "mis-
chiefs of faction"lll and the ebb and flow of momentary passions. 
"[S] own in the nature of man" was "[a] zeal for different opinions" that 
"divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and 
rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other than 
to co-operate for the common good."1l2 The conduct of government 
through representatives partially solved these problems by requiring that 
popular opinions flow through the temperate filter of calm, experienced 
intermediaries before becoming law. As Madison wrote: 
The effect of the ... difference [between direct democracy 
and representative government] is ... to refine and enlarge the 
public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen 
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true inter-
est of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will 
be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial 
considerations. 113 
In this second view, representative government also solves another 
problem inherent in a direct democracy: the problem of amateurism. 
"No man," wrote Madison in The Federalist No. 53, "can be a competent 
legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound judg-
ment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to 
109. Spencer, supra note 82, at 375. 
110. Id. 
111. The Federalist No. 10, at 126 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
112. Id. at 124. 
113. Id. at 126. 
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legislate."1l4 Everyday citizens, of course, have such knowledge with re-
spect to their own particular spheres of interest, but with respect to other 
subjects they are lost. And everyday citizens have everyday lives; they can-
not be bothered to become experts on every subject of potential legisla-
tion. An elected body of representatives, serving for a reasonable amount 
of time before standing for reelection, solves these problems: Each legis-
lator has the time and motive to become reasonably acquainted with 
every subject upon which legislation must be passed. 
The first justification of representation discussed above fits best with 
a proceduralist rather than a functionalist view of democracy, because it 
considers actual participation in legislation to be the ideal and represen-
tation as a necessary second-best alternative. A functionalist could, of 
course, also hold such a view, although the second type of justification, 
focusing as it does on the quality of substantive legislation produced by 
the different forms of democracy, accords more with functionalism. The 
key point is simply that adherents of both types of democratic theory, 
proceduralist and functionalist, can accept constructive participation in 
legislation through representation as a legitimate form of democratic self-
government, and as an adequate (or even superior) substitute for direct 
participation itself. Both types of theory demand personal, individual 
participation only in the selection of the lawmakers, not in the actual 
authorship of the laws. 
It is one thing, however, to recognize the necessity of representative 
government; it is another to make sure that it works in a democratic way. 
The mechanisms by which we do so in our system of representative de-
mocracy are generally so well known as to require little comment; they 
are the stuff of a high school civics class. The people, we know, can 
choose their representatives and can replace them periodically with 
others if the quality of representation is deemed inadequate. They have 
the power of electoral coercion, and this power is a strong incentive indeed 
to legislative responsibility. This is why, in Madison's understated phrase, 
electing our representatives is "the characteristic policy of republican 
government."l15 
But in addition to simple electoral coercion, there is a second, re-
lated element of our representative system that is often overlooked. 
Through the power of the vote, the people in a representative democracy 
have the ability to promote interest representation: They can select as repre-
sentatives people who, because they have certain key similarities with 
their constituents, will be independently likely to act in the constituents' 
interests. Interest representation is important in its own right as a mecha-
nism of representative government, from both a proceduralist and a func-
tionalist perspective. -
114. The Federalist No. 53, at 328 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
115. The Federalist No. 57. at 343 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed •• 1987). 
1997] ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENTATION 341 
Let us look briefly at these twin mechanisms, electoral coercion and 
interest representation. In doing so, we will examine representative gov-
ernment first from a proceduralist and then from a functionalist perspec-
tive. The point will be to demonstrate how representative government 
operates to meet the concerns of both proceduralist and functionalist 
theorists of democracy. 
1. Electoral Coercion 
a. Proceduralist Legitimacy. - From a proceduralist standpoint, legiti-
macy in a system of representative democracy like that in the United 
States is achieved in part because citizens have the ability freely to choose 
their legislators and to replace them periodically by election. This mech-
anism of electoral control provides an incentive for legislators to act in 
accordance with citizens' wishes, that is, to enact the sorts of laws that 
citizens want enacted: 
[Representatives] will be compelled to anticipate the moment 
when their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be 
reviewed, and when they must descend to the level from which 
they were raised; there forever to remain unless a faithful dis-
charge of their trust shall have established their title to a re-
newal of it.H6 
The electoral mechanism also allows the people to repair the effects of 
inadequate representation by replacing legislators who fail to legislate 
well with new legislators who then can enact better laws. (This latter 
function is really one of electoral remediation, not electoral coercion, but 
it is tightly bound up with the coercive premise of elections.) 
Of course, it is a matter of continuing controversy whether legislative 
representatives should be guided primarily by the "wishes" or "prefer-
ences" of their constituents, by the ''best interests" of their constituents 
despite their expressed preferences, by the good of the state or the na-
tion as a whole, by some combination of these standards, or indeed by 
some different standard or standards altogether.1l7 But regardless of 
how elected representatives ideally should act on behalf of their constitu-
ents, the democratic system of electoral control ensures that the people 
have the ability to replace legislators whom they see to be acting improp-
erly (by whatever standard the constituents choose to apply). This fact of 
electoral control means that the laws produced by the elected legislators 
can in a real sense be said to have been created through a system of citi-
zen participation. 
b. Functionalist Legitimacy. - Electoral coercion is important on a 
functionalist view as well. Like proceduralism, functionalism relies upon 
a close correspondence between the actions of the legislative representa-
tive and the vie~oints and interests of her constituents. Without such a 
116. Id. at 344-45. 
117. For an indispensible survey of various views on the proper role of the 
representative in a democracy, see Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 
144-240 (1967). 
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close correspondence, the functional values served by citizen participa-
tion in government cannot be served; the diversity of viewpoints and in-
terests in the body politic at large will not accurately be translated into 
legislation unless each legislator accurately represents the views and inter-
ests of her constituency in the legislative debate. So,just as electoral coer-
cion preserves the procedural values of participation by giving each citi-
zen indirect influence over the content of the laws, it preserves the 
functional values of participation by conducting the interests and ideas of 
the people "through the medium"118 of their representatives. 
2. Interest Representation 
a. Proceduralist Legitimacy. - Besides bare electoral control, there is 
another important, related aspect of representative democracy that allows 
the electorate to control or consent to legislation (and thus is legitimate 
according to proceduralist theories). We tend to expect our legislative 
representatives to have something in common with us-to share some of 
our central characteristics and thus, presumably, some of our interests. 119 
That is, we expect our representatives to serve us conscientiously not only 
because they desire reelection but also because they are like us in some 
fundamental ways and because, thanks to this fundamental likeness, their 
interests and ours to some important degree coincide. 
Recognition of this fact of political life, this affinity for representa-
tives that remind us of ourselves, partly explains the practice of so-called 
"racial gerrymandering" of electoral districts to allow ethnically or racially 
homogeneous communities the opportunity to send "one of their own" 
to the state capitol or to Washington. It also largely underlies recent pro-
posals by theorists like Lani Guinier to move beyond "black single-mem-
ber districts" and establish a system of "proportionate interest representa-
tion" that would ensure the presence in government of a proportionately 
"fair" number of minority representatives and thus guarantee that the 
true interests of minorIty groups are not overlooked in legislation.120 In-
deed, the desire for a bond of interest between the representative and 
her constituency is displayed every time we vote for a candidate because 
her stand "on the issues" is similar to ours. If we viewed elections only as 
tools of incentive and coercion, we would care little whom we elected. 
The fact that we prefer one candidate to the next presupposes a concern 
for kinship of interests. 
In other words, part of the point of democratically electing legislative 
representatives is not simply to provide an incentive for them to act in 
ways we find satisfactory and to replace them if they fail to do so, but also 
to allow people to elect representatives likely to look out for their constit-
uents' interests even aside from the coercive force of the polls. Incorpo-
118. The Federalist No. 10, at 126 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
119. I mean "interests" in the sense not of avocations or enthusiasms but of desires, 
preferences, benefits, or advantages. See Pitkin, supra note 117, at 60-91, 168-89. 
120. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the 
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077, 1134-53 (1991). 
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rated ,vithin a proceduralist theory of democracy, then, is the idea of in-
terest representation-of legislators who truly represent our interests, not 
merely because they desire reelection, but because our interests are their 
interests, too. The idea of interest representation reflects a faith not only 
in the power of electoral coercion, but also in the power of electoral 
affinity. 
Note the distinction beuveen interest representation in the sense in 
which I mean it here and the broader kind of interest representation that 
is promoted by a bare mechanism of electoral coercion. Electoral coer-
cion operates to encourage representatives to "represent" the "interests" 
of their constituents by threatening the representatives \vith unemploy-
ment if they do not do so. As such, electoral coercion works precisely 
because the interests of the representative are unique; they are her inter-
ests qua representative, that is, her interests in getting reelected. By con-
trast, the kind of interest representation I describe here encourages rep-
resentatives to act in the interests of their constituents precisely because 
the representative's interests are not unique. Interest representation op-
erates because the representative's interests are the same as the interests 
of a majority of her constituents; they are her interests qua private citizen. 
Thus what I call (follmving a long tradition) interest representation 
might better be thought of as "representation through interest con-
gruity." Its unique element is not the representation of the constituents' 
interests, which also is promoted by bare ,electoral coercion. Its unique 
element, rather, is the harmony it embodies bet\Veen the constituents' 
interests and the representative's own interests as private citizen. 
Although interest representation and electoral coercion are distinct 
in this way, however, tlfey are far from incompatible. The goal of both 
devices is the same: to ensure that representatives act according to the 
interests of a majority of their constituents. Electoral coercion promotes 
this goal by giving legislatures unique incentives to act in this way, while 
interest representation promotes this goal by selecting legislators \vith the 
same incentives to act in this way that their constituents have. And both 
mechanisms can be implemented simultaneously through the electoral 
process. In voting for a representative, we are telling her to act in our 
interests under threat of losing her job; we also are selecting the repre-
sentative we believe is most likely to represent our interests even absent 
this threat. As such, interest representation serves in a representative de-
mocracy as a complement, and perhaps as a supplement, to electoral 
coercion. 
The idea of interest representation recalls the theory of "virtual rep-
resentation" most closely associated \vith Edmund Burke. Burke's theory 
held that constituencies could legitimately be represented by legislators 
poss~ssing "a communion of interests and a sympathy in feelings and 
desires" ,vith their constituents even if the representatives were not actu-
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ally elected by the people said to be represented.121 For Burke, virtual 
representation was 
in many cases even better than the actual. It possesses most of 
its advantages, and is free from many of its inconveniences; it 
corrects the irregularities in the literal representation, when the 
shifting current of human affairs or the acting of public interests 
in different ways carry it obliquely from its first line of direction. 
The people may err in their choice; but common interest and 
common sentiment are rarely mistaken.122 
The American Framers shared Burke's notion of interest representa-
tion, although they appreciated that interest representation is better real-
ized when representatives are more than virtual-when they are in fact 
chosen by those they may be said to represent, whom we presume to be 
the best judges of just whose interests coincide with their own.123 "Differ-
ent interests," wrote Madison, "necessarily exist in different classes of citi-
zens,"124 and "[i] t is a sound and important principle that the representa-
tive ought to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his 
constituents."125 And how better to become "acquainted with" one's con-
stituents' interests and circumstances than to share those interests and 
circumstances oneself? Thus the fact that the representatives 
can make no law which will not have its full operation on them-
selves and their friends, as well as the great mass of society ... 
creates between [the representative and the constituent] that 
communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments of which 
few governments have furnished examples; but without which 
every government degenerates into tyranny.126 
Today we may not share Madison's faith that "interests" are so easily 
definable in the abstract or so readily equatable with "different classes of 
citizens." But we retain his insight, and Burke's, that when representa-
tives share with their constituents "a communion of interests and a sym-
pathy in feelings and desires,"127 those representatives are more likely 
than aloof, disconnected agents to recognize and respond to the true 
needs of the constituency. This indeed is part and parcel of the 
121. Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe, M.P. Gan. 3, 1792), 
excerpted in Burke's Politics 477, 494 (RossJ.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1959). 
122. Id. at 494-95. 
123. Indeed, even Burke recognized that "virtual representation cannot have a long 
or sure existence if it has not a substratum in the actual. The memher must have some 
relation to the constituent." Id. at 495. 
124. The Federalist No. 51, at 321 Games Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
125. The Federalist No. 56, at 339 Games Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
126. The Federalist No. 57, at 345 Games Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
127. Letter from Edmund Burke to Sir Hercules Langrishe, supra note 121, at 494. 
Burke's language here seems lifted almost verbatim from The Federalist No. 57, in which 
Madison claimed that the members of the House of Representatives would share with their 
constituents a "communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments." The Federalist No. 
57, at 345 Games Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
1997] ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENTATION 345 
proceduralist view of representative legislation and its corresponding 
faith in the legitimacy of that institution.I28 
b. Functionalist Legitimacy. - A crucial difference between 
proceduralist and functionalist theories of democracy is that functionalist 
theories require the legislator at critical moments to exercise her own 
independent judgment, at least partially unfettered by the expressed 
wishes of her constituents. This is necessary to actuate the "deliberation" 
component of deliberative democracy; legislators strictly bound by the 
wishes of their constituents cannot engage in the process of negotiation, 
compromise, and persuasion that is required to produce reasoned legisla-
tion. In the words of Roger Sherman, arguing in the first Congress 
against incorporation in the Bill of Rights of a "right to instruct" 
representatives: ' 
I think, when the people have chosen a representative, it is his 
duty to meet others from the different parts of the Union, and 
consult, and agree with them to such acts as are for the general 
benefit of the whole community. If they were to be guided by 
instructions, there would be no use in deliberation.129 
Similarly, Burke told his own constituents: 
Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judg-
ment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to 
your opinion. 
. . . If government were a matter of will upon any side, 
yours, without question, ought to be superior. But government 
and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of 
inclination; and what sort of reason is that in which the determi-
nation precedes the discussion ... ?130 
Functionalist theories of democracy, then, require more of the legis-
lator than mere obedience to the whims of her constituents. Functional-
ist theories require that a legislator, while representing those distinct in-
terests and viewpoints that comprise the particular contribution of her 
constituency to the broader debate, at the same time enter that debate 
with an open mind and a willingness to exercise her own unencumbered 
judgment. In essence, functionalist theories require the legislator to act 
not as her constituents have told her to act, but as her constituents would 
act if presented with all of the information and opposing arguments avail-
able to the legislator.13I 
128. As Steven Winter has written, "we ordinarily expect those who share our interests 
and our trust-whether intimate, professional, or political-to speak up for us .... The 
political premise of our democracy is that it is representative in character." Steven L. Winter, 
The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 
1479 (1988). 
129. 1 Annals of Congo 735 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
130. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol (Oct. 13, 1774), excerpted in 
Burke's Politics, supra note 121, at 114, 115. 
131. Consider the confidence of a New York state legislator that "'had the five 
thousand people who had written me been in the possession of the knowledge which was 
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This delicate balance between strict agency and independent judg-
ment takes us back again to the idea of interest representation, of the 
embodiment in the legislator herself of the core interests and ideals of 
her constituents. The legislator concerned only with reelection might 
cabin her judgment within the strict boundaries of the expressed will of 
her constituency; she might forego any significant exercise of discretion 
and thereby defeat the very purpose of democratic deliberation. Con-
versely, the legislator indifferent to her fate at the polls might move too 
far in the other direction, pursuing policies that are utterly divorced from 
the preferences and interests of those she ostensibly represents. But the 
legislator who is similarly situated to her constituents, who shares a body 
of common interests with them, can walk the line between responsiveness 
and independence. She is unlikely to stray too far from their preferences 
and interests because they are hers as well, and at the same time she can 
bring those preferences and interests to bear in making independent 
judgments based on information and arguments unavailable to her con-
stituents. To the functionalist defender of democnicy, the interest repre-
sentative thus is close to the ideal legislator. She brings to the table both 
a commitment to the distinct interests of her constituency and an open-
ness to persuasion, reason, and compromise. 
This concept of participatory legitimacy through interest representa-
tion is about to become quite important for my arguments in this Article. 
As the next Part demonstrates, the process of adjudication-typically 
thought to be tl}e antithes~s of decisionmaking ~y democratic representa-
tion-can, under certain circumstances, claim a significant degree of par-
ticipatory legitimacy in precisely this way. 
II. THE LEGmMACY OF ADJUDICATIVE LAWMAKING: ADJUDICATION As 
REPRESENTATION 
Reasoning by example in the law is a key to many things. It 
indicates in part the hold which the law process has over the 
litigants. They have participated in the lawmaking. They are 
bound by something they helped to make. 
Edward Levi132 
Whether we view democratic legislation from a proceduralist or from 
a functionalist angle, we find it to be legitimate because it is legislation by 
participation rather than by fiat. With democratic parliamentary lawmak-
ing as our baseline, then, we tend to characterize adjudicative lawmaking 
as nonparticipatory and thus nondemocratic; we tend therefore to look 
elsewhere (to necessity, for instance) to justify it. The res\llt is an uneasy 
tension between institutions like common lawmaking, judicial interpreta-
mine, at least a majority of them would have taken [my] position.'" Pitkin, supra note 117, 
at 222 (quoting New York state legislator). 
132. Levi, supra note 11, at 4. 
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tion of statutes, and judicial review on the one hand, and our ideals of 
democracy on the other. 
In approaching adjudicative lawmaking in this way, we ignore two of 
its fundamental features-features that, in conjunction, clothe adjudica-
tive lawmaking to a significant degree with the same sort of legitimacy 
present in parliamentary lawmaking. The first feature we ignore is the 
fact that most judicial decisions are to a very great extent products not of 
the unilateral decree of a judge or panel of judges, but rather of a process 
of participation and debate among the parties to the case that greatly 
restricts the decisional options available to the court. In this sense, judi-
cial decisions resemble the decisions made by a democratic legislature 
after debate and a fair hearing at which all relevant views have been aired. 
As such, the decisions of courts can be seen to bear some legitimacy with 
respect to the litigants before them, both from a proceduralist and from a 
functionalist perspective. 
The second feature of adjudication that we ignore is the fact that the 
prospectively binding nature of many, perhaps most, judicially created 
rules is tied directly to the degree in which the parties who participated in 
the creation of those rules represented the interests of the parties who 
will be bound by them. Stare decisis binds only to the extent that parties 
to subsequent cases are situated similarly to the parties in precedential 
cases. The parties to precedential cases thus can be said to serve as inter-
est representatives of subsequent litigants in much the same way that we 
expect our elected legislators to serve as interest representatives of their 
constituents. This form of interest representation extends the legitimacy 
of a judicial decision-legitimately measured by both proceduralist and 
functionalist standards-from the parties immediately before the court to 
later parties who will be bound by the precedential effect of the court's 
decision. 
Together these features, participatory decision making and interest 
representation, constitute a form of adjudicative lawmaking that I will re-
fer to as adjudication as representation. Adjudication as representation can 
be seen as legitimate in a democratic way, at least to a meaningful extent, 
because it incorporates the concept of participation through representa-
tion into the adjudicative decisionmaking process. Let us see in more 
detail precisely how these mechanisms work. 
A. Participatory Adjudicative Decisionmaking 
[T]he distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in the 
fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of par-
ticipation in the decision, that of presenting proofs and rea-
soned arguments for a decision in his favor. 
Lon Fuller133 
133. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353, 364 
(1978). 
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Writers often refer to adjudication as if it were a purely dictatorial 
process, governed in practice only by some combination of the particular 
judge's or panel's disposition, acumen, conscience, and political sagacity. 
The judicial decision is seen as a self-contained, autonomous entity aris-
ing solely from the judge's own will, an act of authority for which the 
judge and the judge alone is accountable. This is perhaps understanda-
ble, given legal academia's focus on the normative assessment of judicial 
decisions-what courts should be doing-rather than on the practical 
constraints imposed on those decisions. Ronald Dworkin's ideal judge 
Hercules, for instance, while normatively bound to principled consistency 
with previous legal decisions, is descriptively an all-powerful character, 
constantly presented with unsupervised choices of whether to decide a 
case wrongly or rightly and restrained in the real world only by his incli-
nation and ability to choose correctly. 1M Anyone familiar with constitu-
tional and other public-law scholarship will recognize the same habit 
there: court decisions are treated as ministerial acts of isolated individu-
als, unaffected in substance by the processes employed in reaching them 
and attributable to "the Court" alone or, sometimes, to a single member 
or faction of "the Court." It is as if judges decided by muse or divine 
inspiration, spinning opinions out of whatever cloth happens to match 
their mood that day. 
But judgments come from cases, and cases are more than abstract 
exercises in legal theory. Cases are the products of disputes among real 
people, and, not surprisingly, those same real people and their agents 
tend to be intimately involved in managing them. Court cases are con-
tests, and judges often find themselves in the position of mere referee. 
Indeed, Anglo-American adjudication is a fundamentally par-
ticipatory enterprise. Judges may finish cases, but they do not initiate 
them or move them toward conclusion; they do not decide what facts 
need to be proven; they do not determine what legal arguments will be 
presented. Judges rule on motions, but they do not bring them; they 
respond to objections during testimony, but only rarely do they elicit tes-
timony themselves; they hear arguments of counsel and read legal briefs, 
but they do not make or write them. All of this-all of the activity that 
drives adjudication forward, that defines the legal issues and determines 
what facts will animate them-is done by the litigants themselves, 
through their counseJ.135 By the time the litigants and attorneys have 
done their jobs, the court's options for decision are in reality quite 
limited. 
I do not mean to imply that everyone who has written about courts 
has ignored this participatory essence of adjudicative decisionmaking. 
134. See Dworkin, supra note 11. 
135. As the coun rather pithily put it in McCargo v. Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 401 (4th 
Cir. 1976): "Ours is an adversary system of justice .... In our system lawyers worry about 
the whereabouts of witnesses. The coun does not. Lawyers worry about proof. The court 
does not ..•. Lawyers get the case ready for trial. The court does not." 
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One who did not was Lon Fuller, who, in his influential, posthumously 
published article "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,"136 identified 
three conditions he felt were necessary for a decisionmaking process to 
be considered adjudicative. As paraphrased by Melvin Eisenberg in his 
comment on "Forms and Limits," these three conditions were: 
(i) The adjudicator should attend to what the partit!s have to 
say. 
(ii) The adjudicator should explain his decision in a manner 
that provides a substantive reply to what the parties have to say. 
(iii) The decision should be strongly responsive to the parties' 
proofs and arguments in the sense that it should proceed from 
and be congruent with those proofs and arguments.137 
Thus Fuller saw that adjudicative decisions actually are created in a very 
real sense by the litigants, not by the court: The court's duties of atten-
tion to the parties' arguments, explanation of its decision, and strong re-
sponsiveness to those arguments in fact limit the court's decision to an 
act of choosing between (or perhaps compromising between) alternatives 
presented by the contesting parties. The court has chosen the decision, 
but the decision itself has been authored by the litigants-to a significant 
degree, at least. 
We call this mode of participatory justice "the adversary system," 
although the adversarial nature of the proceedings is simply one aspect 
(if arguably a vital one138) of the entire framework of party initiation, 
party presentation, and court responsiveness that makes the system par-
ticipatory. It is not the only way to do adjudication. Other political sys-
tems, systems that generally place a much lower value on government by 
participation, also (not coincidentally) employ adjudicative procedures 
that are far less party-driven and are controlled to a much greater extent 
by the state in the person of the judge. Mhjan DamaSka has demon-
strated the strong connection between a polity's general philosophy of 
government and its chosen system of adjudication. 139 Polities preferring 
individual decisionmaking over state control tend towards adjudicative 
procedures featuring party initiation, party control, and relatively passive 
136. See Fuller, supra note 133. 
137. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative 
Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 410, 411-12 (1978). 
138. Fuller believed adversarial proceedings to be a necessary component of 
acljudication. See Fuller, supra note 133, at 382-85. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a 
system of adjudication that would involve meaningful participation by those to be affected 
by the decision and at the same time would not involve a great degree of adversariness. 
Adjudication implies the existence of a dispute that must be resolved, and the parties to a 
dispute will by definition be adverse to each other. Thus, their participation in the 
adjudicative proceeding could hardly be cooperative and still be meaningful qua 
participation. For a good survey of arguments for and against the adversary system, with a 
noticeable tilt in favor ofit, see Stephan Landsman, Readings on AdversarialJustice: The 
American Approach to Acljudication, ABA Sec. Litig. 1988. 
139. See MiIjan R DamaSka, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative 
Approach to the Legal Process (1986). 
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judges,140 while polities preferring state decisionmaking over individual 
autonomy tend towards methods of adjudication involving state initiation 
of proceedings and extensive judicial control.141 
The system of adjudication we choose, then, speaks volumes about 
our more general philosophy of government. In the Anglo-American tra-
dition, we restrict the role of the judge to that of making "a choice be-
tween competing views, or a mediation among such views";142 to the par-
ties who will be affected by the judgment we leave the definition and 
articulation of those views. Thus the litigants subject to a court decision 
are in a very real sense, as Edward Levi observes, "bound by something 
they helped to make."143 This echoes our general preference for govern-
ment through participation over government by fiat. 
In the remainder of this section I do two things. First, I provide a 
hypothetical (but, I think, quite typical) example of the process of par-
ticipatory adjudication in action. Then I discuss how the process of par-
ticipatory adjudication produces democratic legitimacy according to the 
proceduralist and functionalist theories we examined in Part I. 
1. Participatory Adjudication in Action. - Imagine a dispute between 
one individual, Smith, and another, Jones. Smith believes she has been 
injured in a legally cognizable way by Jones, and so she files a lawsuit 
against Jones in a state trial court of general jurisdiction.l44 The first 
thing to note about the events so far is precisely who has initiated the 
legal proceeding: It is Smith, a private party with a claim of legal injury, 
not the court itself or any other government organ. 
140. See id. at 109-40. 
141. See id. at 154-73. 
142. Id. at 169. 
143. Levi, supra note 11, at 4. 
144. See Fed. R Civ. P. 3 (Commencement of Action) , 7 (Pleadings Allowed; Form of 
Motions). Although we will suppose this hypothetical case to be before an imaginary state 
court, I will insert references to the relevant Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, or Federal Rules of Evidence (and, in some instances where 
the Federal Rules themselves are silent, to exemplary local federal court rules) at the 
appropriate places in the discussion to make sure that we have a grounding in the world of 
fact. 
My hypothetical case is a civil lawsuit, but there is no reason to think that the model of 
participatory adjudication 1 outline here could not apply in the criminal context as well. 
As we shall see, the accuracy of the model depends upon (1) the extent to which each 
party in a real case is afforded a relatively equal chance to influence the outcome of the 
case, and (2) the extent to which the outcome of that case is authored to a significant 
degree by the litigants and their counsel. Of course, problems of inequitable ability to 
influence the outcome might arise more often in criminal cases, where one party always is 
the government and the other often is a defendant with limited resources. Where the deck 
is stacked against a criminal defendant (or indeed against any litigant, civil or criminal) in 
this way, participatory adjudication will be compromised, and the democratic legitimacy of 
the adjudicative process will be compromised as a result. This gives us yet another reason 
to deplore this kind of circumstance-as if any additional reason were necessary. In any 
event, a detailed exploration of the legitimacy crisis posed in such cases is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
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The second point of importance follows closely on the first. Smith's 
complaint, if properly drafted, states one or more legal theories about 
why she should recover damages from Jones and supports those theories 
with factual allegations.145 Again, the important steps of framing legal 
theories and offering facts for proof have been taken by the litigant 
Smith, not by the court it:self. " 
Jones now files an answer to Smith's complaint.146 In his answer 
Jones does two things. First, he responds to Smith's factual allegations 
with factual allegations of his own, either in the form of admissions or 
denials of Smith's allegations or in the form of affirmative allegations 
designed to demonstrate his lack of liability to Smith. Second, Jones 
frames and articulates his own legal theories of why he should not be 
liable to Smith. Now the initial factual and legal issues between the par-
ties have been joined, and, of course, the court has played little or no part 
in framing these issues. 
Next, the parties engage in discovery to further elicit potentially rele-
vant facts. 147 To be sure, by now the court has become involved in the 
case to some extent; there has been a preliminary scheduling conference 
before the judge to set deadlines for joinder, pleading amendments, dis-
positive motions, and completion of discovery, as well as a tentative trial 
date. 148 The court may even be empowered by statute to encourage set-
tlement, simplification of legal and factual issues, and so on.149 But the 
court's only real coercive power is the setting of deadlines by which cer-
tain steps of the litigation must be completed. The judge cannot force 
the parties to settle, nor can she eliminate on her own motion what she 
believes to be frivolous legal contentions or factual allegations. Under 
these conditions, discovery proceeds, with each party serving and answer-
ing interrogatoriesI50 and document requestsI5I and taking deposi-
tions.152 The content of each party's discovery upon the other, and upon 
third parties, is primarily up to the litigants themselves.153 The court can 
145. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (Claims for Relief), 9 (Pleading Special Matters), 10 
(Fonn of Pleadings), 
146. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7-8, 10, 12 (Defense and Objections). 
147. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37 (Depositions and Discovery). 
148. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management). 
149. See id. 
150. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33 (Interrogatories to Parties). 
151. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 (Production of Documents and Things and Entry Upon 
Land For Inspection and Other Purposes). 
152. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (Depositions Upon Oral Examination). 
153. Under the 1993 amendments to the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules, 
each party is required, "without awaiting a discovery request," to provide a fairly broad 
spectrum of basic information to the other,party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a). This is a significant 
departure from previous practice, and its equivalent bas not yet been adopted by most 
states. See Rogelio A Lasso, Gladiators Be Gone: The New Disclosure Rules Compel a 
Reexamination of the Adversary !-'rocess, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 479 (1995) (providing an overview 
of the new rules and anticipated problems). Indeed, many federal courts have 
promulgated local rules "opting out" of all or part of the new discovery procedures and 
352 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:312 
resolve disputes between the parties on the subject, but it is entirely un-
able to ensure (and probably will not even suggest) that the litigants pur-
sue a particular course of inquiry. 
After some months of discovery, the defendant Jones brings a sum-
mary judgment motion.154 Jones's decision to bring the motion was en-
tirely his own and his counsel's, and his theories of why he is entitled to 
summary judgment are wholly the product of his counsel's own factual 
investigation and legal research and analysis. The court did not, and in-
deed could not, bring the motion on its own initiative. 
A briefing schedule on the summary judgment motion is set:155 
Jones, as the movant, files his supporting brief first, and in it he presents a 
number of legal theories why he is entitled to judgment and supports 
them with references to the pleadings and the facts elicited during discov-
ery.156 Smith then files an opposition brief in which she responds to the 
legal and factual arguments put forth in Jones's brief.157 Finally, Jones 
files a reply brief in which he responds to Smith's arguments and reiter-
ates his own basis for relief.I5S 
The court now has before it a fully briefed motion for summary judg-
ment filed by Jones. The court has two choices: It may either grant or 
deny the motion. (It may also be possible for the court to split the differ-
ence by granting the motion in part and denying it in part.) Theoreti-
cally, of course, the court could make its choice on a whim, or on a theory 
entirely separate from any advanced by either of the litigants. But the 
court probably will consider itself to be much more constrained than this. 
Unless it wishes to renounce centuries of Anglo-American juridical tradi-
tion, the court must articulate reasons for whatever decision it makes. 
The most complete and readily available sets of reasons are those offered 
by each of the parties and contained in their briefs and, perhaps, their 
oral arguments. This is an enormous practical incentive for the court to 
avoid setting off on its own and deciding the motion according to some 
independent theory. And even aside from this incentive, the court is 
likely to feel, with Fuller, that its decision must be "strongly responsive" to 
the arguments of the parties in order to qualify as legitimate adjudica-
tion. Finally, since the court is required by rule to determine whether 
continuing under the old version of the rules. See, e.g., N.D. III. R. 5.00(C) ("Except to 
the extent othenvise directed by order of the court, the automatic disclosure provisions set 
out in F.R.Civ.P. 26(a) (1) shall not apply."). 
The new disclosure rules represent a notable retreat from an adversarial approach to 
the proof of facts in adjudication, as they eliminate much of the strategic element of 
discovery. To what extent they affect the basic process of framing the legal and factual 
issues to which discovery is relevant is open to question. 
154. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (Summary Judgment). 
155. See, e.g., N.D. III. R. 12(0). 
156. See, e.g., N.D. III. R. 12(M). 
157. See, e.g., N.D. III. R. 12(N). 
158. See, e.g., N.D. III. R. 12(M). 
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there is any "genuine issue as to any material fact, "159 it thus is further 
constrained to base its decision upon the facts elicited by the parties dur-
ing discovery. 
In other words, the discretion of the court deciding Jones's summary 
judgment motion is, to a very significant degree, reduced to a choice be-
tween adopting Smith's point of view (for all or some of the reasons put 
forward by Smith) and adopting Jones's point of view (for all or some of 
the reasons put forward by Jones). The court cannot really create its deci-
sion; it can only choose between two alternative decisions authored by 
each of the parties. 
Let us pause for a moment to acknowledge that this is probably a 
somewhat simplistic view of the court's decisionmaking process. The po-
sitions of Smith and Jones may be very far apart, and in order to decide 
between them the court may have to choose between fundamentally dif-
ferent conceptions of, say, law or morality. (Indeed, the court may have 
to make such a choice even if the litigants' positions are rather close to-
gether.) This choice may be animated at least in part by the judge's own 
ideals, predispositions, intelligence, politics, conception of her social 
role, or other factors that cannot be said to have been authored or caused 
by the litigants. What is more, the litigants' conduct during the proceed-
ings-their choice of legal arguments and factual proofs, for instance-
may have been influenced in part by their perceptions (or those of their 
attorneys) of what kinds of arguments and proofs would be likely to influ-
ence this particular judge. In these senses, the judge undeniably has par-
ticipated in the creation of her decision. 
But the important point to remember, and what I am trying to illus-
trate here, is simply that the decision often (perhaps usually) will be 
largely-to a significant (if not total) degree-the product of the volun-
tary, self-directed activities of the litigants themselves. The judge plays a 
role, yes, but it is far from the autonomous, dictatorial one that it is so 
often assumed to be. The decisionmaking process in a court case has 
much more to do with the participation of the litigants than with the 
authoritative fiat of the judge. And, importantly, the stricter the concep-
tion of the adversary system that is adhered to, the smaller will be the 
realm of judicial authorship of the resulting decision. 
So, constrained in this significant (if not absolute) way, the court 
decides for Smith and denies Jones's motion. The court memorializes its 
ruling in a minute order and gives its reasons, which echo Smith's argu-
ments, in open court. 
Having survived summary judgment, Smith's claim now proceeds to 
trial. Let us suppose for simplicity's sake that the parties have agreed to a 
bench trial, although a jury trial would not substantively affect our analy-
sis. As a matter of tradition, lawyers for each party are given the opportu-
nity to present an opening statement to the trier offact (here, the judge) 
159. Fed. R Civ. P. 56(c). 
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laying out that party's theory of the case and what he or she intends to 
prove. Then the trial proceeds with the taking of oral testimony,160 first 
from witnesses called by the plaintiff, Smith, and then from witnesses 
called by the defendant,Jones. Although the court may call and examine 
witnesses on its own initiative161 and will exercise "reasonable control" 
over examination of witnesses by counsel to prevent delay, harassment, 
and the like,162 the eliciting of testimony and the presentation of other 
evidence are primarily directed by the parties themselves through their 
counsel. 
After each litigant has had the opportunity to present his or her case, 
attorneys for Smith and Jones give closing statements to the court in 
which each summarizes the eVidence and reiterates the legal basis for a 
ruling in his or her client's favor. As is often the case in a bench trial, the 
judge also asks each party to file a post-trial brief, which performs essen-
tially the same functions as closing argument in more detailed form. 
Now the court is again in the position of having to make a decision. 
And, as with the summary judgment motion, the court's decision will not 
be pulled from the clear blue sky. It must be firmly grounded in the now 
substantial body of evidence presented at the trial, and it must be strongly 
responsive to the legal theories advanced by the parties in their plead-
ings, briefs, and oral arguments. Once again the court is in the position 
of having to choose between two alternatives (or, at most, from among 
several reasonable variations of those alternatives) that have been devel-
oped not by the court, but by the parties. Even if the court is inclined to 
develop and rely upon its own substantive reasons for a decision, reasons 
that have not been offered by the litigants-an inclination that busy 
courts deciding well-litigated cases are unlikely to act upon very often-its 
alternatives nonetheless are cabined by the legal and factual context in 
which the litigants have placed it. The court cannot, for example, deter-
mine on its own initiative that Jones is liable for trespass when Smith has 
sued him only for breach of contract. 
The court rules in favor of the plaintiff, Smith, memorializing its de-
cision in a fairly lengthy opinion that makes frequent references to the 
evidence and largely incorporates the legal theory advanced by Smith in 
her briefs and at trial. Jones promptly appeals to the intermediate state 
appellate court. 
The appellate court, as a court of review, does not take additional 
evidence or entertain further factual allegations. Instead the appellate 
court will be bound in its decision by the evidence produced during dis-
covery and at trial, and in some instances even by the trial court's inter-
pretation of that evidence.163 But the appellate court is free to make its 
own legal determinations, and so it requires Jones and Smith (through 
160. See Fed. R Civ. P. 43 (Taking of Testimony). 
161. See Fed. R Evid. 614 (Calling and Interrogation of Witnesses by Court). 
162. See Fed. R Evid. 611 (Mode and Order ofInterrogation and Presentation). 
163. See Fed. R App. P. 10 (The Record on Appeal). 
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their attorneys) to submit briefs stating their legal and factual argu-
mentsl64 and to give an oral presentation before the court summarizing 
their positions and answering the panel's questions.165 All of this Jones 
and Smith do. 
Now the appellate court must make its own decision. While the trial 
court was bound to follow the appellate court's precedents, the appellate 
court is not strictly bound to follow its own precedents, and so in that 
sense its discretion is broader than the trial court's. But like the trial 
court, the appellate court cannot weave its decision out of whole cloth. It 
too is significantly constrained by the fact-proving and law-arguing work 
the two litigants have been doing since the beginning of the case many 
months ago. It cannot go outside the elicited evidence-indeed it is 
more strictly tied to that evidence, through the paper record before it, 
than the trial court was-and it must make its decision strongly respon-
sive to the reasoned arguments of the parties. Even if it decides to reject 
one of its own precedents or to interpret it in an especially restrictive or 
expansive way, it is likely to do so only at the suggestion of one of the 
parties before it. And the appellate court probably will ignore legal argu-
ments that were not made in the trial court below. In short, like the trial 
court, the appellate court is mostly restricted to a choice beulTeen t:\ITo 
competing results and the UITO competing legal theories that support 
them. Its ability to author the substance of its decision is severely limited. 
Like the trial court, the appellate court rules for Smith, writing its 
own lengthy opinion which, like that of the trial court, makes frequent 
reference to the evidence (the record) and incorporates much of the rea-
soning contained in Smith's briefs and arguments. Jones now has t:\ITo 
strikes against him, and he decides to forego the time and expense of a 
discretionary appeal to the state supreme court. Smith has won; Jones 
has lost; and, thanks to the decision of an appellate court, presumably a 
significant transfer of wealth will take place bet:\ITeen the t:\ITo. 
What, then, has happened in the case of Smith v. Jones? Two succes-
sive courts have rendered decisions in favor of Smith, but neither court 
has had much real control over the substance of the decision it has ren-
dered. From the beginning, Smith and Jones have manipulated the ulti-
mate resolution of the case, ensuring that the appellate court's final deci-
sion would fall within a very narrow range of possibilities-possibilities 
defined by the facts elicited by the parties and the legal theories advanced 
by them. Had Smith failed to prove one crucial fact or ignored a single 
important line of argument, the court might have decided for Jones; had 
Jones been more diligent in discovery or written a more persuasive brief, 
the court might have decided against Smith. Thus the ultimate decision 
has in a very genuine way been produced by the litigants; they have par-
164. See Fed. R. App. P. 28 (Briefs). 
165. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (Oral Argument). 
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ticipated significantly, even predominantly, in the authorship of that 
decision. 
2. The Democratic Legitimacy of Participatory Adjudication. - The pro-
cess of participatory adjudication we have seen at work in Smith v. Jones 
can, with respect to the litigants who will be bound by a court's decision, 
claim the same sort of democratic legitimacy that we locate in the process 
of lawmaking by deliberation in a representative legislature. We can see 
this by analyzing, briefly, participatory adjudication through the lenses of 
both proceduralist and functionalist democratic theory. 
a. Proceduralist Legitimacy. - Recall that there are two strains of 
proceduralist democratic theory: deontological theories, which view the 
participatory decisionmaking procedures characteristic of democracy as 
inherently good, and consequentialist theories, which hold that par-
ticipatory decisionmaking procedures have good effects (but effects un-
connected with the quality of the substantive decisions the procedures 
generate). 
Deontological proceduralist theories hold that the process of signifi-
cant individual participation in government decisionmaking is inherently 
good, usually as an expression of the principle of individual autonomy.166 
The process of participatory adjudication can be seen as inherently good 
in the same ways. Litigants before a court participate in creating the deci-
sions that will affect them just as voters in a representative democracy 
do-and probably to a greater extent. While there will always be some 
realm of judicial discretion, the decisions on the merits produced 
through the adversary system will always depend to a significant degree 
upon the activities of the litigants themselves. In contrast, the voice of 
the voting constituent in an election is just one among many. 
Participatory adjudication thus satisfies the concerns of deontologi-
cal theorists in at least as great a degree as representative legislation does. 
Participation in adjudicative decisionmaking preserves the negative au-
tonomy of the litigants by ensuring that neither litigant will have dispro-
portionate power over the other, that neither will serve as ':Judge in his 
own Case":167 each litigant is equally allowed (and equally obligated) to 
submit proofs and reasoned arguments for decision by a neutral judge. It 
also preserves negative autonomy by transforming the coercive decision 
of the court into an act of constraint by each litigant's consent: Although 
there is a loser as well as a winner in adjudication, we can say, as in parlia-
mentary legislation, that the party whose proposal is rejected has none-
theless consented to the decision as long as she was given the same full 
opportunity as her opponent to argue her case. As David Gauthier has 
written of parliamentary lawmaking, participatory adjudication 
offers each person the opportunity to advance whatever propo-
sal he pleases, but requires him to submit it to ... critical consid-
166. See supra Part IAl. 
167. Locke, supra note 37, at 369. 
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eration ... so that its adoption depends on his being able to give 
it a reasoned grounding .... Thus no one ... has any basis for 
complaining that he was unable either to advance or to defend 
his concerns in ways available to [the opposing party].168 
357 
Consequentialist proceduralist theories hold that the process of indi-
vidual participation in government decisionmaking is good because it 
serves some valuable nonpolitical social or individual ends-development 
of the human character and encouragement of an enterprising public 
spirit, for example.169 It might be thought that the strain of consequen-
tialism that is concerned with developing the individual human character 
would hardly condone adversary acljudication, because that strain empha-
sizes qualities of "well-doing" and public-mindedness that seem absent 
from the typical self-interested courtroom battle. But this humanistic 
consequentialism, especially as propounded by MiIl, also emphasizes the 
importance of participation for the development of qualities like "indus-
try, integrity, justice, and prudence"17°-individualistic attributes that 
might well be fostered by participatory adjudication. More importantly, 
the humanistic benefits of participatory acljudication must be assessed in 
comparison to its alternative: a system of adjudication by judicial fiat akin 
to the inquisitorial systems present in civil-law countries and to a greater 
degree in the former communist bloc. l7l Participatory adjudication at 
least provides some of the humanistic benefits extolled by Aristotle, 
Rousseau, Mill, and others; adjudication by judicial fiat provides none of 
them. 
The second major strain of consequentialism, the Tocquevillian ar-
gument from indirect social benefits, would seem to support participatory 
adjudication on the same grounds by which it supports representative de-
mocracy in general. The "restless activity, superabundant force, and en-
ergy"172 that Tocqueville saw as a byproduct of participatory government, 
of being called upon to actively make decisions about one's destiny in a 
social context, appears to transpose quite well to the process of par-
ticipatory acljudication, where each litigant must actively vindicate her 
own rights and interests in order to see them fulfilled. Again, the alterna-
tive, adjudication by judicial fiat, can provide scant encouragement for 
the development of these energetic qualities. 
So participatory adjudication can be seen as democratically legiti-
mate from a proceduralist standpoint. Indeed, the direct, meaningful 
participatory role that process confers upon the affected litigants seems 
to address proceduralist concerns of autonomy, humanism, and social dy-
168. David Gauthier, Constituting Democracy, in The Idea of Democracy, supra note 
67, at 314, 321. 
169. See supra Part IA.2. 
170. Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 201. 
171. On some of the distinctive features ofinquisitoriai systems and their relationship 
to the theoretical underpinnings of the state, see DamaSka, supra note 139, at 154-73. 
172. Tocqueville, supra note 29, at 244. 
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namism in a more salient and significant way than the relatively anony-
mous mechanism of periodic elections does. Participatory adjudication 
means that a court decision always will be directly attributable, at least in 
large part, to the active participation of the people who will be affected by 
that decision. 
b. Functionalist Legitimacy. - Participatory adjudication also can 
claim functionalist legitimacy in the same ways that democratic parlia-
mentary government can. Like representative democracy itself, par-
ticipatory adjudication allocates much of the decisionmaking power to 
those who will be most affected by a decision: the litigants who will be 
subject to a court's order. Participatory adjudication necessarily requires 
each litigant to be "the only ... gnardian of his own rights and inter-
ests."17S Similarly, participatory adjudication ensures that a greater diver-
sity of interests will be represented in the decisionmaking process than if 
court decisions were made by judicial fiat, thus increasing the chances 
that the resulting decisions will adequately respond to and balance those 
interests. 
It might at first appear that participatory adjudication does nothing 
to encourage the participation in decisionmaking of especially talented 
and capable decisionmakers: Should we not presume that a typical judge 
is likely to be a more talented decisionmaker than a typical litigant? The 
anS\ver is threefold. First, there is not necessarily any reason to make this 
assumption, and indeed the litigants may be more skillful decisionmakers 
than the judge with respect to the given subject matter of the litigation. 
(This is simply the argument from allocation of decisionmaking power 
restated.) Second, participatory acljudication does not cut the judge out 
of the decisionmaking process altogether; instead it supplements the 
judge'S own decisionmaking powers with those of the litigants and their 
attorneys, thereby increasing the chances that skillful decisionmaking will 
occur. (This is a restatement of the argument from assertion of a diver-
sity of interests.) Finally and most important, participatory adjudication 
in effect creates more talented and capable decisionmakers: Through 
the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments by both sides, it gives 
the judge empirical, theoretical, and analytical materials to which she 
might not have access in a system of decisionmaking by judicial fiat. 
Perhaps most saliently of all, participatory adjudication is the essence 
of decisionmaking by reasoned deliberation among opposing viewpoints. 
In eass Sunstein's words, an important functionalist justification of de-
mocracy is the belief that "[t]hrough confrontation among people who 
disagree, errors of fact may be revealed as SUCh,"174 that the best decisions 
are reached through "reasoned debate," by assessing "'the force of the 
argument[s] '" for all sides.175 What could be more true to this ideal than 
173. Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 224. 
174. Sunstein, Democracy, supra note 97, at 243. 
175. Id. at 245. 
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adversary litigation, the paradigm of a decisionmaking procedure that re-
lies on confrontation and reasoned debate among competing interests? 
Thus participatory adjudication can be seen as legitimate according 
to functionalist theories of democracy as well. It produces decisions 
through a process of reasoned argument among those most concerned 
with the issues being decided. AJ5 such, functionalism predicts that par-
ticipatory adjudication is more likely to produce good decisions than a 
system of adjudication by fiat. 
c. A Word of Caution. - With respect to the litigants immediately 
affected by a court decision, then, participatory adjudication ensures that 
the decision will carry a large measure of the same kind of legitimacy that 
laws generated by a representative legislature possess. But a forceful ca-
veat is in order. To say that participatory adjudication creates meaningful 
democratic legitimacy is not to say that the adjudicative process is pre-
cisely analogous to the process of parliamentary legislation, or that adju-
dicative decisionmaking always (or even often) will be just as legitimate 
from a democratic perspective as parliamentary decisionmaking usually 
is. The simple fact, after all, is that there is no one in parliamentary deci-
sionmaking analogous to the judge. AJ5 long as someone playing the role 
of judge, of ultimate decisionmaking authority, exists in adjudication, 
there is always the chance that a measure of rule by fiat will creep into the 
adjudicative process. Judges, after all, are human, and they are likely to 
do things that human decisionmakers sometimes do: favor one litigant 
over another for irrelevant reasons, or insert their own ideology into the 
decision, or simply sleep through one party's argument. In parliamentary 
decisionmaking, by contrast, rule by fiat cannot gain even the smallest 
foothold. AJ5 long as everyone is given a meaningfully equal vote, no one 
can wield arbitrary power over anyone else. There is no wigged eminence 
who has the final word. 
Participatory adjudication, that is, cannot completely remove the 
possibility of judicial discretion. But let us imagine a case in which par-
ticipatory adjudication operates in its purest form: The judge, in making 
her decision, acts only to choose from between competing theories of the 
case offered by the litigants and exercises no will of her own beyond that 
strictly necessary to make this choice. In such a case-a hypothetical one, 
to be sure-can we really say that the presence of a judge makes any 
difference from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy? The judge, it is 
true, has chosen to reject the arguments of one litigant and to render a 
decision favorable to the other. But this is precisely what the citizen (or 
her representative) does in the process of parliamentary legislation. 
When a voter in a popular election selects one candidate over another, or 
when a legislator in Congress votes to enact a contested statute into law, 
that decisionmaker, like a judge, has chosen to reject the arguments of 
one set of people and to render a decision favorable to another. The 
only real difference is that in adjudication it is one person (or perhaps a 
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small group of people), not hundreds, thousands, or millions, that is 
making the choice. The losers are bound just the same. 
No, it is not the existence of the judge itself that threatens to make 
adjudication nondemocratic; it is the potential, often realized, for the 
judge to exercise disproportionate power in the decisionmaking process. 
We are not bothered by the idea of subjecting important policy decisions 
to the votes of millions of self-interested decisionmakers, because we 
know that no one else's vote will count for more than our own. But we 
are bothered by the idea of subjecting such decisions to the authority of 
one disproportionately powerful judge or panel of judges, because we are 
justifiably afraid that our "vote" will not count for as much as theirs will. 
Participatory adjudication cannot eliminate this fear; it contains no 
foolproof safeguard like the one-person, one-vote electoral system. But 
recognizing its existence can tell us that judges are not, or need not be, as 
disproportionately powerful as we might be conditioned to think. It can 
remind us that those who will be most affected by judicial decisions, the 
litigants themselves, can playas great or nearly as great a role in the crea-
tion of those decisions as the judge can. 
Be this as it may, however, court decisions may have effects ex-
tending beyond the litigants that helped to produce them: They may 
affect future litigants (or potential litigants) through the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Can we somehow say that those extended effects bear some dem-
ocratic legitimacy as well? 
B. Interest Representation Through the Common Law Method 
[Stare decisis results in] a form of representation that is specific 
to the judicial branch: the party who participates in a [court 
case] represents himself and all others who are in a similar posi-
tion. Thus, the common law method has salutary procedural 
consequences in that it brings into the legal decisionmaking 
process precisely those persons who bear the impact of a 
decision. 
Lea BrilmayerI76 
Court decisions, we know, can become rules of sorts. What we call 
"the common law method" means that cases are decided by analogy, by 
comparison of their facts to the facts of previously decided cases and con-
formity of their results to the results of those past cases. I77 To the extent 
176. R. L. Brilmayer,JudiciaI Review,Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law 
Method, 57 B.D. L. Rev. 807, 817 (1977). 
177. The extant literature relating to the common law method, analogical legal 
reasoning, stare decisis, and the like would of course fill a library. A few good examples 
are: Levi, supra note 11; Karl N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 
56-76 (1960); Precedent in Law (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal 
Reasoning and Political Conflict 13-34, 62-100 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legal 
Reasoning]; Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1989); Scott 
Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal 
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a court purposely conforms its decision to that of a previous court in this 
way, the parties are bound by the decision in the previous case; that deci-
sion has become a rule governing the outcome of the subsequent case. 
And this rule is likely to persist not merely as a rule of decision-to be 
followed by courts in deciding subsequent cases-but as a rule of conduct 
as well, to be followed by individuals and entities rationally conducting 
their everyday affairs in ways they believe least likely to result in court-
imposed penalties or most likely to result in court-bestowed gains.178 
Court decisions thus can serve as rules in much the same way that statutes 
do, encouraging and discouraging certain kinds of conduct with the 
promise that such conduct will bear particular legal consequences.179 
We have seen that court decisions can claim a significant measure of 
democratic legitimacy with respect to the litigants immediately before the 
court that produces them. Those litigants have participated in creating 
the decision, and so, from a proceduralist and from a functionalist per-
spective, that decision may legitimately bind them. But what of the liti-
gants before a subsequent court that uses the original decision as prece-
dent? And what of those private (or, indeed, public) actors who conform 
their conduct to the original decision in anticipation that they might be-
come litigants? They have not actually participated in the creation of the 
decision that, for them, has become a binding rule. How then can they 
be bound by that rule in a democratically legitimate way? 
The answer takes us back to the idea of interest representation, of 
representation in the creation of coercive rules by agents who share a 
common bond of interest with their principals. In order to understand 
how interest representation works to extend democratic legitimacy to ad-
judicative rulemaking, we first need to understand how adjudicative 
rulemaking through the common law method works. Then we will be 
able to see how the common law almost invariably produces an especially 
accurate form of interest representation when it binds litigants to the re-
sults of previous cases. 
1. The Nature of a Common Law "Rule. " - The common law advances 
case by case, reasoning by the process of analogy to, and distinction from, 
the facts of previous cases. Common law precedents bind future litigants 
only to the extent that they control by analogy. In the common law, the 
Argument by Analogy, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 923 (1996); Peters, supra note 34; Frederick 
Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 571 (1987); and Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical 
Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1993). 
178. On the difference between decision rules and conduct rules, see generally Meir 
Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 
97 Harv. L. Rev. 625 (1984) (tracing history and discussing importance of distinction 
between decision and conduct rules). 
179. See generally Richard A Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 8.1, at 251-55 (4th 
ed. 1992) (detailing the economic justifications of common law doctrines); Frederick 
Schauer, Opinions As Rules, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1455 (1995) (arguing that the language of 
judicial opinions justifiably resembles that of statutes and legislation). 
362 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:312 
"rule" of a case is the result of that case-no more and no less. As we will 
see, this fact is the engine that drives adjudication as representation. 
In order to understand how the common law works to constrain fu-
ture courts and litigants, it will help to note a crucial difference between a 
common law rule and a typical statutory rule. A typical statute does two 
things: (1) it specifies the set of factual conditions necessary for a certain 
result to obtain, and (2) it dictates that no other factual conditions may 
be considered relevant to whether that result obtains. It is thus an "if and 
only if' rule: It requires a certain result if a certain set of facts exists 
(regardless of what other facts might also exist), and it requires a differ-
ent result if all of those facts do not exist (again, regardless of what other 
facts might also exist). 
For instance, to adapt an example I have used elsewhere in a differ-
ent context,ISO imagine a simple statute regulating admission to the bar 
of a particular jurisdiction. The statute provides that any person who (a) 
has passed that jurisdiction's bar exam and (b) is of "good moral charac-
ter" is entitled to practice law in the jurisdiction. This statute in essence 
contains three complementary but separate rules: (1) the positive rule 
that anyone who meets both factual conditions (passing the bar and good 
moral character) must be allowed admission to the bar; (2) the negative 
rule that anyone who does not meet both factual conditions must not be 
allowed admission to the bar; and (3) the negative rule that no other 
factual conditions-the applicant'S hair color, her birthdate, her taste in 
clothing, whatever-may be considered in deciding whether to admit her 
to the bar. The statute, considered as a decision rule, thus binds at both 
ends, by positively requiring bar officials to admit persons under certain 
conditions, and also by negatively requiring them to allow admission only 
under those conditions and to consider only those conditions in making 
their admissions decisions. 
Common law precedents have a different effect. Like typical stat-
utes, they dictate that on a certain set of factual conditions, a certain re-
sult must obtain. But unlike statutes, they do not dictate either that the 
same result not obtain without those conditions, or that no other factual 
conditions be considered relevant to whether that result obtains. They 
bind positively but not negatively; they are "if-then" but not "if and only 
if'rules. 
Suppose a court must decide whether a certain kind of injury is rea-
sonably foreseeable and thus compensable in a tort lawsuit arising from 
an automobile accident. The plaintiff is the estate of a decedent who 
died after the ambulance in which he was riding (after suffering a heart 
attack) was negligently struck by the defendant's car; the decedent died 
not from injuries suffered in the collision, but because he did not reach 
the hospital in time as a result of it. The court rules that on these facts 
180. See Peters, supra note 34, at 2058-59, 2063-64. 
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the decedent's injury was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, and it 
allows recovery. 
Like a statute, this court decision has enumerated a set of facts on 
which a certain result must obtain. The result is tort liability (or, more 
precisely, the ability to state a tort cause of action); the facts are those 
relied upon by the court in deciding the case, including, for instance, the 
fact that the ambulance's flashing lights and siren were on (indicating an 
emergency), the excessive speed at which the defendant was driving 
(making it more likely that an accident would disable the struck vehicle) , 
and the relative lack of traffic on the street where the collision occurred 
(making it more likely that the defendant was aware of the ambulance 
qua ambulance). By the common law method, stare decisis dictates that 
this decision be followed-that is, that the same result (potential liability) 
be reached-in subsequent cases presenting an equivalent set of facts. In 
this sense the decision establishes a positive rule much like that estab-
lished by a statute: It dictates that, in the future, the presence of a certain 
set of factual conditions necessitates a certain result. 
But in another sense the decisional rule produced by the case is very 
different from a statutory rule. Stare decisis requires that future identical 
(or closely similar) cases bear the same result as this precedential case; 
but it does not require that all future cases without all the facts of the 
precedential case not bear the same result, nor does it limit the range of 
potentially relevant factual conditions to those specific facts relied upon 
by the precedential court. A subsequent court might, consistent with 
stare decisis, impose liability in circumstances where (unlike the prece-
dential case) the ambulance's lights were not flashing; or it might decide 
not to impose liability where, despite the presence of all the material facts 
relied upon by the court in the precedential case, an additional fact (the 
fact, for instance, that the decedent had suffered a broken leg rather than 
a heart attack) is held to have made the injury less foreseeable. A subse-
quent court, to the extent the facts before it are materially dissimilar to 
those of the precedential case, is bound neither to reach the same result 
as in the precedential case nor to reach a different result than in the 
precedential case. To the extent of the factual dissimilarity, the subse-
quent court (and the litigants before it) simply are not bound at all. 
All of this is not to say, however, that courts and litigants in subse-
quent cases are not in some sense constrained by a precedent merely 
because the facts of the two cases are materially dissimilar. A dissimilar 
precedent still can bind in two ways. First, it can bind a fortiori: It can 
determine the results of dissimilar subsequent cases in which the facts 
nonetheless provide as strong or stronger an argument for the result of 
the precedential case than in the precedential case itself. Stare decisis, 
that is, extends the result of a particular case to all those cases, and only 
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those cases, in which the facts support the same result with equal or 
greater force. lSl 
From this perspective, the decision in our ambulance accident case 
would compel the same result in a case with materially similar facts or in a 
case in which the same material facts obtain but an additional fact-say, 
the fact that the ambulance was pulling into the hospital driveway at the 
time of the accident-further supports liability. But the decision would 
not compel the same result in weaker cases like the one in which the 
ambulance's lights were not flashing or the one in which the decedent 
originally had suffered only a broken leg. In such weaker cases, the field 
remains open; the rule of the precedential case does not determine the 
subsequent case's outcome. That outcome is a matter for reasoned argu-
ment by the parties and, ultimately, decision by the court. 
Note, of course, that the threshold question of whether the facts of a 
subsequent case support the result of the precedential case with equal or 
greater force also is a matter for the proofs and reasoned arguments of 
th~ litigants in the subsequent case. Whether and to what extent a prece-
dent will constrain, then, is not static or given, but is a product itself of 
participatory adjudication. 
The second way in which a dissimilar precedent can constrain is to 
set a floor below which the result of a subsequent case cannot go. Even in 
cases in which the facts do not support the result of a precedential case 
with equal or greater force, the court in the subsequent case is not free to 
reach just any old result; the result still must be consistent with that of the 
precedential case. Thus the court in the subsequent case cannot deny 
liability altogether on the ground that drivers who strike ambulances are 
not able to reasonably foresee indirect injuries to their occupants as a 
matter of law. That issue already has been decided a certain way by the 
precedential court, and the subsequent litigants are not free to relitigate 
it. Their freedom extends only so far as the facts of the subsequent case 
are materially different from the facts of the precedential case. 
A final point is that, absent strict constraint by virtue of similarity to 
the material facts of a precedential case, arguments from broad analogy 
or principle based upon the precedential case may still have some persua-
sive force. When the court is not bound by precedent to reach a certain 
result, a litigant is free to argue for the result she favors by claiming that 
the case is similar enough in general ways to one or more previous cases 
so that, although the court is not strictly bound to reach a result 
equivalent to those of the previous cases, the fact of similarity strongly 
supports reaching that result. Such an argument might flow, explicitly or 
tacitly, from the same premises of consistency that underlie the doctrine 
of stare decisis itself: consequentialist notions of predictability, stability, 
efficiency, protection of expectations, and the like, or deontological no-
181. This description of stare decisis is, I think, what Larry Alexander has referred to 
as the "pure result model" of precedent. See Alexander, supra note 177, at 29-30. 
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tions of equality or integrity.182 The litigant might also frame her argu-
ment not in terms of broad factual similarities between cases but in terms 
of principle: She might claim that one or more previous cases have pro-
duced or recognized a principle that also applies in her case to require a 
certain result. 
These uses of precedent-arguments from broad analogy and argu-
ments from principle-become legitimate when, and to the extent that, it 
is determined that no precedent is strictly controlling because no prece-
dent has facts that are materially equivalent to those of the subsequent 
case. In such circumstances, less direct, more general uses of precedent 
become part of the reasoned arguments presented by the parties in favor 
of one or the other result; they serve as tools of participatory 
adjudication. 
Of course, these kinds of arguments do imply some degree of con-
straint over the subsequent court: A court might be said to be con-
strained to reach the result supported by the best arguments from broad 
analogy and principle (although other types of arguments, such as argu-
ments from policy, might also playa role in the court's decision). In-
deed, one of the most influential extant theories of adjudication, Ronald 
Dworkin's theory of law as integrity, posits that courts are constrained by 
broad analogies and principles in this way.183 
But the question of whether courts are in fact constrained by such 
arguments in a way similar to (though not in the same degree as) their 
constraint to follow on-point precedents need not concern us from the 
standpoint of adjudication as representation. This is true in part because 
of the participatory nature of adjudication in the subsequent, potentially 
constrained case; as we shall see,184 litigants in subsequent cases are able 
in a sense to "elect" their representatives by choosing, through reasoned 
arguments, which precedents control, and this same process operates to 
determine which precedents might control in the looser fashion dictated 
by broad analogy and general principle. It is true more fundamentally 
because, even under a holistic Dworkinian theory of constraint, the con-
straining force of a given precedent grows ever smaller as the level of 
factual similarity between that precedent and subsequent cases decreases. 
Thus subsequent litigants can be said to be constrained by a precedent 
only so far as they are similarly situated to the parties in the precedential 
case-that is, only so far as the broad analogies or principles deemed to 
govern them stem from cases with similar facts. The persuasiveness of the 
analogy or principle shrinks as the factual similarities become more 
attenuated. 
182. Elsewhere I have argued that deont~logical arguments in favor of consistency, 
specifically arguments from equality and arguments from integrity, necessarily fail. See 
Peters, supra note 34, at 2055-110. 
183. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 225-312. I have critiqued aspects of this theory 
in Peters, supra note 34, at 2073-112. 
184. See infra Part II.B.3.h. 
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That, then, is the nature of a common law rule. Unlike most statu-
tory rules, it is not a<double-edged sW'Ofd; it dictates results in cases of 
similarity but not in (most) cases of difference. Instead of producing 
comprehensive rules, the common law proceeds case by case,185 binding 
future litigants only through the force of analogy. A common law rule is 
simply the mandate that the decision in a subsequent case not contradict 
the result of a prior one. 
I am not claiming that courts always act precisely in the way I have 
described. I am simply claiming that my description captures the essen-
tial character of the common law with respect to binding rules. To the 
extent courts do not respect this essential character, adjudication as rep-
resentation will be compromised (although other legitimate ends may be 
served); but we ·will cross that bridge when we come to it.186 
2. Stare Decisis and Interest Representation. - The fact that the com-
mon law produces and enforces "rules" in the way I have just described 
creates a dynamic of interest representation between the parties to prece-
dential cases and the parties to subsequently constrained cases. 
Recall that proceduralism favors representation by someone who is 
similarly situated to her constituents in important ways, who is enough 
like them that it is probable she shares many of their core viewpoints and 
interests.187 Similarity of situation between representative and constitu-
ent reinforces the coercive power of the polls because it provides the rep-
resentative with an independent, self-serving reason to act in the constitu-
ent's best interests. Thus a true interest representative, a representative 
who is so similar to her constituents that their interests overlap on a sig-
nificant number of central issues, is more likely than a representative con-
cerned merely with reelection to produce legislation satisfactory to her 
constituency. 
Likewise, functionalism favors this sort of interest representation not 
only because it increases the likelihood that a representative will truly 
represent the distinct characteristics of her constituency, but also because 
it allows the representative to exercise her own independent judgment in 
the way that her constituents likely would have exercised theirs in the 
same position.188 Interest representation allows the representative the 
necessary freedom to act according to her own conscience while retain-
ing the essentially representative nature of her conduct, because it en-
sures that her conscience will resemble the consciences of her constitu-
ents. It thus promotes the character of democracy as a process of 
reasoned deliberation among diverse, often conflicting viewpoints. 
185. For a related discussion of the procedural distinctions between adjudicative and 
parliamentary decisionmaking with respect to the issue of decisionmaking consistency, see 
Peters, supra note 34, at 2081-84. 
186. See infra Part II.C & Part IV. 
187. See supra Part I.C.2.a. 
188. See supra Part I.C.2.b. 
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Now consider the operation of the common law method, which re-
quires a court to conform its decision to that in a previous case only to 
the extent that the facts of the two cases are materially similar. The sim-
ple but crucial fact about this method of constraint is that material similar-
ity between the facts of the two cases means material similarity between the situa-
tions of the parties in each case. If the plaintiff in subsequent Case Y 
successfully argues that his situation is materially different than that of 
the plaintiff in unfavorable precedential Case X, the court in Case Y need 
not reach a result identical to that of Case X; that is, the plaintiff in Case 
Ywill not be bound by the rule of Case X. In contrast, if the defendant in 
Case Y convinces the court that she and the plaintiff are situated materi-
ally similarly to the parties to Case X, the court will follow the rule of Case 
X, binding the parties to the same result reached in Case Y. Thus the 
method of stare decisis ensures that an adjudicatively created rule will bind liti-
gants only to the extent that they are situated similarly to the parties who partici-
pated in creating the rule. 
In other words, the common law method ensures interest representation. 189 
A litigant is not bound by a court-made rule unless his situation is similar 
in material ways to that of a party that participated in creating the rule. 
And the theory of interest representation holds that similarly situated par-
ties will have relevant interests in common. The plaintiff in Case X assert-
ing a novel theory of tort recovery will have the same interest in employ-
ing that theory successfully that a later plaintiff in Case Y, suffering the 
same injury under similar conditions, would have. The plaintiff in Case 
X, that is, serves as an interest representative of the plaintiff in Case Y. In 
acting on her own behalf, the plaintiff in Case X is also necessarily acting 
on behalf of the similarly situated plaintiff in Case Y. 
Note that the common law method as a mechanism of interest repre-
sentation satisfies both the proceduralist and the functionalist ap-
proaches to lawmaking legitimacy. From a proceduralist perspective, the 
plaintiff in later Case Y (call him Py) can rely on the likelihood that the 
original plaintiff in Case X (Px) acted in Py'S best interests in pressing the 
theory, because Px's best interes~_ and Py's best interests coincide.19o 
189. As we shall see, this statement probably needs to be qualified in a couple of 
respects. First, if one believes that mere similarity of interests does not assure adequate 
representation, then one might not be confident that the common law method assures 
adequate representation. I discuss this issue in more detail infra Part IT.C. Second, there 
are certain contexts in which the common law method cannot really operate in the 
archetypal way I have described here; for instance, when a court strikes down a statute as 
unconstitutional, parties whose interests were not represented by parties to the case may be 
affected. I discuss three examples of such circumstances infra Part IV. 
190. As Robert Bone has written of res judicata, a doctrine with many similarities to 
stare decisis, the theory of interest representation "supposes that a party adequately 
represents an absentee when that party shares the same or similar substantive litigation 
goals ('interests') and vigorously litigates the suit. Under these circumstances, the party's 
commitment to her own self interest indirectly furthers the interests of the nonparty." 
Bone, supra note 32, at 203. I would add that the existence of a strong self:.interest in the 
outcome of the lawsuit usually serves to ensure that the participating party will "vigorously 
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Likewise, from a functionalist perspective, society can expect that the rule 
produced in Case X is the best possible rule that could have been pro-
duced, since it was the product of reasoned argument between a plaintiff 
and a defendant who can be seen, respectively, to represent the interests 
of every similarly situated plaintiff and defendant out there. 
This aspect of the common law method-its automatic implementa-
tion of interest representation, and thus of a measure of democratic legit-
imacy-appears to have escaped almost unnoticed in scholarly discussion 
of acljudicative lawmaking and analogical reasoning.191 But its implica-
tions are quite- important. It means that adjudicative lawmaking is closely 
comparable in material ways to parliamentary lawmaking. As with stat-
utes enacted by democratically elected legislatures, those bound by court-
made rules can be said to have participated in the creation of those rules 
through interest representatives. The common law method thus guaran-
tees that adjudicative rulemaking will have some of the same kind of dem-
ocratic legitimacy that parliamentary legislation possesses. 
3. Interest Representation, Electoral Selection, and Legitimacy. - Of 
course, parliamentary legislators are selected by a method of free and 
open elections, while litigants in precedential cases usually are selected by 
sheer happenstance. For this reason the sort of representation produced 
by the common law method can be seen as a second-best alternative to 
electoral representation. The common law method might not generate 
as much democratic legitimacy as a process of representative democracy 
generates. But this gap in legitimacy between adjudicative and parlia-
mentary lawmaking is not as wide as it might first appear. 
litigate[] the suit." See my discussion of justiciability doctrines infra Part IV.C for an 
exploration of how the lack of a strong self.interest in the outcome might affect 
adjudication as representation. 
Stephen Yeazell has explored the concept of interest representation in the context of 
class action lawsuits, another subject with many similarities to stare decisis. Professor 
Yeazell notes that in class actions, " [i]nterest provides the substitute for individual initiative 
and consent; the class action justifies action that legally binds another without his consent 
by pointing out that his interest is represented in a situation in which it is inconceivable 
that he would not wish his interest to be so pursued." Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval 
Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action 15 (1987); see also id. at 197-212 (discussing 
development of idea of interest representation in class action context). 
191. The salient recent exception is the work of Lea Brilmayer, who in several articles 
has discussed the representative function of stare decisis in the context of judicial review, 
arguing that justiciability doctrines must be construed restrictively in order to ensure that 
plaintiffs challenging statutes in court will adequately represent the interests of 
nonlitigants and future plaintiffs who will be affected by the court's ruling. See Brilmayer, 
supra note 176; Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article 1lI: Perspectives on the "Case 
or Controversy" Requirement, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1979). I will discuss Professor 
Brilmayer's important insights in more depth during my application in Part IV.C below of 
the idea of adjudication as representation to the issue of justiciability. Edward Levi, in his 
germinal work An IntroductUm to Legal Reasoning, also hints at a theory of adjudication as 
representation when he asserts that the process of participatory adjudication "protects the 
parties and the community by making sure that the competing analogies are before the 
court." Levi, supra note 11, at 4. 
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a. The Common Law Method and True Interest Representatives. - For one 
thing, the common law method is a more perfect system of selecting true 
interest representatives than elections could ever be: By definition, it ap-
plies rules only to those who are in fact similar to their representatives in 
precisely those ways that are relevant with respect to the rule, that is, pre-
cisely along the appropriate axis of interest. In contrast, people voting in 
elections-even assuming they can accurately identify points of similarity 
between themselves and the candidates-are unlikely always to focus on 
exactly those similarities that matter to the legislation a candidate will be 
enacting; and in any event, no elected representative ever can be situated 
similarly to each of her constituents in every important respect. 
As such, the common law method improves on the interest represen-
tation mechanism of an electoral system in several related respects. It 
requires the court to focus on specific points of similarity and difference 
between the situations of the parties to the precedential and subsequent 
cases, not on general similarities in status or description between the par-
ties. It is concerned only with those points of similarity and difference 
that are demonstrably relevant to the rule by which a litigant might be 
bound. And it ensures that representatives will be similar to their constit-
uents in every way relevant to the rules by which the constituent might be 
bound; a litigant will find himself-represented by entirely different repre-
sentatives with respect to entirely different rules. Thus the common law 
method assures that a party will not have been represented by a prior 
litigant who is similar to her in just any old way; it sees to it that the 
similarities between representative and constituent are specifically mate-
rial to every rule by which the constituent will be bound. 
It would appear, then, that the common law method accomplishes 
interest representation better than the electoral process does. Subse-
quent litigants may not have direct coercive power over the representa-
tives who produce court-made rules on their behalf, but there is a solid 
basis for assuming that those representatives will act roughly how the sub-
sequent litigants would act in their shoes. If a factual basis for this as-
sumption is absent, the common law method ensures that the rule in 
question will not be binding. From the perspective of democratic legiti-
macy, therefore, the absence of direct coercive power over prior litigants 
does not trouble us as much as the absence of such power over elected 
representatives would, because we have good reason to believe that the 
mechanism of interest representation will operate better in adjudication 
than it does in parliamentary legislation. Stronger interest representa-
tion compensates, to some degree at least, for the lack of electoral 
coercion. 
b. "Election" of Representatives Through Participatory Adjudication. -
There is a second reason why the interest representation brought about 
by the common law method is not so poor an alternative to electoral con-
trol as we might think. Here we return to the process of participatory 
adjudication. Facts and legal arguments do not magically appear before a 
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judge deciding a case; they are framed, produced, and managed by the 
parties themselves. Thus precisely which precedents-precisely which 
court-made rules-will be determinative of a case, and precisely how they 
will be determinative, depend to a significant degree on how the parties 
choose to litigate the case. If the plaintiff succeeds in strategically down-
playing certain facts, a harmful precedent in which similar facts played a 
prominent role might go unnoticed. If the defendant chooses to advance 
one legal theory and rejects another, a whole line of precedents might 
become irrelevant. And even assuming all arguably material facts and 
precedents find their way before the court, the acumen and force of the 
reasoned argnments of the respective parties will determine which prece-
dents are followed, which are ignored, which are interpreted narrowly 
and which are analogized expansively. 
In short, it is not stretching things too far to say that the parties have 
some ability to choose-to "elect"-their representatives by bringing cer-
tain precedents to the fore and relegating others to the background. 
Seen this way, a court case becomes something like a hotly contested elec-
tion. Partisans of each candidate present reasoned arguments to the ulti-
mate decisionmaker-in the court case, the judge; in an election, their 
fellow citizens-explaining why their candidate should be chosen to gov-
ern. The litigant's "candidates" are simply opposing theories of the case 
with their respective supporting readings of precedent. In an election 
the winning candidate can be said to have been "chosen" even by those 
who voted against her, because all had an equal opportunity to present 
their best arguments in a fair selection process. Similarly, in a court case 
the winning theory, and the precedents supporting it, can be said to have 
been "chosen" even by the losing litigant, who similarly had a fair oppor-
tunity to make his best case. The losing litigant cannot complain that the 
losing litigant in a precedential case deemed to be controlling was not in 
fact an adequate representative of his interests, because he had every 
chance to convince the court not to rely on that precedent. The other 
side's arguments simply were better. 
This point, of course, should not be carried too far. Picking prece-
dents is not exactly like electing legislators. For one thing, the field of 
relevant precedential cases sometimes will be relatively well-defined and 
obvious; in such circumstances, most of the work of the litigants and their 
attorneys will consist not of choosing which precedents to rely upon, but 
of deciding how to analogize or distinguish the obviously relevant author-
ities. This does not look much like the simpler process of choosing 
among candidates A, B, and C in which the voter engages. 
Even the process of deciding what to do with a precedent already 
before the court, however, is a participatory process, a process allowing 
the litigant to attempt meaningfully to shape the decision that will apply 
to her. As a medium of true participation, this process, which requires 
the litigant and her attorney to manage constructively the progress of the 
case and to make myriad subtle choices of order and method of proof, 
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argument technique, emphasis, and the like, may be even more valuable 
than the somewhat mechanical act of flipping one or the other lever in a 
voting booth.192 And it is no objection to the portrayal of participatory 
acljudication as a kind of electoral process to say that the diversity and 
substance of the "representatives" (that is, the precedents) available to 
any litigant will be outside her control. The same is true of democratic 
elections, in which the typical voter is powerless to change either the field 
of candidates with which she is presented or the substantive views of those 
candidates. 
Another way in which participatory adjudication is perhaps an imper-
fect substitute for the electoral process is the inability of litigants to 
change the decisions that constrain them by electing new legislators at 
the next opportuni!y. This imperfection too, though, is not as glaring as 
it may at first seem: A subsequent litigant can attempt to "change" unfa-
vorable precedents by presenting reasoned arguments why those prece-
dents should not apply to her. And it is not clear that even litigants who 
lose are harmed to a significantly greater degree, or in a significantly dif-
ferent way, than citizens whose"candidates lose elections or whose pre-
ferred legislation does not pass. Precedents can be overruled just as legis-
lators and statutes can be changed. We would like both kinds of events to 
occur only through a process of reasoned argument demonstrating that 
an initial decision was wrong, or that things have changed so much since 
then that the decision is no longer valid. Such arguments are open to the 
litigant as well as to the legislative constituent or the legislator herself. 19B 
While participatory adjudication is not a mirror image of the electo-
ral process, then, it still resembles that process in important ways. Like 
the electoral process, it enables and bolsters interest representation 
through a process of choosing representatives that is essentially par-
192. I do not mean to downplay the role of attorneys in this participatory process. 
Typically it will be the attorneys for the litigants, not the litigants themselves, who are 
making most of these decisions. But compare participatory adjudication to its alternative, 
adjudication by judicial fiat. Participatory adjudication places the ultimate control of these 
kinds of litigation decisions with the litigants themselves: They can choose lawyers that 
they think will make these decisions correctly, they can oversee the general (and 
sometimes even the specific) activities of the attorney during the litigation, and they can 
fire and replace attorneys whom they think are not performing adequately. The litigants 
can even represent themselves if they choose. Adjudication by judicial fiat, on the other 
hand, would remove most or all of these kinds of decisions from the litigants' hands 
entirely. 
193. Of course, a losing litigant cannot, after exhausting her appeals, change the 
result of the specific case she has lost. But neither can a "losing" citizen reverse the effects 
he has suffered from an unfavorable statute merely by voting in the next election for a 
representative who will replace the law. The point is illustrated by imagining a court case 
in which the application of a statute is at issue. The losing litigant in such a case, who has 
been harmed both by an unfavorable court decision and by an unfavorable piece of 
legislation, is powerless to reverse that particular harm (i.e., change the result of that 
specific case) by any means-adjudicative ar legislative. The most she can hope for is that 
the statute (or its judicial interpretation) will change in the future so that any similar case 
in which she is involved will be decided the other way. 
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ticipatory. This is not to deny the ultimate authority of the judge, who 
occupies a decisionmaking role without a true analog in the electoral and 
parliamentary decisionmaking processes. No independent arbiter akin to 
the judge decides between alternative political candidates in elections or 
between alternative statutory provisions in the legislature, it is true; there 
the people rule. But this is not to say that parliamentary lawmaking sim-
ply is democratic while adjudicative lawmaking simply is not. It is to say 
only that parliamentary lawmaking is, or can be, finally more democratic 
than its adjudicative counterpart. We might not believe that participatory 
adjudication imbues adjudicative lawmaking with quite as much demo-
cratic legitimacy as parliamentary lawmaking posesses, but we must recog-
nize that a meaningful degree of that kind of legitimacy is nonetheless 
present in it. 
4. Representation of Conforming Nonlitigants. - So the effect of the 
common law method is to bind litigants only to those rules that can be 
said to have been produced through the participation of a true interest 
representative. In this way, the peculiarities of the common law method 
extend the legitimate authority of a court decision from the parties im-
mediately before the court to subsequent litigants whose cases will be 
controlled or affected by that decision, in much the same way that popu-
lar elections extend the participatory legitimacy of direct democracy to 
laws made by representative legislatures. But what of the potential bind-
ing effect of a court-produced rule on persons who never make it into 
court? What about those who conform their conduct to an adjudicatively 
created rule out of fear of the legal consequences they may suffer if they 
do not? 
Here the argument for interest representation of similarly situated 
litigants becomes, in most cases, an a fortiori argument for interest repre-
sentation of conforming nonlitigants. Nonlitigants who conform to a 
court-created rule imagine themselves to be litigants who will be bound by 
that rule. They adjust their behavior out of a belief that, were their be-
havior to be tested in court, their situation would be found similar to that 
of the party whose behavior was chastised or rewarded in a precedential 
case. Such conforming nonlitigants are not in reality bound by a prece-
dential court decision; they are only predicting that they will be bound by 
that decision. Thus their resulting adjustment in behavior has an ele-
ment of voluntariness to it, and is certainly no more troubling than the 
coercion of someone actually held by a court to be bound by a court-
made rule. Indeed, to the extent that such persons have advance warning 
of the potential applicability of a rule to their conduct, they can be said to 
choose their representatives (in the form of the precedents that will bind 
them) to a degree that litigants hauled unsuspectingly into court cannot. 
They have the opportunity both to conform their conduct to that re-
quired of similarly situated parties in decided cases, and to begin preemp-
tively planning their arguments about the extent to which they should in 
fact be bound. 
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There may be some kinds of cases in which this a fortiori argument 
becomes problematic. Suppose, for instance, that a manufacturer loses a 
products liability case. The result of the case may cause that manufac-
turer, and perhaps other manufacturers, to modify their conduct by sell-
ing the product (or similar products) in a less dangerous but more ex-
pensive form, or even by withdrawing the product from the market 
altogether. If only the manufacturers will be affected by their own con-
duct modification, we would not be concerned from the perspective of 
interest representation. But others will be affected too: consumers who 
want to purchase the product, and merchants who want to sell it. They 
will be forced to buy or sell the product at a higher price now, or will be 
prevented from buying or selling it at all. And we cannot say that the 
interests of these consumers and merchants were adequately represented 
by the plaintiff in the germinal litigation, because the plaintiff's interest 
clearly was to force the manufacturer to alter its conduct in this way (or, 
rather, to pay for not having altered its conduct in this way). 
In this kind of case, interest representation seems not to work very 
well. Does this threaten our general view of the legitimacy of adjudicative 
rulemaking? The answer is threefold. First, although the existence of 
this kind of case reduces the extent to which we can claim adjudicative 
rulemaking is democratically legitimate, it does not eliminate our ability 
to make this claim. Many, probably most, court cases will not present this 
kind of representational problem, at least not in the degree that our 
products liability example presents it And even in cases presenting such 
a problem, our evaluation oflegitimacy must (again) be comparative, not 
absolute; we must compare the degree oflegitimacy produced by a system 
of participatory adjudication and interest representation, imperfect 
though that system may be, with the degree of legitimacy that would be 
produced by a system of adjudication by judicial fiat. We must ask 
whether the interests of absent consumers and merchants are more likely 
to be represented by a system in which opposing litigants present proofs 
and reasoned arguments in favor of a certain result than by a system in 
which a judge decrees the result without the benefit of this participatory 
process. If our answer, as I suspect it may be, is that representation is 
better achieved through a participatory than through a dictatorial deci-
sionmaking scheme, then cases like our products liability hypothetical are 
not so lacking in democratic legitimacy as we may initially fear. 
This point leads nicely to a second response to such cases, which is 
that the interests of absent, dissimilarly situated parties may not be so 
unrepresented in them as we might imagine. It is true that the plaintiff 
in our hypothetical products liability case does not represent the interests 
of absent consumers and merchants who are willing to sacrifice safety for 
price and availability. But the plaintiff probably does represent the inter-
ests of consumers (and some merchants) who, like the plaintiff, value 
safety over price and availability-who are willing to have unsafe products 
made safer at greater cost or even removed from the market altogether. 
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It is not clear that this group of nonlitigants will be less numerous than 
their more risk-prone, price-sensitive counterparts. And, perhaps more 
importantly, what of the manufacturer defendant in the case: Whose in-
terests does it represent? Its own, certainly, and those of similarly situated 
manufacturers; but it also represents, at least to some degree, the inter-
ests of others who want the product to remain on the market at its cur-
rent price, including some consumers and merchants. The interest cor-
relation here is unlikely to be perfect: The manufacturer, for instance, 
may not have as great an interest in defending a single product of its 
diversified product line as a merchant whose sole business is selling that 
product would have. But the point is that there is unlikely to be a signifi-
cant group of nonlitigants whose interests in the result of a case like this 
are entirely unrepresented in the adjudicative process. Put simply, a non-
litigant consumer with an interest in the outcome of a products liability 
case either favors liability or opposes it. If the former, her interests are 
largely (if not perfectly) in step with the plaintiff's; if the latter, her inter-
ests are largely (if not perfectly) in step with the defendant's. 
A final response to this kind of case is that to the extent the interests 
of the litigants do not perfectly coincide with those of affected nonliti-
gants, there may be remedies that can be implemented in the adjudica-
tive process itself. I will discuss some possible remedies below when I 
consider another kind of case that often involves a significant number of 
affected nonlitigants: constitutional cases.194 One such remedy with par-
ticular application in the products liability context might be allowing af-
fected groups who are not original parties to the case-consumer groups, 
for instance, and merchants' and perhaps manufacturers' trade associa-
tions-to intervene in the proceedings. Doing so would increase the like-
lihood that the interests of nonlitigants who are affected when a court 
decision significantly alters the status quo will be represented in the deci-
sionmaking process. 
C. Adjudication As Representation: Three Necessary Conditions 
The concept of representation . . . is a continuing tension be-
tween ideal and achievement. 
Hanna Pitkin195 
We have seen now how the conjunction of two related phenomena 
can give adjudicative lawmaking some claim to democratic legitimacy. 
The first phenomenon is participatory adjudication-that process 
whereby court decisions are created in large part through the participa-
tion of the litigants before the court. Participation clothes the resulting 
decision with legitimate authority to bind the litigants, both from a 
proceduralist and from a functionalist perspective. 
194. See infra Pan IV.B. 
195. Pitkin, supra note 117, at 240. 
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The second phenomenon is interest representation through the 
common law method-that process whereby prior decisions are made 
binding on subsequent litigants only to the extent that the litigants in 
both cases are similarly situated in all material respects. Interest repre-
sentation extends the legitimate authority of a court decision from the 
litigants immediately before the court to litigants (and conforming nonli-
tigants) subsequently affected by the decision through the force of 
precedent. 
Operating together, these phenomena comprise a process I will call 
adjudication as representation. Acljudication as representation endows adju-
dicative lawmaking with a legitimacy akin to that present in democratic 
parliamentary lawmaking, a legitimacy derived both from the constructive 
participation of the governed and from the deliberative quality of the 
substantive decisions produced. This legitimacy thus springs from a sepa-
rate source entirely than the necessity of filling gaps in legislative pro-
nouncements or of checking the occasional excesses of majority rule to 
which those seeking to justify adjudicative lawmaking usually appeal. 
But I have been painting a rose-colored picture of the adjudicative 
process. The activities of courts do not always fit this description quite so 
neatly; sometimes they fall quite short of it indeed. In Part IV we will look 
a bit more closely at some of those instances. Here, though, let me sketch 
the pattern that we will use in dissecting those cases, and in thinking 
about adjudication as representation for the remainder of this Article. I 
will do so by describing the two, or possibly three, general conditions that 
must exist for adjudication as representation to function properly (that is, 
legitimately). 
The first general condition necessary for adjudication as representa-
tion is that the binding (i.e., precedential) decision actually be produced to a 
significant degree by the litigants. This condition is more or less a restate-
ment of the features thought necessary by Fuller in order for adj~dication 
in its core sense to exist: the parties must be allowed to take the lead in 
shaping the litigation through the presentation of proofs and reasoned 
arguments,196 and the court's decision must (in Professor Eisenberg's 
paraphrase) actually "proceed from and be congruent with [the parties'] 
proofs and arguments."197 Excessive intervention by the court in the 
proof-taking or argument-making processes, or failure by the court to 
conform its decision relatively closely to the alternatives offered by the 
parties, threatens adjudication as representation by attenuating the con-
nection betvveen the litigants' conduct and the ultimate outcome. 
The second necessary condition is that the precedential decision bind 
only those future parties who are similarly situated to the original litigants in every 
material way. This is simply another way of saying that subsequent courts 
must apply stare decisis correctly. Precedents must not be stretched be-
196. See Fuller, supra note 133, at 365-72. 
197. Eisenberg, supra note 137, at 412; see Fuller, supra note 133, at 387-91. 
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yond their reasonable bounds to encompass materially dissimilar fact pat-
terns; analogies must not be drawn based on insignificant factual similari-
ties between the precedential and the subsequent case; meaningful 
differences between cases must not be ignored. Where parties are 
deemed bound by decisions rendered under materially different circum-
stances, the coincidence between the interests of the precedent-setting 
litigants and those of the subsequent parties is lost, and the representative 
legitimacy of the binding is compromised. 
It is worth remembering here what we hinted at previously:198 A 
properly functioning mechanism of participatory adjudication in a subse-
quent case may to a certain degree remedy, or at least excuse, a breakdown 
of interest representation (i.e., an incorrect application of stare decisis) 
in that case. We should not forget that, ideally at least, the litigants in 
subsequent cases have as much control over the decisions of those cases 
as the litigants in a precedential case had over the decision in theirs. To 
the extent, then, that a subsequent court enlarges the precedential force 
of a case beyond its natural reach, the arguments of the parties to the 
later case themselves might be to blame. In other words, while the deci-
sion in such a subsequent case loses its legitimacy as an application of the 
decision in the precedential case, it may well have gained new legitimacy 
with respect to the parties it binds as a product of their own Iitigative 
efforts. 
Argnably, there is a third general condition that is necessary in order 
for adjudication as representation to function correctly: that the conduct of 
the parties in litigating the precedential case meet a threshold standard of ade-
quacy. If this condition applies, a subsequent litigant is not legitimately 
bound by a precedent unless her counterpart in the precedential case 
pressed his claims or defenses with a reasonable level of skill and enthusi-
asm; the precedent-setting litigant's failure, for instance, to present a key 
piece of evidence or to articulate the strongest legal arguments might 
prejudice similarly situated parties to a degree that would vitiate the legit-
imacy of binding them. 
In many or most circumstances, this supposed third condition will be 
superfluous in light of the second condition identified above. A subse-
quent litigant who demonstrates that a party to a potentially precedential 
case failed to present key evidence or to make the best available argu-
ment thereby distinguishes her situation from the situation of the prior 
litigant. She tells the court that because she has presented material evi-
dence that the prior litigant did not present, or because she has made a 
valid argument that the prior litigant did not make, she is situated differ-
ently from the prior litigant and should not be bound by the rule of that 
case. We would expect the court to credit this line of reasoning and rec-
ognize that it is not bound to reach the same decision in the subsequent 
case. Indeed, the later litigant's mere act of presenting different evi-
198. See supra Part n.B.3.h. 
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dence or making different or stronger arguments, whether or not the 
previous litigant's failure to do so is recognized, might be sufficient to 
convince the subsequent court to discount or disregard the precedent. 
With respect to most defects in representation, then, the proper opera-
tion of stare decisis should eliminate the problem. 
But there may be situations in which the correct application of stare 
decisis cannot remedy inadequate representation by precedent-setting 
parties. Defects in representation in the precedential case may be subtle 
and hidden from the view of later litigants and courts, such as where a 
prior litigant has presented all the relevant evidence and made all the 
appropriate arguments but has done so in an ineffective, unpersuasive 
way. Or the nature of the precedential decision itself might not admit of 
distinctions based on differing arguments or somewhat divergent facts, 
such as a decision broadly interpreting a statutory provision or invalidat-
ing a statute on constitutional groundS.199 In these kinds of circum-
stances, the impairment of our third general condition of adequate rep-
resentation may operate, absent correction, to compromise the 
legitimacy of an adjudicative decision as a binding rule. 
One final comment about this third condition seems necessary here. 
Even assuming the third condition is not redundant of the second one, it 
could be argued that a representative's competence or lack thereof has 
no bearing on the legitimacy of the representation, and thus of the rules 
produced by means of that representation. Exhibit A in favor of this con-
tention is the fact that we do not consider parliamentary legislation to be 
illegitimate merely because some or even all of the legislators who voted 
for it do not meet our ideal of competence. (Or perhaps we do; if so, this 
argument is thwarted before it begins.) Why should we place more strin-
gent requirements on adjudicative representatives? 
A possible answer is that unlike elected legislators, adjudicative rep-
resentatives cannot be thrown out of office and replaced with more com-
petent ones, who then can repeal and replace their predecessors' ill-con-
ceived laws. Litigants bound by bad precedent must rely primarily on the 
common law method to ensure that precedent-setting litigants have acted 
competently; and arguably, if a precedent binds despite having been in-
competently litigated, this premise of interest representation is vitiated. 
The possibility of overruling-a possibility that itself may be open to the 
reasoned arguments of the parties200-may temper this disadvantage, but 
it exists to some extent nonetheless. As such, actual adequacy of repre-
sentation probably should be considered a necessary condition of adjudi-
cation as representation. 
These, then, are the two, and probably three, necessary conditions of 
adjudication as representation. The next Part illustrates adjudication as 
199. Such cases may also violate the second condition of adjudication as 
representation, as the discussion of constitutional cases below suggests. See infra Part N.B. 
200. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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representation in action in some paradigmatic cases-cases in which all 
three of these conditions exist. 
III. ADJUDICATION As REPRESENTATION IN AcrION 
All theory, dear friend, is grey, but the golden tree of actual life 
springs ever green. 
Johann von Goethe201 
How does adjudication as representation actually work in the real 
world? The answer is not only empirical; it also is largely anecdotal and 
thus difficult to examine. This holds true for all three conditions neces-
sary for the process to function. The degree to which a court decision is 
responsive to the actual participation of the parties is hard to track be-
cause the only reportage of court cases that is regularly published and 
widely available-written judicial opinions-no longer routinely recounts 
the arguments of the parties and usually gives little or no indication of 
how the case was litigated in the trial court. This problem is exacerbated 
by the fact that most published opinions are those of appellate tribunals, 
not trial courts. These same factors make it even more difficult to assess 
the quality of advocacy engaged in by the litigants and their attorneys. In 
order to test for these conditions in a typical court case, one therefore 
must be on the lookout for bits and pieces in the reported opinions, re-
maining vigilant for, to borrow the title of a recently popular rock album, 
"hints, allegations, and things left unsaid."202 
Testing for the accuracy of an adjudicative rule's binding effect can 
be just as difficult, for different reasons. A precedent is not likely to be 
applied squarely (that is, to virtually identical facts) in many published 
opinions. This is because "easy" cases-those where the precedent binds 
without much controversy-rarely make it to the written opinion stage. 
Often they never make it to court at all; parties either modify their every-
day conduct to conform to the precedent, or they settle out of court 
those conflicts that clearly are governed by the precedent. If such cases 
do make it to court, they likely will be disposed of summarily and without 
a published opinion, on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. 
Even if they survive through trial they are not likely to be the subject of a 
written, reasoned decision. Only very infrequently will such cases be me-
morialized in a published appellate opinion. 
So, since researchers often find themselves working only with the 
opinions of appellate courts, they have to make do with what they can 
find in them. Modem appellate opinions rarely give much of a sense of 
how (or how effectively) the parties have participated in the decision. 
Moreover, they tend rarely to simply apply a precedent to virtually identi-
201. Johann von Goethe, Faust pt. 1 (1808). 
202. Collective Soul, Hints Allegations and Things Left Unsaid (Atlantic Records 
Corp. 1993). 
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cal facts to reach an identical result; more often when appellate (as op-
posed to trial) courts say they are "applying" or "following" a precedent, 
they are in fact simply reaching the same result on arguably analogous 
but nonetheless quite distinct factual circumstances. This is not so much 
a question of misapplying a rule as it is of creating a new rule, and we may 
assess the legitimacy of that new rule itself by the degree to which it was 
created through effective litigant participation and by the extent to which 
it binds only those future litigants or conforming nonlitigants who are 
similarly situated. 
This Part is an attempt to illustrate the basic operation of adjudica-
tion as representation by examining three series of actual cases. First I 
will trace the developmerit of a common law rule (and the implications of 
its development for adjudication as representation) through a string of 
California tort cases. Then I will discuss briefly how adjudication as rep-
resentation might translate from the common law to two other modes of 
adjudicative decision: those interpreting and applying statutes and those 
reviewing statutes for consistency with constitutional provisions. I will 
work only with reported appellate opinions, so my methodology might 
suffer to a certain extent from the weaknesses described above. But I 
hope to have chosen cases in which such potential weaknesses can be 
assumed away, cases in which it is reasonable to assume that adjudication 
as representation has worked as it should. If, by the end of this Part, the 
reader has a fairly good picture of what adjudication as representation 
can look like in these three p(lIadigmatic kinds of cases, I will have 
achieved here what I hope to achieve. 
A. Adjudication As Representation in a String of Common Law Cases 
That the courts should allow recovery to a mother who suf-
fers emotional trauma and physical injury from witnessing the 
infliction of death or injury to her child for which the tort-feasor 
is liable in negligence would appear to be a compelling 
proposition . 
. . . In the instant case, the presence of all the above factors 
indicates the plaintiff has alleged a sufficient prima facie case. 
Dillon v. Legg203 
Plaintiffs ... contend that they have stated a cause of action for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress under our decision in 
Dillon v. Legg .. .. 
Ochoa v. Superior Court204 
1. Creating a Common Law Rule: Dillon v. Legg. - In the well-known 
common law tort case Dillon v. Legg, the California Supreme Court al-
203. 441 P.2d 912, 921 (Cal. 1968). 
204. 703 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1985). 
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lowed a plaintiff who had witnessed an auto accident in which a close 
relative was killed, but who was not herself in fear for her safety during 
the accident, to state a tort claim against the injuring party for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. Dillon was the first American decision to 
reach such a result.205 
The state supreme court's opinion in Dillon provides us with what 
appears to be a relatively complete account of the procedural and factual 
history of the case. The plaintiff in Dillon was Margery Dillon, the mother 
of a young girl who had been struck and killed by the defendant's car as 
the girl "lawfully crossed" a road at an intersection.206 Margery's com-
plaint alleged that she had been "'in close proximity to the ... collision 
and personally witnessed said collision.' "207 Margery claimed to have 
"'sustained great emotional disturbance and shock and injury to her ner-
vous system' which caused her great physical and mental pain and suffer-
ing"208 as a result of witnessing the accident, and she sought damages 
from the defendant based on these injuries. 
The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings with respect to 
Margery's emotional distress claim.209 Citing existing case law, the de-
fendant contended that Margery could not be allowed to recover for 
merely witnessing a tort unless she had "suffered emotional distress, 
fright or shock as a result of fear for [her] own safety. "210 Because Margery 
had alleged that her emotional injuries resulted from the trauma of wit-
nessing her child's death, not from any fear for her own safety, the de-
fendant argued that she had alleged no legally cognizable injury. The 
trial court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the case. 
Margery appealed to the state supreme court.211 
Let us pause for a moment to note the degree to which the trial 
court's decision in Dillon appears to have been shaped by the activities of 
the litigants. (Recall that the degree to which the litigants themselves 
have shaped a decision is the degree to which the first necessary condi-
tion of adjudication as representation has been met.212) In Dillon, the 
facts and legal theories offered by the plaintiff in her complaint, and the 
205. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914; Marc A. Franklin & Robert L. Rabin, Cases and 
Materials on Tort Law and Alternatives 299-300 (4th ed. 1987). 
206. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 914. Another daughter who witnessed the accident also was a 
plaintiff. See id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. See id. 
210. Id. at 914-15 (emphasis altered). 
211. See id. at 915. 
212. See supra Part II.C. The degree to which the third (possibly) necessary 
condition of adjudication as representation-adequacy of representation, see id.-was met 
in Dillon is, of course, difficult to discern from the reported opinion, especially since the 
court does not explicitly rehearse the arguments of the parties in much detail. The most 
we can say for sure is that the losing party in Dillon, the defendant, appears to have 
identified the relevant precedents, which did not support liability, see Dillon, 441 P.2d at 
914-15 (quoting defendant's memorandum supporting motion for judgment on the 
1997] ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENTATION 381 
legal arguments made by the defendant in his motion, were entirely de-
terminative of the legal issue decided by the court. Had Margery alleged 
that she had been in fear for her own safety during the accident, the 
defendant would have had no basis on which to bring his motion for 
judgment on the pleadings (or he would have had to bring the motion 
on a different theory entirely). Similarly, the defendant's decision to 
bring the motion, and to base it upon the theory that he used, forced the 
trial court to decide a certain issue in a certain procedural posture. Had 
the defendant, for instance, chosen to take discovery before seeking dis-
missal, it is possible that the facts elicited would have provided Margery 
with an alternative theory for the recovery of emotional damages, making 
the issue irrelevant; or the facts could have contradicted Margery's con-
tention that she witnessed the accident, again mooting the question. 
And, had the defendant's attorney not uncovered the case law cited in his 
motion, Margery'S emotional distress claim might have proceeded with-
out legal challenge. In short, the parties presented the trial court with 
two mutually exclusive alternatives: dismiss the emotional distress claim 
on certain legal grounds, or retain it on the theory that those grounds do 
not apply. The trial court chose the former. Without the particular work 
done by the litigants and their counsel in Dillon, the trial court might 
have decided a different issue, or none at all. 
Margery'S decision to appeal the dismissal is, of course, also signifi-
cant. She and her attorney probably did not go through the time and 
expense of an appeal to a state supreme court on a whim; they likely 
believed they had strong legal arguments in favor of allowing her claim to 
proceed, despite the countervailing case law. Thus the supreme court 
was presented not with a fait accompli, but with two reasoned and mutually 
exclusive theories of the case. 
The supreme court in Dillon reversed the trial court's judgment on 
the pleadings. In doing so, the court rejected the defendant's contention 
that a witness to an accident must be allowed to recover for her own emo-
tional injuries only if she feared for her own safety-only if, in the rele-
vant terminology, she was in the "zone of danger."213 Instead the court 
adopted the plaintiff's theory of recovery. It is foreseeable to a tortfeasor, 
said the court, that even a plaintiff outside the zone of physical danger 
could suffer "bodily injury or sickness ... brought on by [the] emotional 
disturbance" of witnessing a severe injury to a loved one.214 This foresee-
ability gives rise to a duty of care on the part of a defendant with respect 
to bystanders.215 According to the court, the question whether this fore-
seeability actually exists "must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a 
pleadings), and that the court spends most of the opinion considering and rejecting what 
appear to be the strongest policy arguments against liability. See id. at 916-25. 
213. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 915. 
214. Id. at 920. 
215. See id. 
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case-by-case basis."216 But on the facts alleged in Dillon it clearly could be 
said to have existed, and the case therefore was allowed to proceed to 
trial. 
Read as a rule that could be applied in factually similar future cases, 
the Dillon decision looks something like this: If a certain set of factual 
conditions is present-including a close relationship between an accident 
victim and the plaintiff, the plaintiff's contemporaneous presence at the 
accident scene, and the sensory perception of the accident by the plain-
tiff-then severe emotional injury to the plaintiff may be foreseeable and 
the plaintiff must be allowed to proceed with her tort claim. By allowing 
Margery's claim to proceed on these facts, the Dillon court bound future 
courts, by stare decisis, to reach the same result in cases where (at least 
roughly) the same set of facts is present. But as the Dillon court itself 
warned, its decision did not require future courts to reach a different re-
sult in the presence of dissimilar facts or, in other words, "in the absence 
or reduced weight of some of the ... factors" present in Dillon.217 Dillon 
left future courts free to "draw lines of demarcation upon facts more sub-
tle than the compelling ones alleged in the complaint before [the Dillon 
court]. "218 
2. Reaching the Dillon Result on Similar Facts: Krouse v. Graham. -
For reasons already mentioned, the actual binding effects of the Dillon 
decision on subsequent litigants and conforming nonlitigants-and thus 
the extent to which the second necessary condition of adjudication as 
representation, the binding only of similarly situated parties,219 has been 
met-are difficult to ascertain. Some of these effects surely are hidden. 
Many accident defendants and their insurers probably settled claims after 
Dillon was handed down; other claims that would have been dismissed 
probably made it to trial and, eventually, to judgments that were not ap-
pealed with respect to the now-settled Dillon issue. In other words, much 
of the "binding" effect of Dillon undoubtedly took place sub rosa, 
through the process of people estimating their similarity to the parties in 
Dillon and settling their disputes or conducting their lawsuits accordingly. 
To the extent that this private activity accurately predicted the outcome 
of disputes should they progress to judgment, any coercion imposed by 
Dillon need not concern us: If similarly situated litigants are legitimately 
bound by the Dillon rule through adjudication as representation, a forti-
ori similarly situated nonlitigants are legitimately so bound. To the extent 
parties erred in their predictions of Dillon's binding effect, this need not 
216. Id. The Dillon court also enumerated three general factual circumstances that 
"the courts will take into account" in determining foreseeability in bystander cases. Id. In 
this respect, Dillon established the sort of "multifactor test" that I critique later as 
threatening to adjudication as representation. See infra Part IV.A.S.b. 
217. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 921. 
218. Id. 
219. See supra Part II.C. 
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concern us either, not any more than a party's misreading of a statute 
makes us question the legitimacy of the statute itself.220 
But of course the effects of the Dillon rule are not entirely concealed; 
it also has appeared in many subsequent reported decisions. In Krouse v. 
Graham, for example, the plaintiff sued to recover damages for emotional 
i~ury allegedly incurred when his wife was struck and killed by the de-
fendant's car.221 There was 'a potentially material factual difference be-
tween Krouse and Dillon: Unlike the plaintiff in Dillon, the plaintiff in 
Krouse had not actually seen the defendant's car striking his 'wife. While 
the Krouse plaintiff sat in the driver's seat, his wife had been removing 
groceries from the back of their parked car.222 The defendant's vehicle 
had "approached the rear of the Krouse vehicle, straddled the curb, and 
struck [the wife] before colliding with the rear of the parked car."223 As 
the court described it: 
[A]lthough [the plaintiff] did not see [his wife] struck by de-
fendant's automobile, he fully perceived the fact that she had 
been so struck, for he knew her position an instant before the 
impact, observed defendant's vehicle approach her at a high 
speed on a collision course, and realized that defendant's car 
must have struck her.224 
On this reasoning, the court held that the facts of Krouse were suffi-
ciently analogous to those of Dillon to require the same result. 225 
Although Mr. Krouse did not actually see his wife hit by the defendant's 
car, his proximity to and sensory perception of the accident were so simi-
lar in material respects to those of the Dillon plaintiff that he "must be 
deemed a percipient witness" to the accident as the Dillon plaintiff had 
been.226 As such, he met the Dillon requirement of "sensory and contem-
poraneous observance of the accident. "227 
From the perspective of acljudication as representation, there are two 
ways to look at Krouse. The first is that the Krouse court straightforwardly 
applied the Dillon rule-that the situations of the parties in the two cases 
were in fact virtually identical in all material respects. If this was the case, 
Krouse was unquestionably legitimate in the representational sense, since 
the defendant who participated in the creation of the rule in Dillon and 
the defendant held bound by that rule in Krouse were identical in situa-
220. For important discussions of instances in which nonlitigants may be affected by a 
court decision without their interests having fully been represented before the court, see 
supra Part n.B.4 & infra Part IV. 
22l. See 562 P.2d 1022 (Cal. 1977). 
222. See id. at 1024. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 103l. 
225. The actual issue in Krouse was whether certain jury instructions were proper. See 
id. at 1029-32. 
226. Id. at 103l. 
227. Id. at 1030 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 
1968». 
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tion and thus in interest. The second necessary condition of adjudication 
as representation-the binding only of similarly situated future liti-
gants-was satisfied. 
The second way to look at Krouse is to assume that the facts of Krouse 
really were materially dissimilar to those of Dillon, but that the Krouse 
court nonetheless decided to reach the same result as in Dillon (potential 
liability). This view keys on the arguable difference between actually see-
ing an accident that injures a loved one and perceiving that accident 
through a combination of nonvisual senses. The argument for foresee-
ability in the latter sort of case might be thought weaker than the argu-
ment for foreseeability in the former. If so, the situation of the defend-
ant in Dillon was dissimilar in this small but important way to the situation 
of the defendant in Krouse. On this view, the binding effects of Dillon 
extended only so far as its facts and those of Krouse were materially identi-
cal; beyond that point the parties in Krouse were free to argue for either 
possible result. If Krouse is seen in this way-as the implementation of an 
identical result to Dillon on dissimilar facts-then it is the same sort of 
case as Ochoa v. Superior Court,228 which I will discuss in Part III.AA, below. 
Note that the difference between these two alternative views of 
Krouse turns on whether that case can be described as materially "similar" 
or "dissimilar" to Dillon. If the former, it is a straightfonvard application 
of the Dillon rule, and if the latter, it is in essence the creation of a new 
rule above and beyond the binding effect of Dillon. Does this distinction 
make a difference from the perspective of adjudication as representation? 
It should not make a difference. Remember that one component of 
adjudication as representation is a participatory process of adjudication-
the ability of the litigants to play a large role in determining their own 
fates by participating extensively in the formation of a decision. That pr<r 
cess, we know, should operate in both precedential and subsequent cases. 
Whether we view the crucial issue in a subsequent case as what decision to 
reach after identifying materially dissimilar facts or as whether the facts 
are materially dissimilar at all, we must recall that the parties potentially 
bound by a precedential rule will play decisive roles in resolving either 
issue. If participatory adjudication functions properly, the extent to 
which a precedent binds the parties will, in a very real sense, be deter-
mined by the parties themselves-by their pleadings, proofs, and rea-
soned legal arguments. As such, even if Krouse bound dissimilar litigants 
to the Dillon result, it still can be seen as legitimate as long as the decision 
was largely a product of the litigants' own participation. 
Assuming participatory adjudication functioned properly in Krouse, 
then, it does not matter whether the Krouse court's analogy to Dillon was 
objectively "correct" or "incorrect" (assuming it is even meaningful to as-
sess the analogy in terms of "correctness"). If the analogy ,vas correct, 
then interest representation operated properly in Krouse to bind the liti-
228. 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985). 
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gants to the Dillon result. If the analogy was incorrect, then participatory 
adjudication operated in Krouse to serve the same legitimizing function. 
What matters is simply that the parties to Krouse, through their participa-
tion in the decisionmaking process, had the opportunity themselves to 
determine the binding effect of Dillon, to make the bed in which they 
found themselves sleeping.229 In the words of Edward Levi, as long as 
"the competing analogies are before the court[,] [t]he rule which will be 
created arises out of a process in which if different things are to be 
treated as similar, at least the differences have been urged."230 Thus the 
result of Krouse, whether objectively "right" or objectively "wrong," can be 
seen as a legitimate manifestation of adjudication as representation. 
Of course there is a certain element of fiction to my description here 
of adjudication as representation in Dillon and Krouse. The court in 
Krouse was indeed concerned with the legitimacy of subsuming that case 
under the Dillon rule, but it probably was not specifically occupied with 
the question whether the parties in Dillon were proper interest represent-
atives of the parties in Krouse. It simply was concerned with the similari-
ties and differences between the facts of the two cases. But to interpose 
this verity as an objection to the theory of adjudication as representation 
is to misunderstand the theory. That theory does not hold that interest 
representation in adjudication is a conscious process like it is in parlia-
mentary legislation, in which the representatives are well aware that they 
are engaging in the process of representing and the constituents are 
equally aware that they are being represented. Rather, adjudication as 
representation assumes interest representation simply to be a functional 
feature of adjudication under certain conditions, conditions in which 
stare decisis is applied in the correct way. It does not matter that the 
participants-the litigants and the court-are unaware that what they are 
doing in distinguishing and analogizing case law is ensuring that only 
rules made by true interest representatives will be applied. What matters 
is that, through the process of distinguishing and analogizing, interest 
representation is in fact occurring. Knowledge and intent are irrelevant; 
that indeed is much of the point of a procedural theory of legitimacy. 
3. Rejecting the Dillon Result on Dissimilar Facts: Deboe v. Horn. -
Deboe v. Horn was a California Court of Appeal case that, like Dillon and 
Krouse, involved alleged emotional distress resulting from a close rela-
229. Recall, of course, that the analogy between making arguments about precedent 
and "electing representatives" is not a perfect one. See supra Part II.B.3.b. But the point I 
am making here is not that litigants bave the unfettered ability to choose which precedents 
will bind them; clearly they do not in most cases. The point is that whether a court treats a 
precedent as materially similar and thus stricdy binding, or rather as materially dissimilar 
and thus not binding, will turn in large part on the arguments and proofs presented by the 
litigants. Thus whether the Krouse court thought it was stricdy bound to reach the Dillon 
result or, instead, believed it was not bound but decided to reach that result anyway is 
largely attributable to the activities of the parties in Krouse. This is the sense in which they 
have made the bed in which they are sleeping. 
230. Levi, supra note 11, at 4. 
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tive's injury in an automobile accident.231 The plaintiff in Deboe was a 
wife whose husband had been struck and severely injured by the defend-
ant's car. Unlike the mother in Dillon or the husband in Krouse, however, 
the plaintiff in Deboe was not actually present at the scene of the accident; 
instead she "'was summoned to the emergency room at the hospital [after 
the accident], where she observed and was told her husband was totally 
paralyzed. "232 Like the plaintiff in Dillon, Mrs. Deboe alleged that she 
had suffered "profound shock to her nervous system, mental suffering 
and emotional distress,"233 and sought damages from the defendant for 
her injuries. 
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plain-
tiff's emotional distress claim. The court noted that Mrs. Deboe, unlike 
the plaintiff in Dillon, "was not a witness to the accident and was advised 
of its occurrence by others. "234 Her claim, then, and thus her situation 
and that of the defendant, was materially dissimilar to the plaintiff's claim 
in Dillon, and the Deboe court was not bound to reach the same result. 
The court refused to extend the Dillon result to these dissimilar facts and 
held that "no liability would exist as a matter of substantive law"235 in 
Deboe. 
One initially might suppose the Deboe decision to have applied the 
Dillon rule to bind at both ends, as if it were a statute. The Deboe court 
acknowledged the binding force of Dillon and the fact that it would be 
compelled to reach the same result if its facts were materially similar to 
those of Dillon. But because it found an important dissimilarity in the 
facts of the two cases, the Deboe court refused to reach the same result the 
Dillon court had reached. This might be read as ascribing to Dillon both 
positive binding force (a requirement that a certain result obtain given 
the presence of certain facts) and negative binding force (a requirement 
that a different result obtain given the absence of some of those facts)-
precisely what most statutes do.236 
Another way to read Deboe, however, and the reading most consistent 
with the operation of the common law method, is to understand that 
once the defendant in Deboe succeeded in convincing the court that the 
facts of that case were materially dissimilar to those of Dillon, the result of 
the case was, in a sense, thrown up for grabs. Not fully up for grabs, of 
course, because the Deboe court was not free to reach a decision that con-
tradicted the result of Dillon; it was not free, for instance, to dismiss the 
case on the ground that emotional injury to bystanders outside the zone 
of danger was unforeseeable as a matter of law. But once a material dis-
231. See 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1971). 
232. Id. at 79. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 223 (emphasis omitted). 
235. Id. at 224. 
236. Such a reading has some support in the Deboe opinion; but I will defer detailed 
discussion of this possibility until infra Part IV A3.b. 
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tinction betw'een the two cases was identified, the parties were free to 
argue that either possible result (potential liability or no potentialliabil-
ity) was consistent in this way with Dillon. The question became not so 
much a question of following an existing rule·as a question of what new 
rule to create. The new rule that emerged from Deboe was the product of 
the same sort of participatory process in which the parties to Dillon had 
engaged, except that in Deboe the defendant's arguments carried the day. 
From the perspective of adjudication as representation, the recogni-
tion by the Deboe court that the facts of that case were materially dissimilar 
to the facts of Dillon 'was the equivalent of a recognition that the litigants 
in Dillon were not true interest representatives of the litigants in Deboe. 
To the degree that the facts were the same-the presence in both cases of 
an auto accident, for example, and of emotional injury to a victim's rela-
tive as a result of the accident-Dillon controlled; the parties to Dillon 
resembled the parties to Deboe to that extent, and the Deboe litigants there-
fore had adequate interest·representatives and were not free to relitigate 
the entire issue of the foreseeability of emotional injury to close relatives 
of accident victims. This constraint was legitimate, remember, because 
the second condition of adjudication as representation-the binding 
only of similarly situated parties-'was present. 
And to the degree that the facts of Deboe were materially dissimilar to 
the facts of Dillon-the absence in Deboe of the victim's contemporaneous 
observation of the accident-the Dillon rule was not binding on the Deboe 
litigants. They were free to contest the import of this factual difference, 
that is, to determine through participatory adjudication what new "rule" 
would decide their case. As the result of Deboe indicates, the defendant 
won this contest. In another case the plaintiff might have won it. Either 
result would have been legitimate as long as the litigants participated 
meaningfully in creating the decision.237 
Thus Deboe can be seen as an example of adjudication as representa-
tion functioning properly (because it is an example of stare decisis being 
properly applied). Nor should this conclusion change even if one be-
lieves that the Deboe court's factual distinction from Dillon was objectively 
incorrect: Recall that the parties to Deboe were in effect allowed to choose 
whether to be bound by the Dillon rule through the process of par-
ticipatory adjudication,238 and thus any compromise of interest represen-
tation in that case was largely the choice of the parties themselves. 
4. Reaching the Dillon Result on Dissimilar Facts: Ochoa v. Superior 
Court. - Faced with facts deemed materially dissimilar to those of Dillon, 
the court in Deboe declined to reach the same result. In Ochoa v. Superior 
237. The extent to which the plaintiff in Deboe actually was pennitted to argue that 
Dillon was not negatively binding is unclear from the opinion. The plaintiff did assert in a 
brief that her failure to witness the accident did "not preclude [her] ...• as a matter of law, 
from asserting a claim for such damages." 16 Cal. App. 3d at 223. 
238. See supra Part II.B.3.b; see also supra note 229 (explaining that litigants' 
arguments shape court's decision of which precedents to apply). 
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Court, the court made the opposite choice.239 The plaintiffs in Ochoa 
were a mother and father whose lS-year-old son had died of an unspeci-
fied illness while in the custody of the Santa Clara County juvenile hall. 
While visiting their son in the hall, the plaintiffs observed that he vvas in 
severe physical discomfort, and they "experienced extreme mental and 
emotional distress upon seeing their son's illness and pain."24o The 
plaintiffs expressed concern to juvenile hall authorities, including a physi-
cian, that their son was not receiving adequate medical care.241 The au-
thorities, however, refused to allow the boy to be treated by the Ochoas' 
family physician and apparently misdiagnosed the boy's condition, result-
ing in the boy's death (which was not actually witnessed by the par-
ents}.242 The Ochoas sued the county and various officials for, among 
other things, negligent infliction of emotional distress on a Dillon theory. 
The defendants moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the 
dismissal.243 
On appeal, the Ochoa court acknowledged that, unlike Dillon, the 
child's death in Ochoa was not "the result of a brief and sudden occur-
rence viewed contemporaneously by the plaintiff[s]."244 Thus there was 
some potential merit to the Ochoa defendants' argument that the parents' 
injury in that case was less foreseeable than the plaintiff's injury in Dillon. 
Nonetheless, the Ochoa court reversed the dismissal and allowed the 
plaintiffs to "state a cause of action under Dillon."245 As in Dillon (and 
other cases following Dillon on analogous facts), the Ochoas were "aware 
of and observed conduct by the defendants which produced injury [to 
their] child" and were "able to perceive, and suffered shock, from the 
connection between defendants' conduct and [their] child's injury."246 
Thus the Ochoas could potentially recover despite the absence of a "sud-
den occurrence"; the court was "satisfied that when there is observation 
of the defendant's conduct and the child's injury and contemporaneous 
awareness the defendant's conduct or lack thereof is causing harm to the 
child, recovery is permitted."247 
As in Deboe, the court in Ochoa thus acknowledged the presence of a 
material difference betvveen the facts of its case and those of Dillon. The 
Ochoa court therefore recognized, as the Deboe court had, that it was not 
strictly bound to reach the same result that the Dillon court had 
239. 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985). 
240. Id. at 3. 
241. See id. at 3-4. 
242. See id. 
243. See id. at 4. 
244. Id. at 6. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 8. 
247. Id. 
1997] ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENTATION 389 
reached.248 Unlike the court in Deboe, though, the court in Ochoa none-
theless reached the Dillon result, grounding its decision in the general 
analogies between Dillon and Ochoa,249 in the "flexib[le]" application of 
Dillon accomplished in a number of post-Dillon decisions,25o in the notion 
of reasonable foreseeability as it applied to the facts of Ochoa,251 and in 
the liberal policy of tort recovery which, according to the Ochoa court, 
"the [Dillon] cause of action was meant to further."252 
Viewed through the lens of adjudication as representation, the Ochoa 
decision bound the litigants in that case to the rule of Dillon only to the 
extent that they were similarly situated to the Dillon parties and thus were 
adequately represented by those parties. .As such, Ochoa satisfied the sec-
ond necessary condition of adjudication as representation. To the de-
gree that the similarity to Dillon, and thus interest representation, failed 
in Ochoa, the litigants were free to present reasoned arguments based in 
policy, broad analogy, and the like as to which of the two possible results 
the court should reach.253 Unlike in Deboe, the arguments of the plain-
tiffs in Ochoa were found by the court to be stronger than those of the 
defendants, and the plaintiffs' claim was reinstated. Thus, to the extent 
the result in Ochoa was based on materially different facts than those of 
Dillon, the Ochoa litigants participated in creating a new rule that then 
would bind litigants in similar future cases. With respect to those future 
cases, the first necessary condition of adjudication as representation was 
satisfied. 
Again, it is unimportant for purposes of adjudication as representa-
tion whether the decision in Ochoa is viewed as based upon strict analogy 
with Dillon or as based upon reasoned arguments presented when strict 
analogy failed. As long as the litigants in Ochoa had a meaningful and 
effective opportunity to participate in the decision of that case, they can 
be said to have chosen their representatives by choosing whether (and to 
what extent) Dillon would bind them. Thus Dillon's binding effect on 
them, to the extent it existed, was as legitimate as if the facts of Ochoa had 
been identical to those of Dillon. 
5. Summary. - The Dillon line of cases illustrates adjudication as rep-
resentation in action in a common law context. If we make a few assump-
tions for the sake of demonstration-if we assume, that is, that par-
ticipatory adjudication functioned properly in all of the cases we 
examined (and there is no reason to think it did not)-then each of the 
248. Of course, the court deciding Ochoa was the California Supreme Court; as such, 
it was not in general strictly bound to follow its own decisions. But the Ochoa court 
nevertheless had no desire to be seen as contradicting Dillen. 
249. See Ochoa, 703 P.2d at 7-9. 
250. Id. at 7. 
251. See id. at 7-9. 
252. Id. at 7. 
253. While the Ochoa court relied heavily on arguments of policy and broad analogy 
in deciding to broaden the Dillen rule, see id. at 6-9, it is not clear from the opinion to 
what extent these arguments actually were presented by the plaintiff. 
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parties to each of the cases implicating the Dillon rule was bound by Dillon 
only to the extent that his or her counterpart among the Dillon litigants 
was similarly situated to him or her in every material way. Where material 
similarity of situation was held to exist (as Krouse can be read to have 
held), the Dillon result obtained; where it was held not to exist (as in 
Deboe and Ochoa), the result was determined by the proofs and reasoned 
arguments of the parties. Dillon had binding effect, but it bound in only 
one direction. And even if we can quarrel with the results of particular 
cases-with the court's process of analogy or distinction in a given case-
we cannot say that adjudication as representation necessarily failed in 
such cases, because the court's decisions in them were traceable in large 
measure to the activities of the litigants themselves. The parties were 
bound by a rule only to the extent that it was created by previous litigants 
whom the parties themselves chose as their representatives. In each case, 
then, the second necessary condition of adjudication as representation 
was satisfied. 
The process of adjudication as representation in the common law 
therefore is a familiar and simple one; it is merely garden-variety litiga-
tion at work. But the implication of the process-the presence, through 
the process itself, of democratic legitimacy in the authority it wields-
might strike a new chord. Recall the perceived problem that animates 
this Article: the assumption that courts act nondemocratically when they 
make decisions that bind present and future litigants (or conforming 
nonlitigants). Dillon and its progeny show us how this problem largely 
evaporates under the right conditions-how common law decisions can 
claim democratic legitimacy with respect to those affected by them. Let 
us review the process by which this can occur. 
First and most simply, the decision in Dillon bound the litigants in 
that case in a democratically legitimate way because that de!=ision was, to a 
siguificant extent, a product of the litigants' own participation in the 
decisionmaking process. Participation in decisionmaking, remember, is 
the key element of democratic legitimacy on both proceduralist and func-
tionalist theories of democracy.254 
Second, on one reading of Krouse, the Dillon decision legitimately 
bound the Krouse litigants to its result because the parties to Dillon, who 
were similarly situated in material ways to the litigants in Krouse, therefore 
served as interest representatives of those subsequent litigants. Interest 
representation, we have seen, is a mechanism used by democratic theory 
to legitimize the creation of authoritative rules by proxy.255 
Third, to the extent that the Dillon decision bound the dissimilar 
litigants in Deboe and Ochoa-by establishing a baseline of tort liability to 
bystanders beyond which those courts could not retreat-that constraint 
was legitimate in the same way Dillon's constraint of the Krouse litigants 
254. See supra Part I. 
255. See supra Part I.C.2. 
1997] ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENTATION 391 
was legitimate. Dillon bound them only insofar as they were similarly situ-
ated to, and thus their interests were represented by, the parties to Dillon. 
The Dillon decision did not bind the Deboe and Ochoa litigants to the ex-
tent that their interests were not represented by the parties to Dillon. In 
that nonbinding realm, the litigants in Deboe and Ochoa were free to par-
ticipate in creating the ultimate decision through the presentation of 
proofs and reasoned arguments. As such, the results of those cases were 
democratically legitimate because the litigants themselves participated 
meaningfully in generating them. 
Dillon and its progeny thus illustrate the operation of adjudication as 
representation in common law cases and the way in which democratic 
legitimacy can arise from it. But what of the other archetypal kinds of 
cases decided by courts-statutory and constitutional cases? Can adjudi-
cation as representation operate in them as well? 
B. Adjudication As Representation in Statutory and Constitutional Cases 
[T]he court [interpreting a statute] will search for the legislative 
intent. . .. In building up this interpretation, the reference will 
be to the kind of examples that the words used, as commonly 
understood, would call to mind. Reasoning by example will 
then proceed from that point. 
Edward Levz"256 
Restricting [constitutional] challenges to legislative action to 
the form of cases has the ... advantage of emphasizing the sur-
rogate nature of the forum that courts are expected to pro-
vide. . .. If the challenge is unsuccessful, the precedential effect 
of the decision is . . . limited to other cases involving similar 
situations. A later challenger has freedom to reargue the stat-
ute's invalidity as applied to him to the extent that he has exper-
ienced the statute's impact in a different way. 
Lea Brilmayef257 
The process of judicial construction and application of statutory and 
constitutional provisions often is thought to be essentially different from 
common law decisionmaking. Statutes and constitutions, as commands 
of a sovereign, seem to demand a process of making particular decisions 
within their purview that is concrete and unchanging, not flexible and 
accretive like the common law.258 
256. Levi, supra note 11, at 22-23. 
257. Brilmayer, supra note 176, at 816-17 (citation omitted). 
258. As David Strauss wrote in a recent article: 
ConventionalIy we think ofIega! reasoning as divided into common law reasoning 
by precedent on the one hand, and the interpretation of authoritative texts on 
the other. Constitutional and statutory interpretation, while of course different 
in many respects, are viewed as forms of the latter and fundamentally different 
from the former. 
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But, as some scholars persistently have noted,259 the common law 
method often operates in statutory and constitutional adjudicationjust as 
it does in common law cases themselves. Statutes and constitutions are 
not self-interpreting; inevitably their language presents ambiguities, gaps 
that must be filled through the same case-by-case process of reasoning by 
analogy and distinction that operates in common law adjudication.26o 
This process can generate the same conditions of legitimacy in statutory 
and constitutional cases that it can generate in common law cases: condi-
tions of participatory adjudication and interest representation. When 
these conditions are present, statutory and constitutional adjudication be-
comes adjudication by representation; it takes on a siguificant measure of 
democratic legitimacy. Let us take a look at how adjudication as repre-
sentation can work in statutory and then in constitutional adjudicative 
decision making. 
1. Statutory Interpretation Cases. - In The Legal Process, Hart and Sacks 
give us a good example of adjudication as representation at work in adju-
dicative statutory interpretation:261 the line of Sherman Act antitrust 
cases beginning with the 1922 Supreme Court decision in Federal Baseball 
Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs.262 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, whose core language has remained 
unchanged since its enactment in 1890, prohibit, respectively, "con-
tract[s], combination[s] ... or conspirac[ies], in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States"263 and monopolies or attempted 
monopolies of "any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States. "264 In Federal Baseball, the plaintiff, a member of an upstart profes-
sional baseball league allegedly driven out of business by the defendants, 
two better-established leagues, brought a treble damages action under 
both sections of the Act. 265 The court of appeals overturned a jury ver-
dict in the plaintiff's favor on the ground that professional baseball was 
not "trade or commerce among the several States" within the meaning of 
David A Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 877, 889 
(1996) (citation omitted). 
259. See, e.g., Henry M. Hart. Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic 
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1313-44 (William N. Eskridge,Jr. & Philip 
P. Frickey eds., 1994); Levi, supra note 11, at 27-102; Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra 
note 177, at 79-90; Brilmayer, supra note 176; Brilmayer, supra note 191; Strauss, supra 
note 258. 
260. See Cardozo, supra note 7, at 14 ("[Clodes and statutes do not render the judge 
superfluous, nor his work perfunctory and mechanical. There are gaps to be filled. There 
are doubts and ambiguities to be cleared."); Levi, supra note 11, at 21-23 (discussing 
ambiguity in statutes); see also supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text (describing 
Holmes' conception of the courts as gap-filling rulemakers). 
261. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 259, at 1313-36. 
262. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
263. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). 
264. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). 
265. See Federal BasebaU, 259 U.S. at 207. 
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the Act.266 In an opinion written by Justice Holmes, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the reversal: 
The business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely 
state affairs. It is true that ... competitions must be arranged 
between clubs from different cities and States. But [that] fact 
... is not enough to change the character of the business. . . . 
[T]he transport [of players and equipment across state lines] is 
a mere incident, not the essential thing. That to which it is inci-
dent, the exhibition, ... would not be called trade or commerce 
in the commonly accepted use of those words. As it is put by the 
defendants, personal effort, not related to production, is not a 
subject of commerce. That which in its consummation is not 
commerce does not become commerce among the States be-
cause the transportation that we have mentioned takes place.267 
Thus the Court in Federal Baseball-explicitly drawing, it should be 
noted, upon the reasoning offered by the defendants268-found the play-
ing of baseball games, even for money and where travel across state lines 
was involved, not to be the sort of "trade or commerce among the several 
States" that Congress had in mind when it passed the Sherman Act. As an 
interpretation of the Act, Federal BasebaU created a rule, to be sure; but, 
like a common law rule, its binding effect did not extend beyond the 
particular facts of the case. The Federal Baseball rule merely required that, 
in future cases, any business having the peculiar characteristics that pro-
fessional baseball possessed in 1922-consisting, that is, primarily of local 
sporting exhibitions carried out by the "personal effort" of the players in 
a manner that "would not be called trade or commerce i~ the commonly 
accepted use of those words"-must be held to be outside the scope of 
the Sherman Act.269 Like a common law decision, Federal Baseball did not 
require that any cases bearing materially different facts be decided in a 
particular way. Such cases would have to be litigated on their own merits. 
Almost exactly a year after the Federal Baseball decision was handed 
down, in Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange,270 the Court arguably was 
faced with such a materially different case. Hart 'was another lawsuit 
under the Sherman Act, this time brought by a vaudeville agent who al-
leged that the defendants, other agents and theater owners, had con-
spired to exclude the plaintiff's clients from performance at "practically 
all the theatres in the United States and in Canada in which high class 
vaudeville entertainments are produced. "271 The defendants argued that 
Federal Baseball was controlling-that, as with baseball in the previous 
case, "the dominant object of all the arrangements [of the defendants' 
266. Id. at 208-09. 
267. Id. 
268. Compare the Court's paraphrase of the defendants' argument, see id. at 209, 
with the summary of that argument offered earlier in the opinion, see id. at 206-07. 
269. Id. at 209. 
270. 262 U.S. 271 (1923). 
271. Id. at 272. 
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business] was the personal performance of the actors, all [interstate] 
transportation being merely incidental to that."272 The Supreme Court, 
again through Holmes, summarily rejected this argument: 
On the other hand it is argued [by the plaintiff] that in the 
transportation of vaudeville acts the apparatus sometimes is 
more important than the performers and that the defendants' 
conduct is within the statute to that extent at least. 
... [I]t may be that what in general is incidental, in some 
instances may rise to a magnitude that requires it to be consid-
ered independently.273 
In other words, vaudeville performances, at least on the allegations of the 
plaintiff's pleadings (for Hart was decided on a motion to dismiss), were 
materially dissimilar to baseball exhibitions; their "apparatus" and its 
transportation "sometimes [were] more important than the performers 
themselves," and thus the business of vaudeville was more likely than 
baseball to be the sort of "trade or commerce" envisioned by Congress 
when it passed the Act. 
Whether or not the baseball-vaudeville distinction drawn by the 
Court makes much sense to us, Hart displays the common law method, 
and thus the process of adjudication as representation, at work in a statu-
tory interpretation case. The central question of Hart was whether vaude-
ville acts were similar enough to baseball games to be covered by the 
same rule, that is, to require that the same result be reached in Hart that 
was reached in Federal Baseball. Responding to the proofs and arguments 
of the parties-indeed, expressly grounding its holding in the allegations 
made by the plaintiff in his complaint-the Court in Hart answered this 
question in the negative: It, and the litigants before it, were not bound to 
the result of Federal Baseball because vaudeville was dissimilar to baseball 
in certain material respects. Thus the parties in Hart were free to argue 
for any result consistent with the statute.274 Adjudication as representa-
tion had functioned properly: The Hart plaintiff had in effect convinced 
the Court that the plaintiff in Federal Baseball was not his adequate interest 
representative and that he therefore should not be bound by the result of 
that case. 
The impact of Federal Baseball did not die with Hart, however. Sev-
eral subsequent decisions considered the holding of that case in various 
related contexts. In the 1953 case Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., the 
Court squarely applied Federal Baseball to uphold the dismissal of several 
Sherman Act civil actions brought against professional baseball teams.275 
272. Id. at 273. 
273. Id. at 273-74. 
274. Indeed, on remand the defendants apparently succeeded in convincing the trial 
court that vaudeville performances, like baseball games, were entitled to exemption from 
the Act, thus gaining a later dismissal of the case; the court of appeals affirmed and the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari. See United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 228 n.10 
(1955). 
275. See 346 U.S. 356, 356-57 (1953). 
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As presented in the per curiam opinion, Toolson was a straightforward 
application of stare decisis to directly on-point facts: the business of base-
ball in 1953 was not materially different from the business of baseball in 
1922, and thus the situations of the two cases were indistinguishable.276 
In United States v. Shubert, a 1955 case with facts closely similar to 
those of Hart, the Court refused to apply Federal Baseball to grant a 
Sherman Act exemption to the business of producing and booking "legit-
imate theatrical attractions" and operating theaters.277 The Court distin-
guished Toolson as "a narrow application of the rule of stare decisis";278 if 
stare decisis were to be applied in Shubert, "Hart . .. -not Federal Baseball 
and Toolson-[is] the controlling decision[ ]."279 
Finally, in United States v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., 
decided on the same day as Shubert, the Court refused to extend the 
Federal Baseball-Toolson exemption to the business of conducting profes-
sional boxing matches, which, "as described in the complaint," was of a 
sufficiently interstate nature to "constitute[] 'trade or commerce among 
the several States' within the meaning of the Sherman Act."28o Justice 
Frankfurter vigorously dissented in International Boxing Club, declaring 
that "[i]t would baffle the subtlest ingenuity to find a single differentiat-
ing factor between other sporting exhibitions, whether boxing or football 
or tennis, and baseball" with respect to whether such activities amounted 
to "'trade or commerce.'"281 
These decisions demonstrate simply that statutory interpretation 
cases, despite the presence of a supposedly authoritative text, frequently 
become exercises in analogical, case-by-case reasoning virtually indistin-
guishable from what takes place in the common law. As in common law 
adjudication, the question in statutory interpretation cases often is 
whether the fact pattern before the court so closely resembles a fact pat-
tern found by a previous court to produce a certain effect (in statutory 
cases, the application of a statute in a certain way) that the subsequent 
court is required to prescribe the same effect (that is, to apply the statute 
in the same way). And where this common law process operates, adjudi-
cation as representation, for the reasons we have seen, operates as well. 
Litigants are able to participate in shaping the decisions that bind them, 
and they are bound by previous decisions only to the extent that those 
decisions were shaped by their interest representatives. 
276. See id. Justice Burton's dissent in Toolson challenged this assumption, pointing 
to the extensively interstate nature of professional baseball at the time the case was 
decided, including the revenues it derived from radio and television broadcasts. See id. at 
357-65 (Burton,]., dissenting). 
277. 348 U.S. 222, 223 (1955). 
278. Id. at 230 (emphasis omitted). 
279. Id. 
280. 348 U.S. 236, 240 (1955). 
281. Id. at 248 (Frankfurter,]., dissenting). 
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2. Constitutional Cases. - The common law method also operates in 
constitutional !:ases, perhaps to an even greater extent than it does in 
statutory cases.282 An example is the line of decisions assessing First 
Amendment challenges to convictions under the Espionage Act of 1917 
and similar statutes restricting subversive speech. The first of these cases, 
Schenck v. United States,283 produced Holmes's famous "clear and present 
danger" test for the assessment of speech-restricting legislation. To the 
extent this formulation later took on a life of its own as a rule separate 
and independent of the facts and result of Schenck, it diverged from the 
common law method and compromised the operation of adjudication as 
representation, but I will discuss that point in the next Part.284 For pres-
ent purposes it is enough to note how cases following Schenck reasoned, 
in the common law fashion, by analogy and distinction to the facts of that 
case in reaching their own results. 
In Schenck the Court was faced with the conviction, pursuant to the 
Espionage Act of 1917, of socialists who had distributed leaflets arguably 
encouraging draft resistance. The language of the leaflets was ambiguous 
to say the least; one side encouraged draftees not to "submit to intimida-
tion," while the other side prompted them simply to "assert your opposi-
tion to the draft."285 In order to determine whether the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the convictions, the Court was required to consider 
the defendants' argument that the convictions restricted their freedom of 
speech and press in violation of the First Amendment. Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Holmes opined: 
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defend-
ants in saying all that was said in the circular would have been 
within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act 
depends upon the circumstances in. which it is done. The most 
stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in 
falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. . . . The 
question in every case is whether the words used are used in 
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear 
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive 
evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of 
proximity and degree.286 
Because the defendants' words in Schenck could be found to pose such a 
clear and present danger, the convictions were affirmed. 
The Schenck decision was applied squarely to two subsequent cases 
involving similar convictions under the Espionage Act, Frohwerk v. United 
282. See generally Strauss, supra note 258, at 889 ("To whatever extent the contrast 
with the common law is true for statutes, it is not true of an eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century constitution."). For a significant category of exceptions to this statement, see my 
discussion of judicial review infra Part IV.B. 
283. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
284. See infra Part IV .A.3.a. 
285. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51. 
286. Id. at 52 (citations omitted). 
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States287 and Debs v. United States.288 In Frohwerk the defendant was a 
German sympathizer who, according to a jury, had published inflam-
matory newspaper articles with the intent of disrupting the draft; in Debs 
the defendant was a well-known socialist who had spoken against the 
draft. Both convictions were affirmed by a unanimous Court in opinions 
also written by Holmes. Holmes saw both cases as substantively indistin-
guishable from the recently decided Schenck, commenting in Frohwerk that 
"so far as the language of the [newspaper] articles goes there is not much 
to choose between expressions to be found in them and those before us 
in Schenck v. United States."289 According to the Court, that is, the results 
of Frohwerk and Debs were dictated by the result of Schenck because the 
facts of the three cases were materially identical. 
Then, in three subsequent Espionage Act cases following closely on 
the heels of Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs-Abrams v. United States,290 Schaefer 
v. United States,291 and Pierce v. United States292-the unanimity of the 
Court was broken. All three cases produced affirmances of convictions 
under the Act for conduct arguably similar to that of the Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs defendants. In all three, however, Holmes andJustice 
Brandeis published lengthy dissents, and in Schaefer Justice Clarke 'wrote a 
separate dissent as well. The lynchpin upon which the three cases turned 
was whether the conduct of which the defendants were accused rose to 
the level of the clear and present danger found to exist in Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs-whether, that is, the defendants in Abrams, Schaefer, 
and Pierce were sufficiently similarly situated to the defendants in the 
prior cases to mandate the same result. Holmes and Brandeis thought 
not, focusing in each case on what they perceived to be a tenuous connec-
tion bet\veen the speech at issue and the sort of direct adverse conse-
quences to the military effort threatened by the speech in Schenck.293 
In Dennis v. United States, a 1951 case brought pursuant to the Smith 
Act, the Court considered how Schenck should apply to a case in which the 
defendants' activities seemed directed to the eventual overthrow of the 
government rather than the sort of imminent danger to order that the 
speech punished in Schenck and its progeny was thought to threaten.294 
The defendants in Dennis were members of the American Communist 
Party who had been convicted of advocating, and organizing for the pur-
pose of, "'overthrowing or destroying [the] government [of] the United 
States by force or violence'" in a manner consistent with the revolutionary 
287. 249 U.S. 204 (1919). 
288. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). 
289. Frohwerk, 249 U.S. at 207. 
290. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
291. 251 U.S. 466 (1920). 
292. 252 U.S. 239 (1920). 
293. See Pierce, 252 U.S. at 253-73 (Brandeis & Holmes,n., dissenting); Schaefer, 251 
U.S. at 482-95 (Brandeis & Holmes,n., dissenting); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 624-31 (Holmes, 
J., dissenting). 
294. See 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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beliefs of the party.295 Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice Vinson tacitly 
acknowledged that the conduct at issue in Dennis did not bear the sort of 
immediate threat of violence and disorder that the conduct in Schenck 
had been held to display. The Court nonetheless affirmed the convic-
tions on the ground that "the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid 
the danger."296 In doing so, the Dennis Court can be seen to have done 
roughly what the California Supreme Court did in the common law Ochoa 
case discussed in the previous Part:297 the Court first rejected the notion 
that Schenck was fully binding on the differently situated litigants of 
Dennis, but then determined, through the proofs and reasoned argu-
ments of the parties in that case, that it should nevertheless reach the 
same result as that reached in Schenck. 
Finally, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court declined to reach the 
Schenck result on what it determined to be materially different facts. 29B 
The defendant in Brandenburg was a K.u Klux Klan leader who had been 
convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute of '''advocat[ing] 
... the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlaw-
ful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or polit-
ical reform.'''299 (One wonders precisely which "methods of terrorism" 
the Ohio legislature did not consider "unlawful.") The defendant had 
been captured on film burning a cross in the traditional KKK regalia, 
accompanied by several companions carrying firearms; in another por-
tion of the film the defendant gave a speech at a rally in which he ex-
claimed that "if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, contin-
ues to suppress the white, Caucasian race,it's possible that there might 
have to be some revengeance taken. "300 Citing the principle, gleaned 
from Schenck and other decisions (although Schenck itself'was not actually 
mentioned in the Court's opinion), that the First Amendment allowed 
states to prohibit the advocacy of violence only "'where such advocacy is 
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to 
incite or produce such action"301 but not where it amounted to '''mere 
abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a 
resort to force or violence,"'302 the Court overturned the conviction. 
Here, as in the California common law decision in Deboe v. Hom,303 the 
295. Id. at 496 (quoting section 2 of the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 10 (1946». 
296. Id. at 510. This language was Learned Hand's interpretation of the Schenck 
phrase "clear and present danger, n taken from his Second Circuit opinion in United States 
v. Dennis, 183 F.2d'201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950). 
297. See supra Part m.A.4. 
298. See 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969). 
299. Id. at 444-45 (quoting the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism statute, Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann. § 2923.13). 
300. Id. at 445-46. 
301. Id. at 447. 
302. Id. at 448 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961». 
303. 94 Cal. Rptr. 77 (Ct. App. 1971); see supra Part m.A.3. 
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Court can be seen to have rejected the binding force of Schenck and its 
progeny because of materially dissimilar facts between Brandenburg and 
those cases and to have decided, agahi through the proofs and arguments 
of the parties, to reach a different result than that of Schenck. 
As in statutory interpretation cases, then, the common law method 
can operate in constitutional cases. When courts adhere to this common 
law mode in reviewing statutes for constitutionality, adjudication as repre-
sentation works just as it does in the common law itself. Subsequent liti-
gants are bound only so far as they are found to be similarly situated to 
the parties to the precedential case, and those subsequent litigants them-
selves are allowed to "choose" their representatives by arguing for or 
against the binding force of any particular decision. And although 
Schenck and its progeny were criminal cases, the common law process ap-
plies no less in civil challenges to statuteS.304 
All of this is not to say that statutory and constitutional adjudication 
do not differ in important ways from common law decisionmaking, or 
that adjudication as representation always functions flawlessly in statutory 
and constitutional cases. Neither claim would be true. Indeed, in the 
next Part we will look at some of the situations in which, from the per-
spective of adjudication as representation, such claims often ring all too 
hollow. But the foregoing discussion should at least have demonstrated 
just how adjudication ~ representation works through the common law 
method, and how the common law method (and, through it, adjudica-
tion as representation) can function in a variety of adjudicative contexts. 
It should, that is, have provided some paradigm cases of adjudication as 
representation in action. Now it is time to consider some implications of 
the theory of adjudication as representation as applied to several impor-
tant current issues. 
IV. THE THEORY OF ADJUDICATION As REPRESENTATION: SOME TOPICAL 
,ApPLICATIONS (AND SOME SURPRISING IMPLICATIONS) 
It is therefore not the fault of the theory if it is of little practical 
use in such cases. The fault is that there is not enough 
theory .... 
Immanuel Kant305 
Believe it or not, many of the vexing issues in modem adjudication, 
studied though they are, suffer from the problem of not enough theory. 
Adjudication, especially adjudicative lawmaking, typically is seen as an ir-
redeemably nondemocratic process. Where adjudication comes into ten-
sion with parliamentary lawmaking, the goal of adjudicative theory has 
been to reduce that tension to a minimum or, sometimes.' to explain away 
304. See. Brilmayer, supra note 176, at 817; Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 306-10. 
305. Kant, Theory and Practice, supra note 35, at 61. 
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the tension as illusory.306 That the results of this effort have been unsatis-
factory should not surprise us when we consider what has been missing 
from adjudicative theory. The missing piece-at least, a missing piece-
has been an understanding of adjudication as representation, a recogni-
tion that adjudicative lawmaking can in fact be democratic under certain 
conditions. The goal of the theory of adjudication as representation is 
not to reconcile adjudicative with parliamentary lawmaking, but rather to 
define the conditions necessary for democratic legitimacy in adjudication 
and to suggest how they might be preserved. As such, that theory treats 
adjudicative lawmaking as only occasionally, not inherently, "deviant" 
from the democratic ideap07 
In this Part, I will examine three current issues in adjudication from 
the perspective of adjudication as representation. The examination in 
each case will be somewhat tentative. Here I am more concerned with 
shedding some new light on these old questions than with dissecting 
them methodically, and I will be happy if I do no more than stimulate 
fresh discussion about them. Chekhov once wrote of Anna Karenina and 
Eugene Onegin that "not a single problem is solved, but they satisfy you 
completely just because all their problems are correctly presented."308 In 
a similar spirit, my goal here is not to solve these problems, but simply to 
present them in a new and helpful way. 
The first suggestion I will make is that courts, in deciding cases (and, 
more to the point, in writing opinions), should not attempt to articulate 
general rules that will govern future cases. Stating general rules threatens 
the mechanism of interest representation, which works only if dissimilarly 
situated people are not bound by judicial decisions. 
My second suggestion is that certain kinds of constitutional decisions 
are democratically illegitimate because they necessarily affect nonlitigants 
whose interests were not adequately represented in the adjudicative pro-
cess. The theory of adjudication as representation implies some remedies 
for this illegitimacy, namely the exercise of decisional minimalism in judi-
cial review and the participation in the litigation of a wider variety of 
interested parties and groups than is traditionally allowed. 
306. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 
77-104 (1980) (attempting to solve "counter-majoritarian difficulty" by justifying judicial 
review as a means of ensuring proper functioning of democratic processes); Barry 
Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 580 (1993) (declaring that 
counter-majoritarian difficulty "rests upon a descriptively inaccurate foundation," i.e., the 
counterposition of unaccountable courts with accountable branches of government, and 
articulating descriptive theory of "dialogue" among three governmental branches); 
Michelman, supra note 33, at 74 (stating theory of judicial review as "the modeling of 
active self-government that citizens find practically beyond reach"). 
307. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch 18 (2d ed., Yale Univ. 
Press 1986) ("[N]othing ... can alter the essential reality that judicial review is a deviant 
institution in the American democracy."). 
308. Letter from Anton Chekhov to Alexei Suvorin (Oct. 27, 1888), in Selected 
Letters of Anton Chekhov 56, 57 (Lillian Hellman ed. & Sidonie K Lederer trans., 1955). 
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My third suggestion is that justiciability doctrines should be strictly 
applied. The theory of adjudication as representation tells us that relaxa-
tion of justiciability requirements sometimes threatens interest represen-
tation by binding future litigants to decisions shaped by dissimilarly situ-
ated parties. 
As we shall see, woven through each of these issues is a common 
thread: the threat to adjudication as representation that arises when the 
potential binding effects of a decision extend beyond its particular facts 
to parties whose situations are materially dissimilar to those before the 
deciding court. Because interest representation is compromised in such 
circumstances, democratic legitimacy is compromised too. The theory of 
adjudication as representation suggests at least that we pay attention to 
the existence and the nature of the legitimacy problems these kinds of 
cases present.309 
A. The Debate over Legal Rules 
Ordinary courts are reluctant to traffic in abstractions. Judges 
often proceed on a case-by-case basis; they are practitioners of 
the old, much-reviled, and indispensable art of casuistry. 
Cass Sunstein310 
There is much debate nowadays about the place of "rules" in adjudi-
cation.311 The central question of the debate seems to be: Is it better for 
courts, in deciding cases, to attempt to lay down general rules intended to 
dictate the results of future cases, or is it better for courts to avoid this 
kind of broad rulemaking and confine themselves to saying only what is 
necessary to decide the particular case before them? 
There are strong arguments on both sides. In defending the prac-
tice of making general rules, for instance, Justice Antonin Scalia points to 
the interlocking values of equality, efficiency, uniformity, predictability, 
andjudicial restraint.312 On the other side of the question, Cass Sunstein 
attacks rules on the grounds that their inherent ambiguity "undermines 
the aspiration to rule-bound justice"313 and that they are prone to several 
varieties of harmful social consequences: over- and underinc1usiveness, 
obsolescence, camouflage of bias and discretion, encouragement of tech-
309. There will, of course, be other topical implications of the theory of adjudication 
as representation-for statutory interpretation, procedural reform, and structural reform 
litigation, to name a few examples-that will have to remain outside my somewhat limited 
scope here. 
310. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 177, at viii. 
311. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination 
of Rule-Based Decision Making in Law and in Life (1991); Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, 
supra note 177, at 10-12, 101-47; Scalia, supra note 11; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The 
Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Foreword: TheJustices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. 
Rev. 24 (1992). 
312. See Scalia, supra note 11, at 1178-80. 
313. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 177, at 121-30. 
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nical evasion through loopholes, inflexibility, and a weakening of "the 
equitable spirit."314 
Both sides of the debate measure the legitimacy of rules by their re-
sults. Justice Scalia thinks judicially articulated rules help order the world 
in a fair and productive way; Professor Sunstein disagrees. Neglected in 
the controversy is the issue of whether it is legitimate for courts to an-
nounce general rules at all, good results or no. As I contend here, the 
theory of adjudication as representation suggests that it usually is not. 
When courts articulate general rules that are intended (or that may be 
read by future courts) to govern future cases, the litigants in those future 
cases may be bound to a rule produced by dissimilarly situated parties. If 
so, interest representation, and thus the democratic legitimacy of the 
constraint, breaks down. 
1. Rules Versus . .. 'What? - The debate on rules is complicated by 
the uncertainty about precisely what the alternatives to rules might be. 
Rules often are contrasted with "standards"315-relatively vague require-
ments that leave open a number of reasonable possibilities of precisely 
what kind of conduct might comply with the requirement in any given 
circumstance: 
A ban on "excessive" speeds on the highway is a standard; so is a 
requirement that pilots of airplanes be "competent," or that stu-
dent behavior in the classroom be "reasonable." These might 
be compared with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit, a ban on pi-
lots who are over the age of seventy, or a requirement that stu-
dents sit in assigned seats.316 
Sometimes rules are compared with "principles"-general guides for 
conduct that, unlike rules or standards, must be weighed in any given 
case against other reasons for acting a certain way: 
Consider some examples: tell the truth; keep your promises; do 
not hurt other people's feelings. These principles ... are not 
taken by themselves as decisive of moral issues. They bear on 
moral issues, but by themselves they do not resolve particular 
cases. Their content emerges from their applications.317 
Rules also might be compared to "factors"-specific factual consider-
ations that must be taken into account when deciding how to decide a 
case.31S For example, in an aspect of the Dillon v. Legg decision that I 
purposely treated only briefly above,319 the California Supreme Court 
suggested three "factors" that "courts will take into account" in determin-
ing whether bystander emotional injury is foreseeable: 
314. Id. at 130-35. 
315. See, e.g., id. at 27-28; Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic 
Analysis, 42 Duke LJ. 557 (1992); Sullivan, supra note 311. 
316. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 177, at 27. 
317. Id. at 30. 
318. See id. at 28-30. 
319. See supra Part mAl. 
1997] ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENTATION 
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident 
as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) 
Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact 
upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous obser-
vance of the accident. ... (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim 
were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any rela-
tionship or the presence of only a distant relationship.320 
403 
Factors like these are not "rules" because they do not specify how they are 
to be weighted in the decisionmaking process (as opposed to strict rules, 
which have absolute weight-they must be followed), and because they 
do not purport to be the only grounds upon which decisions may be 
made. But to the extent such factors exist in an opinion, they constrain 
in some degree: decisionmakers are forced at least to give the factors 
some weight in deciding how to act. 
Let us ignore for the moment the differences among strict "rules," 
standards, principles, factors, and related phenomena and think of them, 
as Cass Sunstein suggests, simply as different points along the same con-
tinuum of "ruleness. "321 All such examples of ruleness, when present in a 
judicial opinion, purport to constrain the decisionmaking of future 
courts and the arguments of future litigants in some way; they "aspire to 
make legal judgments in advance of actual [subsequent] cases."322 For 
this reason all of them-let us call them alljust "rules" for now-threaten 
adjudication as representation. The theory of adjudication as representa-
tion gives us reason to distrust any kind of constraining force exerted 
from one court decision to the next except to the extent that it is directly 
attributable to interest representation, and sometimes judicially articu-
lated rules purport to exert such an additional constraining force. 
2. Rules Ver.5US Results. - Until now I have been speaking rather casu-
ally of adjudicative "rulemaking," common law "rules," and the like. But 
as we have seen,323 the common law does not in fact produce binding 
effects by means of "rules" per se. In fact the common law binds through 
results: it requires only that courts subject to stare decisis reach the same 
results as precedential cases with materially similar facts. By this mecha-
nism of constraint, litigants are bound only by rules produced by true 
interest representatives, that is, materially similarly situated parties. As 
such, the constraint is legitimized through the operation of adjudication 
as representation. 
The trouble begins when courts depart from this strict, case-by-case 
common law method. One of the ways courts might stray from the com-
mon law is by attempting to articulate rules (or things similar to rules) 
desigued to constrain future litigants and courts in ways that the simple 
result of the case could not. 
320. Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968). 
321. See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 177, at 21-23. 
322. Id. at 21 (emphasis omitted). 
323. See supra Part ILB.I. 
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Recall our second condition for the legitimate operation of adjudica-
tion as representation: that the precedential decision bind only those future 
parties who are similarly situated to the original litigants in every material way.324 
This condition is met as long as the common law method is strictly ob-
served, ensuring that subsequent litigants will be bound by a prior case 
only to the extent that the facts of their case are materially similar to the 
facts of the prior case. To the extent the facts of the two cases are not 
materially similar, the common law leaves the result up for grabs-or, 
rather, open to the proofs and reasoned arguments of the parties. 
Suppose, however, that instead of simply deciding a case and specify-
ing the facts upon which the decision is based, a court also attempts to 
articulate a rule according to which future cases should be decided. Im-
agine that in Case X, facts A, B, and C (and only those facts) are material 
to the result. If the court in Case X simply decides the case and explains 
that its decision is based on the presence of facts A, B, and C, a subse-
quent court in Case Y will feel itself bound to duplicate the result of Case 
X only if the set of material facts in Case Y also equals A, B, and C. Thus 
if Case Y contains facts A and B but not C, or if it contains facts A, B, C, 
and the additional material fact D, the Case Y court will not feel itself 
bound to reach the same result as in Case X; the result of Case Y will be 
open to the proofs and reasoned arguments of the parties.325 
But suppose the court in Case X states its decision in the form of an 
explicit rule: "Whenever facts A, B, and C are present, result R should 
obtain." Such a rule looks suspiciously like a statute, and the court in 
subsequent Case Y, especially if it is a lower court reluctant to break new 
ground, might feel that it is bound both positively and negatively by the 
rule. The court, that is, might treat the rule not as simply an "if-then" 
rule-"Iffacts A, B, and C, then resultR"-butas an "if and only if' rule-
"If and only iJfacts A, B, and C, then result R" 
This would produce one (or perhaps both) of two troubling effects 
with respect to the decision of Case Y. First, the court in Case Y might 
believe it is constrained not only to consider facts A, B, and C in making 
its decision, but also to consider only facts A, B, and C in making its deci-
sion. If there is a potentially relevant additional fact D in Case Y, then, 
the court will iguore it in deciding its case. Second, the court in Case Y 
324. See supra Part IT.C. 
325. For the sake of making a point, I am ignoring the possibility that the factual 
difference between Case Y and Case X (say, the presence of additional fact D) makes Case 
Ya stronger case for the result of Case X than Case X itselfwas. Ifitis true that factD makes 
the argument for that result stronger, then the parties to Case Y can be bound to that 
result as legitimately as if the facts of the cases were identical. This is so because if the 
losing litigant in Case X lost on facts A, B, and C, then a fortiori she would have lost in what 
for her would have been a weaker case containing facts A, B, C, and D. Her counterpart in 
subsequent Case Y, then, cannot complain that he is bound to a result not produced by his 
interest representative. Of course, the question whether a given fact makes the argument 
for a certain result weaker or stronger is a matter for litigation-for the presentation of 
proofs and reasoned arguments-among the parties to any subsequent case. 
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might also believe that the rule of Case X forces it to reach a different 
result than that in Case X whenever one or more of facts A, B, and C are 
not present. If fact C is missing from Case Y, then, the court will feel 
bound to reach a result different than R (the result of Case X). Which-
ever of these effects is produced in Case Y, the constraining force of the 
Case X result will have been extended beyond the particular facts of that 
case. The litigants in Case Y, that is, will be bound to a certain result-
either R or -R-despite being dissimilarly situated to the litigants in Case 
X in a material 'way, that is, despite the fact that the litigants in Case X 
were inadequate interest representatives of the litigants in Case Y. Aclju-
dication as representation, and thus the democratic legitimacy of Case 
X's constraining force, will be compromised. 
Let us see how this sort of hazard to democratic legitimacy actually 
has played itself out in some real cases. 
3. Some Examples. , 
a. General Rules: Schenck. - As an example of the phenomenon of 
nonrepresentative constraint at work, recall the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Schenck v. United States.326 Viewed in the common law mode, the 
Court in Schenck simply decided that, on the particular facts of that case, 
the First Amendment did not prohibit the prosecution of the defendant. 
Under the common law, the binding force of the Schenck decision ex-
tended only so far as future cases presented an equivalent set of material 
facts. Any courts (and the litigants before them) faced with materially 
different facts than those in Schenck were not bound to the same result. 
But Justice Holmes's opinion in Schenck did more than simply state 
the result and explain how it arose from the facts. It also articulated 
something that looked like a rule-what became known as the "clear and 
present danger" test. Holmes wrote: "The question in every case is 
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a 
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about 
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."327 
It is possible to read Holmes's language here as merely a description 
of the facts upon which, in that particular case, the Court had based its 
decision-as a simple statement that Schenck (and Schenck alone) was be-
ing decided as it was because the facts of that case demonstrated a "clear 
and present danger" of "substantive evils that Congress has a right to pre-
vent." But it is extremely difficult to limit the import of Holmes's words 
in this way. When Holmes speaks of "[t]he question in every case," it 
sounds as if he means just that-as if he intends future courts deciding 
First Amendment issues to consider those facts (and only those facts) rel-
evant to the question of whether a clear and present danger exists. It also 
sounds as if Holmes intends that future courts faced with facts that do not 
amount to a clear and present danger should consequently reach a differ-
326. 249 u.s. 47 (1919). 
327. Id. at 52 (emphasis added). 
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ent result than that of Schenck-they should automatically acquit defend-
ants prosecuted for subversive speech, regardless of whether other poten-
tially relevant facts exist. It sounds, that is, as if Holmes is stating a rule 
intended to constrain both positively, by specifying what result must ob-
tain upon a certain set of facts, and negatively, by requiring future courts 
to consider only that set of facts and to reach a different result if all of 
those facts are not present. 
Now imagine a defendant in a subsequent case implicating Schenck. 
Suppose that instead of a socialist distributing leaflets against the draft, 
the subsequent defendant is a museum curator who is arrested for dis-
playing photographs deemed to be pornographic. Absent Holmes's rule-
like clear and present danger language, the subsequent defendant proba-
bly could disregard Schenck as a potentially controlling precedent328 be-
cause the facts of the two cases are so dissimilar. But the subsequent de-
fendant must contend with that language, which purports to allow 
government regulation of speech any time there is a "clear and present 
danger that [it] will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a 
right to prevent."329 As such, the defendant must attempt to prove not 
simply that his case is materially different from Schenck, but also that his 
conduct, regardless of any similarity or difference in comparison to the 
conduct of the Schenck defendant, does not produce a clear and present 
danger of this sort. The result may be a conviction where none would 
have occurred absent Holmes's rule-like language. Even if the result is an 
acquittal on First Amendment grounds, the subsequent defendant has in 
a very real sense been bound by the clear and present danger rule: He 
has been forced to prove that his conduct did not violate the prohibition 
that rule establishes. (And, of course, the prosecuting authorities also 
have been bound by the clear and present danger test despite their dis-
similarities with the prosecutors in Schenck.) 
This binding force has arisen from a decision in which no true inter-
est representative of the subsequent defendant participated. The anti-
war socialist defendant in Schenck cannot by any stretch of the imagina-
tion be thought to have had many interests in common with the museum 
curator in the subsequent case (except, perhaps, an interest in unfettered 
expressive conduct in the broadest sense). As such, the second necessary 
condition of adjudication as representation has been violated, and the 
binding force of the Schenck clear and present danger rule is democrati-
cally illegitimate with respect to the subsequent defendant. 
The question of whether Schenck's clear and present danger test had 
some binding force over and above the simple common law force of the 
result in Schenck did in fact surface in Dennis v. United States.330 The de-
fendants in Dennis, remember, were "the leaders of the Communist Party 
328. But Schenck still might he a persuasive precedent in this later case. See supra text 
accompanying note 182. 
329. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
330. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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in this country"331 who were charged under the Smith Act 'with "'know-
ingly or willfully advocat[ing] ... the duty, necessity, desirability, or pro-
priety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States 
by force or violence'"332 and for "'organiz[ing]''' for that purpose.333 
The problem for the prosecutors in Dennis was that, in contrast with 
Schenck, there did not seem to be any immediate danger that the defend-
ants would accomplish any part of their objective. Unlike in Schenck, 
Dennis was prosecuted in peacetime, and the defendants sought to 
achieve the somewhat unlikely goal of "a violent revolution"334 overthrow-
ing the entire United States government rather than simply a few deser-
tions or acts of passive resistance against the armed forces. Thus the pros-
ecutors in Dennis were faced with more than just the task of persuading 
the Court that, despite the material dissimilarities between their case and 
Schenck, the same result should obtain; they also had to fit the facts of 
their case within the Schenck clear and present danger language, arguably 
a more difficult row to hoe. They were, that is, bound by the clear and 
present danger rule despite the material differences between their case 
and Schenck. 
In upholding the convictions in Dennis, the Court openly struggled 
with the issue of precisely how binding the clear and present danger test 
was apart from the bare result of Schenck. The Court ultimately resolved 
the problem by denying that the test had (or was intended to have) much 
binding force at all: 
Justice Holmes . . . [n] ever envisioned that a shorthand phrase 
should be crystallized into a rigid rule to be applied inflexibly 
without regard to the circumstances of each case. Speech is not 
an absolute .... Nothing is more certain in modem society than 
the principle that there are no absolutes,335 that a name, a 
phrase, a standard has meaning only when associated with the 
considerations which gave birth to the nomenclature. To those 
who would paralyze our Government in the face of impending 
threat by encasing it in a semantic straitjacket we must reply that 
all concepts are relative.336 
Thus the Court in Dennis labored to free itself from the separate con-
straint of the clear and present danger rule and to acknowledge only the 
binding force of the result of Schenck itself, of the particular case "which 
gave birth to the nomenclature." We may not favor the outcome of 
Dennis, and indeed we may believe that the outcome would have been 
better had the Court in that case clung more tightly to the clear and 
331. Id. at 497. 
332. Id. at 496 (quoting the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, II (2) (a) (1) (1946». 
333. Id. (quoting the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 10, l1(2)(a)(3) (1946». 
334. Id. at 497. 
335. The self-contradiction inherent in this statement can hardly go unremarked: 
Justice Vinson, the author of the plurality opinion, is in effect stating as an absolute rule 
that there are no absolute rules. 
336. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 508 (citation omitted). 
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present danger formulation. But from the perspective of adjudication as 
representation,337 we have to acknowledge that the Court's instincts were 
correct. The litigants in Dennis should not have been bound by the clear 
and present danger rule, because the litigants in Schenck were differently 
situated and thus were inadequate representatives of their interests. The 
constraining force of Schenck should indeed have run out where the mate-
rial similarities between it and Dennis stopped. 
b. Multifactor Tests: Dillon. - The Schenck clear and present danger 
language probably falls on that half of the "ruleness" continuum whose 
end is occupied by strict rules; it is not itself a strict rule allowing no 
discretion in individual cases, but it is at least a standard confining the 
potential outcomes within a fairly limited range. Closer to the other end 
of the spectrum are "factors," enumerated factual conditions whose pres-
ence or absence must be considered by subsequent courts in making de-
cisions but whose relative weight is indefinite. When courts announce 
such factors in deciding cases, though, the resulting constraint on future 
courts can be just as illegitimate from the standpoint of adjudication as 
representation as the constraint produced by stricter rules. 
Dillon v. Lergf38 is a salient example. In that case, the California 
Supreme Court listed three specific "factors" that courts in subsequent 
cases should "take into account" in deciding whether bystander emo-
tional injuries are foreseeable: (1) the proximity of the plaintiff to the 
accident; (2) the existence or nonexistence of a direct "sensory and con-
temporaneous observance" of the accident by the plaintiff; and (3) the 
degree of intimacy in the relationship between the accident victim and 
the plaintiff.339 Uke the clear and present danger test of Schenck, this 
"multifactor test" lent itself to interpretation in later cases as an indepen-
337. As a criminal case, Schenck reminds us with particular saliency that the 
perspective of adjudication as representation often will not be the only perspective from 
which we can assess the overall rightness of a judicial decision. There may be strong 
reasons for courts to articulate broad rules even if doing so compromises the 
representative legitimacy of the decision. One such reason that arises in the criminal 
context, and perhaps especially in the First Amendment context, might be a concern for 
fair notice to potential actors about the possible criminal consequences of their actions. A 
court-articulated broad rnle like the clear and present danger test might fulfill the notice 
function better than a minimalist, fact-specific decisionmaking approach would. The 
presence of this kind of concern, of course, does not undermine the theory of adjudication 
as representation; it merely suggests that such concerns would have to be balanced against 
concerns of democratic legitimacy in determining how a case should be decided (and how 
the resulting opinion should be written). 
338. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). 
339. Id. at 920. Interestingly, the Dillon court implied that these factors should not be 
considered exclusive: 
[F]oreseeability ... must necessarily be adjudicated only upon a case-by-case 
basis .... [N]o immutable rule can establish the extent of [a defendant's] 
obligation for every circumstance of the future ..•. 
. . . All these elements, of course, shade into each other; the fixing of 
obligation, intimately tied into the facts, depends upon each case. 
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dently binding rule separate and apart from the result of Dillon itself. A 
later court easily might have interpreted this list of factors not simply as a 
description of how the Dillon court reached its particular result, but as a 
rule intended to apply in future cases (to "the courts," in the language of 
the Dillon opinion340) and looking something like this: If and only iJfacts 
P (proximity to the accident), 0 (direct observance of the accident), and 
R (close relationship between victim and plaintiff) are present, then result 
L (potential liability) obtains. The subsequent court might then have felt 
bound by Dillon to reach a particular result even on facts materially differ-
ent from those of Dillon. It might have felt bound to reject liability where, 
say, fact 0 is absent, despite the presence of the other factors or even of a 
fourth material fact. Or it might have felt bound to impose liability in the 
presence of facts P, 0, and R even where a fourth fact F suggests that 
liability should not be imposed. 
In this way Dillon, like Schenck, had the potential to bind future liti-
gants in situations where interest representation did not function. In-
deed, consider Deboe v. Hom, in which a panel of the California Court of 
Appeal declined to extend Dillon to allow recovery to a plaintiff who had 
not actually witnessed the accident but had observed her husband's se-
vere injuries at the hospital.341 As I suggested above,342 Deboe might well 
be legitimate; it might be seen as a case in which the court recognized 
material dissimilarities to Dillon and decided, after proofs and reasoned 
arguments from the parties, not to reach the Dillon result. But the per-
functory opinion in Deboe suggests that in fact the court largely ignored 
this second step-that it automatically equated the existence of dissimi-
larity between its case and Dillon with the necessity to reach a different 
result than in Dillon. The Deboe court quoted the entire passage from 
Dillon in which the Dillon court set forth its three-factor test and then 
asserted baldly that, on the facts alleged by the plaintiff, "no liability 
would exist as a matter of substantive law."343 It is thus difficult to shake 
the impression that the court in Deboe felt itself bound not simply (or 
even primarily) to the result of Dillon, but also (or instead) to the three-
factor test articulated by the Dillon court. If Deboe is read this way, the 
absence of one of the factors enumerated in Dillon was deemed automati-
cally to dictate a result different from that of Dillon. The litigants in 
Deboe, despite their dissimilarity to those in Dillon, may have found them-
selves bound negatively by that case-not to the result of Dillon, but to 
the opposite result. 
Id. at 920-21. These caveats were virtually ignored by subsequent courts at all levels until 
the decision in Ochoa v. Superior Court, 703 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1985) ("It is important to 
remember that the factors set forth in Dillon were merely gnidelines to be used in assessing 
whether the plaintiffwas a foreseeable victim of the defendant's negligence."). 
340. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920. 
341. See 94 Cal. Rptr. 77, 79 (Ct. App. 1971). 
342. See supra Part mA3. 
343. Deboe, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 79-80. 
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4. The Democratic fllegitimacy of Court-Produced General Rules. - When, 
as in Schenck and Dillon, a court goes beyond merely deciding its case and 
articulates a rule that could be interpreted by subsequent courts as bind-
ing, adjudication as representation potentially breaks down. Subsequent 
litigants may find themselves constrained by rules created by parties to 
prior cases who, because they were not similarly situated to the subse-
quent litigants, were not adequate interest representatives of those liti-
gants. This can happen in one of two ways. The subsequent court may 
interpret the fact that its case does not conform with the rule (because, 
for instance, it lacks one or more facts specified by the rule as necessary) 
to automatically require a result different from that of the precedential 
case. Arguably, the court in Deboe committed this error. Or the subse-
quent court, in making its decision, may refuse to consider the potential 
effect of facts other than those specified by the rule, thus binding the 
litigants to the same result as in the precedential case even where mitigat-
ing factors argue against it. A court deciding our hypothetical museum 
pornography case might have committed this kind of error. Under either 
circumstance, the parties to the subsequent case have been illegitimately 
bound; the result of their case has been determined in part by a rule 
made by non-interest representatives. 
The theory of adjudication as representation thus gives us a new per-
spective on the debate about rules. It tells us that courts should try to 
avoid articulating rules and using rule-like language (the language of 
"standards," "factors," "guidelines," and so on) not merely because of the 
practical problems and troubling consequences of applying such rules, as 
Cass Sunstein has argued,344 but also because of the inherent illegitimacy 
of applying them. Of course, there may be competing reasons favoring 
the use of such rules in certain contexts. But the more we are concerned 
with preserving democratic legitimacy in adjudication, the less we should 
tolerate judicially promulgated rules. 
The theory or adjudication as representation also sheds some light 
on the ubiquitous propensity of modern courts to articulate multifactor 
tests designed to guide the decisions of future courts. Multifactor tests 
have tended to receive the approbation of commentators who generally 
disfavor judicially propagated rules345 and the condemnation of com-
mentators who generally like such rules.346 But the theory of adjudica-
tion as representation suggests that multifactor tests are not all that differ-
ent from stricter rules in the way in which they constrain future courts. 
344. See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 177, at 121-35. Professor Sun stein 
appears to confine his attack to strict rules, or at least to those phenomena that are near 
strict rules on the "ruleness" continuum. He does not extend his critique to factors and 
the like. For instance, in discussing the problem of strict rules that produce nonsensical 
results in particular cases, Sunstein suggests that "[p]erhaps it would be best to dispense 
with rules and instead to allow [people] to comply [with the law] by showing adequate 
performance under a set of factors." Id. at 13I. 
345. See, e.g., id. at 136-47. 
346. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 11, at 1178-79,1182. ' 
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As in Dillon, they tend to dissuade future courts both from reaching simi-
lar results when every listed factor is not present, and from reaching dif-
ferent results when every listed factor is present but other factors militate 
in the opposite direction. Like stricter rules, multifactor tests invariably 
take on lives of their own, separate from the facts and results of the deci-
sions that produce them; any modem constitutional scholar can confirm 
this phenomenon. In such cases, the tests threaten to bind dissimilar liti-
gants and thus to undermine adjudicative legitimacy. 
Of course, it is one thing to condemn judicial articulation of general 
rules and quite another thing to distinguish that phenomenon from the 
act of simply deciding a case and giving reasons for that decision. Adjudi-
cation as representation suggests that courts should give reasons for their 
decisions, to allow both comparison of the facts of subsequent cases and 
monitoring for responsiveness to the arguments of the parties. But the 
distinction between general rulemaking and case-by-case decisionmaking 
may not be all that difficult to draw. Not surprisingly, much of the prob-
lem can be solved by simple adjustments in language. Had Holmes, in 
writing the Schenck opinion, omitted the introductory phrase "The ques-
tion in every case is whether"347 and replaced it with the phrase "In the 
instant case," much of the independent force of the "Clear and present 
dC!.nger" language might have withered on the vine: "clear and present 
danger" might have looked more like simply a description of the facts in 
the Schenck case itself. The same thing can be said for some of the Dillon 
opinion's language: Declaring that it is "defin[ing] guidelines which will 
aid in the resolution of such an issue as the instant one"348 and then 
separately numbering a list of "factors" for "the courts [to] take into ac-
count"349 seems (as the Dillon court surely knew) a surefire way to estab-
lish an independent, self-sustaining rule. From the perspective of adjudi-
cation as representation, the better course is simply to describe the 
particular factual circumstances upon which a court is resting its decision 
and to tell how the decision proceeds from them. Any hint of generality 
is certain to be taken by future courts, with illegitimate results close 
behind. 
B. Judicial Review 
The real problem of the supposedly counter-majoritarian ten-
dency of judicial review is that so much of the normative work of 
the courts occurs through a process that is exclusionary rather 
than participatory. 
347. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
348. Dillon v. Legg,441 P.2d 912,920 (Cal. 1968). 
349.Id. 
350. Winter, supra note 128, at 1507. 
Steven L. Winter350 
412 COLUMBIA LAW REVlEW [Vol. 97:312 
It is always important at the outset to focus precisely on the con-
troversy before the Court. 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
(opinion of Stevens, ].)351 
To a significant extent, the debate over rules discussed in the previ-
ous section has occurred as part of the continuing, arguably larger debate 
over the proper scope of judicial review.352 A number of respected con-
stitutional scholars recently have suggested that there are particularly 
good reasons to avoid the articulation of broad rules in constitutional 
decisions and to proceed instead on a gradual, case-by-case basis.353 The 
theory of adjudication as representation adds one more good reason to 
avoid rules: the preservation of democratic legitimacy in adjudication. 
This reason applies to constitutional cases in the same way we have al-
ready seen it apply to judicial decisions generally. 
But constitutional cases can pose special problems. Often they are 
cases of tremendous import extending beyond merely the litigants before 
the court and similarly situated future litigants. They involve not simply 
the application, modification, or rejection of a rule made by a previous 
court, but the potential invalidation of a democratically enacted statute. 
And the parties to such cases frequently do not fit the common law model 
of private, self-interested litigants seeking to resolve a dispute. What does 
the theory of adjudication as representation have to say about these unu-
sual features? 
The theory, as we will discover momentarily, finds judicial review 
problematic from the standpoint of democratic legitimacy-not because 
it often results in the invalidation of majoritarian statutes, but because 
the effects of such an invalidation often extend to people whose interests 
have not adequately been represented before the invalidating court. But 
the theory also suggests some remedies for this pathology. It favors both 
judicial minimalism in the constitutional review of statutes and increased 
participation by interested parties and groups in the adjudicative process. 
Together, these prescriptions might substantially increase the democratic 
legitimacy of constitutional adjudication. 
1. Two Types of Constitutional Decisions. - To see why this is so, it will 
be helpful to divide our topic into two types of constitutional decisions, 
viewed from an ex post perspective. The first type simply consists of those 
decisions in which the party challenging a statute on constitutional 
grounds-let us call her the plaintiff, although of course she could also 
351. 438 u.S. 265, 408 (1978) (Stevens,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(footnote omitted). 
352. See, e.g., Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 177, at 10-12, 136-90; Scalia, 
supra note 11, at 1182-84; Sullivan, supra note 311, at 112-21. 
353. See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning, supra note 177, at 171-82; Brilmayer, supra note 
176, at 812-13; Strauss, supra note 258, at 935; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 
Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 6, 33-44 (1996). 
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be a civil or criminal defendant-loses, and the c~nstitutionality of the 
statute or provision being challenged is upheld. The second type consists 
of those decisions producing the opposite result: the plaintiff wins, and 
the challenged statute, or the challenged provision of a statute, is de-
clared invalid by the court on constitutional grounds. 
From the perspective of adjudication as representation, the first type 
of constitutional decision, the one in which the plaintiff loses, typically 
can be analyzed the same way we would analyze a common law decision. 
The court in such a case, if it has adhered to the common law method, 
simply has decided that, on the particular facts of that case, the statute 
may constitutionally be applied to the plaintiff to yield a certain result. As 
with a common law case, the only binding portion of such a decision is its 
result: who has won, and on what set of facts? Future courts and litigants 
then will be bound by the decision only to the extent that the facts of 
their cases materially coincide with the facts of the precedential case. Ad-
judication as representation can operate properly under such conditions 
to legitimize the binding effects of the case on future parties. 
Of course, this type of constitutional case, where the plaintiff loses, is 
susceptible to the risk of judicial rule-stating discussed in the previous 
section. Holmes in Schenck succumbed to this risk. Instead of simply de-
ciding that, on those particular facts, the plaintiff (actually, the criminal 
defendant in Schenck) lost-that is, the statute could be applied constitu-
tionally-he uttered the language of a rule ("clear and present danger") 
apparently intended to have binding effect separate and apart from the 
result of the case. For the reasons we have discussed, the theory of adju-
dication as representation frowns on this kind of judicial ambition. Just 
as in other types of cases, courts upholding statutes against constitutional 
challenges should avoid the articulation of general rules to govern future 
cases if those courts want to preserve adjudicative legitimacy. 
In contrast, the second type of constitutional decision, the one in 
which the plaintiff wins, must be viewed somewhat differently from the 
typical common law decision. In fact, this type of case itself can be subdi-
vided into tw'O subcategories: those decisions in which only the applica-
tion of a statute on certain facts is held to be unconstitutional, and those 
decisions in which the statute itself, or a portion of it, is wholly stricken 
down as unconstitutional. 
Decisions in the first subcategory can be analyzed exactly like deci-
sions in which the plaintiff loses; they are like common law decisions, 
and, unless the court has articulated a broad rule, only the results are 
controlling. Subsequent courts and litigants will be bound only to the 
extent that the facts of those cases materially coincide with the facts of the 
precedential case. (The Supreme Court's decision in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio,354 discussed in a previous section,355 is an example of such a case.) 
354. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
355. See supra text accompanying notes 298-303. 
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Decisions in the second subcategory, though, are inherently differ-
ent from the typical common law decision. In such cases, more than a 
simple fact-specific result has occurred: An entire statute, or a portion of 
an entire statute, has been declared constitutionally invalid on all poten-
tial facts, with respect to everyone. The court in a case like this is in 
essence forced to answer a "yes or no" question: Is the statute unconstitu-
tional, or isn't it? Faced with a "yes" answer to this kind of yes or no 
question, a subsequent litigant cannot attempt to distinguish the deci-
sion; he cannot argue that the statute is not invalid as to him because the 
facts of his case differ from those of the precedential case. The subse-
quent litigant will be bound by the statute's invalidation, even if he is not 
similarly situated to (and thus his interests were not adequately repre-
sented by) a party to the prior case. Indeed, because statutes typically 
affect the lives of a wide variety of dissimilarly situated people, a court's 
invalidation of a statute almost always will in some s'ense bind parties who 
are very different from those who participated in the invalidating deci-
sion. Many. of those parties automatically will be affected as soon as the 
operation or enforcement of the invalidated statute ceases. 
From the standpoint of adjudication as representation, decisions 
striking down statutes on constitutional grounds thus inherently produce 
some degree of illegitimacy. The second necessary condition of adjudica-
tion as representation, the binding only of similarly situated parties, will 
always be violated to some extent by such decisions. This is because the 
precedential decision always will bind more than just those future liti-
gants (or, more significantly, those affected nonlitigants) who are simi-
larly situated to the original litigants in a material way. Must we therefore 
despair for the democratic legitimacy of such decisions? Are we thrust 
back into the clutches of Alexander Bickel's "counter-majoritarian 
difficulty"?356 
2. The GovemmentAs a Party. - Not entirely. For one thing, much of 
the perceived democratic illegitimacy of judicial invalidation of statutes 
often will be illusory in an important way. Remember that one of the 
parties to constitutional cases, the party defending the statute at issue, 
typically will be the government in some form-the prosecuting attorney, 
the state attorney general, the U.S. attorney, the Solicitor General. These 
parties are (or are made up of) officials who are democratically elected or 
who are appointed by other officials who have been democratically 
elected. As such, they are presumed to carry out their duties in a way that 
is responsive to and reflective of the wishes of the public. Perhaps more 
to the point for adjudication as representation, they are charged with rep-
resenting the public interest; they are supposed to do their jobs with the 
same focus on the interests of their constituents that a legislator is pre-
sumed to possess. While they may not be interest representatives by vir-
tue of exact similarity of situation, they are legitimate representatives in 
356. See Bickel, supra note 307, at 16-23. 
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the primary democratic sense of direct, electorally induced responsive-
ness to the public good. Thus their activities can be considered legiti-
mately binding on us in the same sense that the activities of Congress or 
the President can, and if they lose a legal challenge to a statute that we 
support, we cannot claim that their representation of us in the proceed-
ings was democratically illegitimate. 
So the mere fact of government participation in a constitutional 
challenge inserts legitimacy into the result of the challenge that might 
otherwise be lacking from the perspective of adjudication as representa-
tion. Of course, government cannot coherently represent every diverse 
interest that will be impacted if a statute is invalidated; some of those 
interests will conflict with one another. And there will always be those 
cases involving constitutional challenges to statutes in which the govern-
ment is not a party; Fletcher v. Peck,357 Dred Scott v. Sandjord,358 and Home 
Building & Loan Ass'n. v. BlaisdelZS59 are some well-known examples. But 
although judicial review cases inevitably will threaten representational Ie-
gitimacy as a result of these facts of life, the theory of acljudication as 
representation suggests ways to reduce this threat significantly. 
3. Minimalism and the "Passive Virtues. " - One obvious lesson of adju-
dication as representation is that courts striking down statutory provisions 
should be as minimalist as possible in doing SO.360 They should decline 
to reach constitutional questions unless they must decide them to decide 
the case; they should invalidate only those portions of a statute implicated 
by the facts of the particular case; and they should avoid using langnage 
that would suggest, in the words of one Supreme Court Justice, "any opin-
ion about the legal status of any [statute] other than" the one before the 
court.361 In this sense, their decisions, and the opinions reporting them, 
should be what Cass Sunstein has called "narrow."362 Narrowness of deci-
sionmaking avoids binding unrepresented future litigants and affected 
nonlitigants to any greater extent than is absolutely necessary in striking 
down a statute. For the same reason, courts should be careful not to 
theorize their decisions too deeply;363 they should avoid justifying their 
decisions with comprehensive principles other than those necessary to 
explain how the facts of a particular case produce the result reached. 
Comprehensive principles, like strict rules, multifactor tests, and other 
examples of "rnleness," can be treated by future courts as binding over 
357. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
358. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
359. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
360. I borrow the tenn "minimalist" in this context from Cass Sunstein. See Sunstein, 
supra note 353, at 6-7. 
361. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens was referring to the state 
medical school admissions program at issue in Bakke. 
362. See Sunstein, supra note 353, at 15-20. 
363. Here again I borrow tenninology from Professor Sunstein. See Sunstein, Legal 
Reasoning, supra note 177, at 35-61; Sunstein, supra note 353, at 20-21. 
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and above the simple result of the case producing them and, as such, can 
threaten representational legitimacy. 
Another lesson of the theory of adjudication as representation might 
seem to be one of support for the "passive virtues," Alexander Bickel's 
name for the strategic use by courts (particularly the Supreme Court) of 
justiciability doctrines and other procedural techniques to avoid deciding 
issues the Court believes are best deferred to a later date.364 Bickel fa-
vored the passive virtues mostly for prudential reasons: He believed that 
the Court sometimes should conserve its political capital and encourage 
democratic processes by declining to speak on a controversial issue until 
just the right moment in the national debate.365 Adjudication as repre-
sentation, at least on the surface, appears to provide an additional pru-
dential reason for a court carefully to pick and choose the constitutional 
cases it accepts. Knowing that it might be about to make a rule (through 
invalidation of a statute) that will affect people other than the parties 
before it, a court might choose not to adjudicate a case that seems partic-
ularly ill-suited to the production of an accurate rule. That is, a court 
might reject a case featuring litigants who are not representative of those 
typically affected by the statute,366 or bearing facts that do not seem fully 
enough developed to support a completely informed decision. In re-
jecting such cases and waiting for, in Bickel's phrase, a "well-tempered 
case,"367 a court might be seen to promote legitimacy by ensuring that a 
statute will be invalidated, and thus nonlitigants will be bound, only for 
the best of reasons and with the greatest possible amount of information 
before the court. 
Ultimately, however, the theory of adjudication as representation re-
jects the passive virtues. Recall the first necessary condition for legitimacy 
under that theory: that the binding decision actually be produced to a signifi-
cant degree by the litigants.36B Ajudicial refusal to review a statute for con-
stitutionality can bind just as strictly as an adjudicative invalidation of the 
statute can; when it occurs, parties subject to the operation of the poten-
tially unconstitutional statute are left without redress, are bound to the 
continued. unconstitutional operation of the statute itself. Such a deci-
sion, that is, binds the litigants to the status quo. But unlike an adjudica-
tive decision "invalidating a statute on constitutional grounds, a strategic 
judicial decision not to review the statute has little or no basis in the 
proofs and reasoned arguments of the parties; it is not actually produced 
364. See Bickel, supra note 307, at 111-98. 
365. See id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 353, at 36-42 (discussing "democracy-
forcing" aspects of judicial minimalism). 
366. I will explore this particular possibility in more depth during my discussion of 
justiciability doctrines in the next section. See infra Part IV.C. 
367. Bickel, supra note 307, at 169. 
368. See supra Part II.C. 
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to' a significant degree by the litigants.369 Indeed, the effect Qf such a 
decisiQn is to' fQreclQse the presentatiQn Qf prQQfs and reasQned argu-
ments Qn the issue. Even where an exercise Qf the passive virtues fQllQWS 
briefing by the litigants-as, fQr instance, Qn dismissal Qf a case fQr want 
Qf standing Qr denial by the Supreme CQurt Qf certiQrari-the CQurt's 
decisiQn will nQt actually be resPQnsive to' the arguments Qf the parties if 
it is based uPQn extraneQUS criteria such as the imprudence Qf adjudicat-
ing the issue at that time Qr the PQssibility that adjudicatiQn will prQduce 
an unsatisfactQry rule. In shQrt, a self-cQnsciQus, prudential exercise Qf 
the passive virtues by a CQurt usually will undermine legitimacy frQm the 
perspective Qf adjudicatiQn as representatiQn. 
The theQry Qf adjudicatiQn as representatiQn, then, suggests that 
CQUrts shQuld nQt aVQid deciding cQnstitutiQnal cases fQr prudential rea-
SQns. Instead they shQuld act as minimalists when presented with a CQn-
stitutiQnal issue: They shQuld decide it Qnly if necessary to' decide the 
case, and they shQuld nQt invalidate a statute unless the facts Qf the partic-
ular case require it. If PQssible (and it will nQt always be), CQurts shQuld 
invalidate a statute's applicatiQn Qn particular facts rather than striking 
down an entire statutQry prQvisiQn. In these ways, CQurts can limit them-
selves to' deciding Qnly what is necessary while aVQiding the PQtentiallegit-
imacy prQblems Qf a decisiQn nQt to' decide. 
4. Broad Participation. - Finally, adjudicatiQn as representatiQn sug-
gests that CQUrts faced with cQnstitutiQnal challenges to' statutes shQuld 
actively ensure that the vQices Qf as many diverse interests as PQssible are 
heard during the adjudicative prQcess. GQvernment agencies charged 
with interpreting and enfQrcing the statute at issue shQuld be allQwed, 
even encQuraged, to' intervene in the prQceedings.37o Amicus curiae 
briefs and arguments shQuld be entertained, even sQlicited, frQm a wide 
369. "The greatest freedom of judicial choice lies in determining the appropriateness 
of the issues for judicial decision." 13 Charles Alan Wright et aI., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 3529, at 287 (2d ed. 1984). 
370. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), a federal court may in its 
discretion allow a government officer or agency to intervene whenever "a party to an action 
relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by 
[that] ... agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or 
made pursuant to the statute or executive order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). 
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variety of potentially affected interest groupS.371 Joiilder and interven-
tion should be liberally permitted.372 
These conclusions may at first seem counterintuitive in light of the 
importance to adjudication as representation of the common law 
method, a model of adjudicative decisionmaking whose usual medium is 
the traditional sort of lawsuit between two private individuals seeking mu-
tually opposed results.373 But while it is important for adjudication as 
representation to preserve those aspects of traditional adjudication-that 
is, of the common law method-that pass along only those binding rules 
created by interest representation, it is equally important to ensure that 
interest representation occurs in the first place in the precedential case. 
To a certain extent, deficiencies in the former process can be cured by 
tinkering with the latter. Encouraging active participation in the litiga-
tion by affected interest groups can largely compensate for the fact that 
the court's invalidation of a statute will extend beyond those parties 
whose interests are represented by the core litigants in the case. As such, 
371. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29 allows most amicus curiae briefs to be 
filed "by written consent of all parties, or by leave of court," although the federal 
government is allowed to file amicus briefs without consent or leave. Fed. R. App. P. 29. 
Motions for leave to file amicus briefs must "identify the interest of the applicant and ... 
state the reasons why a brief of an amicus curiae is desirable." Id. Supreme Court Rule 37 
similarly allows amicus briefs only by consent of the parties or leave of Court, specifically 
encouraging amicus briefs "which bring[] to the attention of the Court relevant matter 
that has not already been brought to its attention" but discouraging briefs not serving this 
purpose as a "burden [] [on] the Court." Sup. Ct. R. 37. 
372. The current Federal Rules require joinder of a person whose ability to protect an 
"interest relating to the subject of the action" might "as a practical matter [be] impair[ed] 
or impede[d]" by her absence, as long as joinder is feasible and would not defeat the 
court's jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). The Rules also require a court to permit 
intervention of persons whose interests may be impaired or impeded unless those interests 
are "adequately represented by existing parties." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The Rules allow 
permissive joinder and permissive intervention of persons with claims or defenses sharing 
questions of law or fact common with those already present in the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
20(a), 24(b). 
The theory of adjudication as representation suggests that these rules be interpreted 
liberally in constitutional cases to allow joinder of, and intervention by, any party with a 
distinct interest potentially implicated by the case whose interests are not already, in the 
language of Rule 24, "adequately represented by existing parties." If the Rules cannot 
fairly be read to allow joinder or intervention to such an extent, the theory suggests that 
they should he amended to do so. 
As a sidelight, it is instructive to note the degree to which the concept of interest 
representation is embodied in these and other Federal Rules, particularly the class action 
provisions. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (requirements that claims or defenses of named 
parties in class actions be "typical of the claims or defenses of the class" and that the named 
parties "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class"). 
373. For a classic exposition of this bipolar model and a comparison of that model 
with modem public law litigation, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281 (1976). 
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it can bolster the representational legitimacy that is threatened by the 
imperfect operation of interest representation in such cases.374 
The need for broad participation might also seem at odds with the 
belief held by Lon Fuller (and endorsed by Hart and Sacks) that disputes 
involving a multiplicity of parties and interests, what Fuller called 
"polycentric" disputes, are inappropriate for adjudication because of 
their inherent complexity.375 In a sense a conflict does indeed exist. The 
theory of adjudication as representation gives us a reason for, in effect, 
turning some "monocentric" disputes into "polycentric" disputes: to pre-
serve the democratic, representational legitimacy of the result. But the 
theory does not contradict the conclusion drawn by Fuller and by Hart 
and Sacks that these sorts of complicated, polycentric controversies are 
more effectively resolved by nonadjudicative means-private negotiation, 
for instance, or legislation.376 The theory only suggests that if such dis-
putes are to be resolved by adjudication, they should, to preserve demo-
cratic legitimacy, be resolved with the participation of as many affected 
interests as possible. 
5. Adjudication As Representation, the "Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, " 
and the Assumption of Constitutional Supremacy. - Viewed through the lens 
of adjudication as representation, then, judicial review might not seem 
quite so problematic an antithesis to democratic government as is usually 
believed. Constitutional cases often will not be perfect examples of adju-
dication as representation in operation, but judicial minimalism and 
broad participation can bring them fairly closely into line with the com-
mon law model of interest representation. By that model, no one bound 
by a judicial decision is bound illegitimately; everyone constrained by a 
decision, even a constitutional decision, will have had her interests repre-
sented in the decisionmaking process, and even the invalidation of demo-
cratically enacted statutes will therefore occur by democratically legiti-
mate means. As such, if constitutional adjudication is done in a certain 
way, the "counter-majoritarian difficulty" of judicial review begins to look 
a lot less difficult: The process of judicial review may not be majoritarian, 
374. Existing parties to a litigation, of course, often will have no incentive to argue for 
the inclusion of additional interest groups, and indeed may have incentives to oppose their 
participation. This means that the court probably will have to take an active role in 
soliciting the participation of such groups and determining whether and how a particular 
group should be allowed to participate. Thisjudicial role, however, need not conflict with 
the ideal of extensive and meaningful litigant control of the litigation as long as it is 
limited in function and guided by procedural rules (as, for instance, the judge'S function 
in the certification of class actions currently is, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23). Indeed, it seems 
probable that in high-profile cases, a wide variety of interest groups will quickly make 
themselves known to the coun if the possibility of their meaningful participation is 
perceived to be a real one. The coun's role then will become more the traditional one of 
taking proofs and hearing reasoned arguments, albeit on the somewhat nontraditional 
issues of whether a particular interest should be represented in the litigation and whether 
a cenain group adequately represents that interest. 
375. See Han & Sacks, supra note 259, at 646-47; Fuller, supra note 133, at 393-405. 
376. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 259, at 647; Fuller, supra note 133, at 393-405. 
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but It IS democratic in a sense closely akin to that of majoritarian 
lawmaking. 
The theory of adjudication as representation thus suggests that how 
to apply the Constitution is something of a democratic choice after all. 
The implications of this suggestion are simultaneously comforting and 
troubling. They are comforting because they tell us that judicial review is 
not so susceptible to the whims and politics of particular judges as it 
might seem, that constitutional adjudication is not ultimately a matter of 
rule by judicial fiat. They are troubling because they shift the question of 
the countermajoritarian difficulty to another, higher level: They force us 
to face the tension between a supposedly immutable, "metademocratic" 
Constitution on the one hand, and a primarily democratic procedure for 
determining what that Constitution means on the other. The trouble no 
longer is the apparent anomaly of allowing nonelected judges the power 
to invalidate majoritarian statutes. Instead, the trouble has become the 
practice, no less anomalous, of subjecting the Constitution-a document 
of metademocratic commitment that supposedly is immune to the vagar-
ies of everyday democracy-to interpretation by a process that is itself 
significantly democratic. 
Adjudication as representation therefore challenges a long-held as-
sumption of constitutional law, the assumption of constitutional 
supremacy. Exploring the ramifications of such a challenge is simply be-
yond my scope here. But let me tentatively suggest that subjecting the 
Constitution to interpretation through a democratic process of participa-
tion by those affected is at least a preferable alternative to interpretation 
at the unfettered discretion of a judge or panel of judges. The former 
process gives expression to the fundamental democratic tenet of par-
ticipatory government; the latter succumbs to the dangers of rule by fiat. 
C. Justiciability Doctrines 
[A] Court of Justice acting as such ... does not declare the law 
eo nomine and in the abstract, but waits until a case between man 
and man is brought before it judicially involving the point in 
dispute: from which arises the happy effect that its declarations 
are not made in a very early stage of the controversy; ... that the 
Court decides after hearing the point fully argned on both sides 
by lawyers of reputation; decides only as much of the question at 
a time as is required by the case before it, and its decision ... is 
drawn from it by the duty which it cannot refuse to fulfil, of 
dispensing justice impartially between adverse litigants. 
John Stuart Mil[377 
377. Mill, Representative Government, supra note 61, at 403. 
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The Art[icle] III aspect of standing ... reflects a due regard for 
the autonomy of those persons likely to be most directly affected 
by a judicial order. 
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans 
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. 378 
421 
Intimately connected with debates about judicial review are ques-
tions about the proper scope and use of justiciability doctrines-doc-
trines emerging primarily from Article Ill's "case or controversy" require-
ment379 and limiting the circumstances in which courts can adjudicate 
issues. As "public law" litigation has grown in importance over the last 
half century, academic contention over the role of justiciability doctrines, 
especially the three most important of them-standing, ripeness, and 
mootness-has raged.38o The most significant voices on the subject, 
those of the nine members of the Supreme Court, have themselves rarely 
been in harmony about it.38l The result has been a twisting maze of deci-
378. 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982). 
379. Article ill, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution reads: 
The Judicial Power shaH extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shaIl be 
made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritimeJurisdiction;-to 
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies 
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State;-
between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming 
Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects. 
U.S. Const. art. ill, § 2, c1. 1. 
380. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 176; Brilmayer, supra note 191; Lea Brilmayer, A 
Reply, 93 Harv. L Rev. 1727 (1980); William A Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 
Yale LJ. 221 (1988); Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen As Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1033 (1968); Evan Tsen Lee, 
Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 605 
(1992); MaxweIl L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social 
Choice, 83 Cal. L Rev. 1309 (1995); Cass R Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of 
Public Law, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1432 (1988); Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article ill: 
A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 Harv. L Rev. 1698 (1980); Winter, supra note 128. 
One author recently performed a LEXIS search revealing "117 articles over the last 10 
years in which the term 'standing' appears in the title." Stearns, supra, at 1317 n.21. 
381. See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995) (denying standing to voter 
in racial gerrymandering case; three separate opinions filed); Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (denying standing to environmental group in Endangered 
Species Act case; four separate opinions filed); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 
473 U.S. 568 (1985) (finding sufficient ripeness in FIFRA case; three separate opinions 
filed); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (denying standing to parents of black children 
challenging IRS tax-exempt standards for segregated private schools; three separate 
opinions filed); Valley Forge Christian CoIlege v. Americans United for Separation of 
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (denying standing to group challenging 
government's sale of property to religious coIlege; three separate opinions filed). 
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sional law on justiciability that justifies Justice Douglas's complaint that 
"[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as SUCh."BB2 
The theory of adjudication as representation cannot straighten the 
justiciability maze. But it can provide a theoretical foundation for much 
of the current law in the area, and thus it can give us some clues about 
how to find our way out of the labyrinth. Acljudication as representation 
disfavors leniency in justiciability, and favors the "personal stake" require-
ment of existing doctrine, because it tells us that a plaintiff without a 
personal stake in the resolution of an issue can produce a decision that 
constrains in an overbroad way. So-called "ideological" plaintiffs may liti-
gate issues in the abstract, without a firm grounding in actual facts upon 
which the court can rest its decision. This severely impairs the ability of 
later litigants to analogize or distinguish their cases from the precedential 
case-and thus potentially compromises interest representation. The re-
sult once more is a lack of democratic legitimacy in the constraint im-
posed by a precedential decision. 
1. Ideological Plaintiffi and "Yes or No" Decisions. - Let us begin, again, 
with the second necessary condition for adjudication as representation: 
that a judicial decision bind only those future litigants who are similarly 
situated to the original litigants in a material way.BSB We have seen how 
courts violate this condition when they range beyond the mere decision 
of cases to articulate general rules intended to bind future courts. Such 
rules take on lives of their own, constraining future litigants who are not 
in fact situated similarly to the litigants in the precedential case. But even 
where a court avoids the language of a general rule in deciding a prece-
dential case, it may end up binding future litigants who are differently 
situated in material ways from the litigants before it. This can happen 
where a precedential case is litigated without a grounding in facts corre-
lated to the interests of one or more of the litigants in that case-where, 
that is, a litigant in the precedential case is in effect vindicating not his 
own actual interests, but the abstract interests of other people. 
To illustrate how this might occur, let us borrow and adapt an exam-
ple offered by Lea Brilmayer in a groundbreaking article in which she 
connects justiciability doctrines to representational legitimacy in adjudi-
cation.3S4 Professor Brilmayer hypothesizes "a citizen in a town that has 
recently enacted an ordinance prohibiting the posting of campaign signs 
on residential property."3S5 The citizen is offended by the ordinance, be-
lieving it to be a First Amendment violation. But he lacks either the de-
382. Association of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 
(1970). Maxwell Stearns points out that Justice Douglas's statement, which itself is a 
generalization, "is not self-contradictory if it is viewed not as a generalization about 
standing, but rather as a generalization about generalizations about standing." Stearns, supra 
note 380, at 1375 n.207. 
383. See supra Part II.C. 
384. See Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 298-99. 
385. Id. at 298. 
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sire or the ability to post a sign himself-let us suppose that he lives in a 
high-rise apartment-and so he himself has not been and cannot be pros-
ecuted under the ordinance. Nonetheless, the citizen, whom we will call 
Mr. Watchdog, files a lawsuit against the town in which he alleges that the 
ordinance violates the First Amendment on its face and seeks an injunc-
tion against its enforcement. 
Suppose the court agrees to hear Mr. Watchdog's case. (Under cur-
rent standing doctrine this possibility is unrealistic, at least in a federal 
court;386 but this is only a hypothetical, and indeed the unlikelihood of 
this situation is precisely the point.) Mr. Watchdog presents evidence 
that the ordinance serves no compelling government interest and would 
severely impair the ability of the town's citizens to express their political 
views. The town (let us call it Dullsville) defends itself with evidence that 
campaign signs detract from the natural and architectural beauty of 
Dullsville, thus significantly reducing the income from tourists who come 
to see Dullsvi1le's stately antebellum homes, and that the signs contribute 
to litter and are frequent targets of unsightly vandalism. Dullsville also 
points out that other fora are available for its citizens to air their political 
views, including the Dullsville town square, which is frequently the site of 
political speeches and rallies. 
Mter a bench trial, the court enters a judgment against Mr. 
Watchdog and in favor of Dul1sville. The court finds that the Dullsville 
ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest, and 
that Dullsville citizens have adequate alternative fora in which to express 
their political opinions. The decision is appealed to the state supreme 
court, which affirms. 
Now it is a year later. Another Dullsville citizen, Ms. Martyr, has been 
arrested under the same ordinance for posting a campaign sign on her 
front lawn. To make things more interesting, let us suppose that Ms. 
Martyr lives not in one of the old neighborhoods of DuIlsville featuring 
lovely nineteenth-century homes, but in a modem, rather nondescript 
subdivision out by the shopping mall. In her misdemeanor trial for viola-
tion of the ordinance, Ms. Martyr is defending herself on the ground that 
the First Amendment prohibits the enforcement of the ordinance against 
her. 
Of course, Dullsville's attorneys immediately have referred the court 
to the decision in Watchdog v. Dullsville, claiming it to be precedent with 
respect to Ms. Martyr's First Amendment defense. Notice the extent to 
which Ms. Martyr is boxed in by the Watchdog result. She can try to argue 
that the result does not apply to her because her home is not one of those 
antebellum mansions the court seemed so concerned about in Watchdog, 
or because she is not similarly situated to the plaintiff in Watchdog, an 
ideological litigant lacking a real personal stake in the issue. But these 
arguments are likely to be unavailing. The court in Watchdog, remember, 
386. See. e.g .• Hays. 115 S. Ct. 2431; Lujan, 504 U.S. 555; Allen, 468 U.S. 737. 
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did not decide merely that the ordinance was constitutional as applied to 
the plaintiff in that case; it could not limit its decision in this way, because 
the ordinance had never even been applied to the plaintiff in Watchdog. 
Rather, the plaintiff in Watchdog had forced the court in that case to 
reach what in essence was a "yes or no" decision: Does the ordinance 
violate the First Amendment, or doesn't it? There was no room for the 
Watchdog court to limit its decision to the particular facts of that case, 
because that case had no particular facts. 
Thus the defendant in People v. Martyr probably will not be able to 
distinguish Watchdog; and Ms. Martyr will be bound by that decision. She 
will be constrained by the result of Watchdog, that is, despite the rather 
salient differences between her situation and that of the Watchdog plain-
tiff. She will be bound illegitimately, without interest representation, and 
adjudication as representation will be compromised. 
The plight of poor, aptly named Ms. Martyr illustrates quite starkly 
the implications of adjudication as representation for justiciability doc-
trines. Current (but much-maligned) justiciability jurisprudence gener-
ally requires, inter alia, that a plaintiff have a "personal stake" in the out-
come of a case before he can be heard in court.387 In the context of 
standing, this means that the plaintiff must have suffered an "irYury in 
fact";388 in the context of ripeness, it means that the injury must be actual 
or imminent and not contingent or merely anticipated;389 and in the con-
text of mootness it means essentially that judicial relief must potentially 
do some good.39o The theory of adjudication as representation provides 
a theoretical justification for this personal stake requirement, and thus 
supports the idea that it should be strictly enforced. If plaintiffs are al-
lowed to force judgments in which they have an insufficient personal 
stake, future litigants with actual stakes in the issue may be illegitimately 
bound by those judgments. This might happen where a future litigant 
finds herself, like Ms. Martyr, unable to distinguish a precedential case 
that in essence has no particular facts to distinguish. 
It is worth noting in this regard the relationship between plaintiffs 
lacking personal stakes, or "ideological" plaintiffs, and facial challenges to 
statutes, that is, lawsuits asserting that a statutory provision is constitution-
ally invalid on its face. In a sense, the legitimacy problem in the hypo-
thetical Dullsville litigation had more to do with the fact that Mr. 
Watchdog'S lawsuit forced the court to assess the facial validity of the or-
dinance than with the fact that Mr. Watchdog had no real personal stake 
in the outcome. Ms. Martyr's inability to free herself from the binding 
effect of the Watchdog decision stemmed from the ''yes or no" breadth of 
that decision, not from Mr. Watchdog'S ideological status. As such, adju-
387. The phrase "personal stake" comes from Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
388. See HfEJs, 115 S. Ct. at 2435. 
389. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 
(1985). 
390. See, e.g., Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-82 (1990). 
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dication as representation would appear to have more of a quarrel with 
facial challenges to statutes in general than 'with litigants lacking personal 
stakes in the outcomes of cases. 
But the two issues, standing and the legitimacy of facial challenges, 
are intimately connected. A plaintiff with no personal stake in the out-
come of a case almost inevitably will be forced to bring a facial challenge 
to a statute, because the statute will not have been applied to him in any 
way that allows the court to limit the scope of its decision. Thus, requir-
ing plaintiffs to have personal stakes in the outcomes of cases will have 
the effect of severely limiting the legitimacy risk posed by broad facial 
challenges. Plaintiffs with personal stakes will still be able to bring facial 
challenges, but the court will always have the option of limiting the scope 
of its decision to the actual application to the plaintiff of the challenged 
statute. The theory of adjudication as representation suggests that the 
personal stake requirement can be seen at least in part as a way to limit 
the availability of facial challenges to statutes, whose results might bind 
future dissimilar litigants. 
And the theory of adjudication as representation has reason to be 
suspicious of plaintiffs lacking personal stakes even outside the context of 
facial challenges to statutes. There is no reason to believe that ideologi-
cal plaintiffs need be confined to constitutional and statutory litigation. 
A plaintiff 'without a personal stake could desire that the common law 
move in a certain direction and file a la'wsuit to urge it along. A con-
sumer advocacy group, for instance, could sue a manufacturer on a the-
ory of strict product liability, hoping to force that manufacturer and 
others to incorporate better safety features into their products. If the 
consumer group loses the case, future litigants actually injured by unsafe 
products might be illegitimately bound by the decision. The theory of 
adjudication as representation tells us that a personal stake requirement 
is a good idea in these kinds of cases as well, at least from the perspective 
of democratic legitimacy. 
Of course, there may be other good reasons, reasons not connected 
with democratic legitimacy, why we should relax the' personal stake re-
quirement in certain instances. Sometimes there will be a collective ac-
tion problem hindering a challenge to an unconstitutional statute or 
some other aspect of the status quo: Every member of a' certain class is 
being injured in some way by the status quo, but no individual member 
has a sufficient interest in change to undertake the time and expense of 
filing a lawsuit. In such cases, ideologica1lawsuits may be the only way to 
redress widely dispersed hanns.391 And, in any case, we may have some 
confidence that subsequent courts and litigants, faced with a precedent 
upholding the validity of a statute against a facial challenge, will nonethe-
less find ways to hold that the statute is invalid as applied in certain cir-
cumstances. But there seems reason to suppose that subsequent courts 
391. See infra note 402. 
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will not ~ways fully succeed in doing so-that a decision rejecting a facial 
challenge will have at least some prejudicial effect on future litigants who 
really have been harmed by a statute. The theory of adjudication as rep-
resentation tells us that this kind of binding effect may be illegitimate, 
and it therefore gives us reason to enforce standing doctrines in a fairly 
rigid way. 
2. The Effectiveness of Ideological Plaintiffs. - In several insightful arti-
cles written in the late 1970s, Lea Brilmayer pointed to the connection 
between justiciability doctrines and representational legitimacy as a 
strong reason to deny court access to ideological plaintiffs seeking to 
challenge the constitutionality of statutes. In 'Judicial Review, 
Justiciability and the Limits of the Common Law Method," Professor 
Brilmayer argued that the legitimacy of judicial review depends on a strict 
application of the "case method," that is,judicial action only in the con-
text of concrete cases. Restricting judicial review to specific cases, she 
contended, ensures that "participation in the challenge [to the statute] 
will be limited to those persons actually suffering the statute's adverse 
impact."392 This in turn preserves the legitimacy of the process with re-
spect to later litigants, who will be free "to reargue the statute's invalidity 
as applied to [them] to the extent that [they] ha[ve] experienced the 
statute's impact in a different way."393 The case method thus inserts a 
form of representational legitimacy into judicial review: The plaintiff 
challenging a statute can really be said to represent "all others who are in 
a similar position."394 Brilmayer used these observations to support her 
argument against expansive justiciability doctrines in constitutional cases. 
Similarly, in "The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the 
'Case or Controversy' Requirement," Professor Brilmayer asserted that 
the "case or controversy" language of Article III can be explained in part 
by the desirability of protecting litigants from the binding precedential 
effect of decisions reached through the participation of previous litigants 
with insufficient personal stakes in the outcome.395 Brilmayer again 
noted that a litigant involved in producing a precedential decision can be 
said to represent future litigants who will be affected by the decision. She 
then suggested that a so-called "ideological" plaintiff-"a challenger [of 
legislation] without the traditional personal stake"396-is not likely to be 
as adequate a representative of future affected parties as a "traditional 
plaintiff," who may be "better able vividly to illustrate the adverse effects 
of the complained-of activity."397 
Professor Brilmayer's representational argument against relaxation 
of justiciability requirements focused on the idea that ideological plain-
392. Brilmayer, supra note 176, at 816. 
393. Id. at 816-17. 
394. Id. at 817. 
395. See Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 306-10. 
396. Id. at 306. 
397. Id. at 309. 
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tiffs, because they lack a personal stake in the outcome of a case, are 
unlikely to do as good a job litigating the case as a "traditional" plaintiff 
(or, in a criminal case, a defendant) might. She pointed, for example, to 
the "danger that by seeking to change the law too rapidly an ideological 
plaintiff will take greater risks by framing the issues in a broader, more 
controversial, manner."398 This argument has been criticized by Mark 
Tushnet, who questions Brilmayer's premises that plaintiffs are likely to 
pursue public interest litigation without some degree of ideological moti-
vation399 and that ideological plaintiffs are unlikely to litigate as effec-
tivelyas traditional plaintiffs.40o 
But the theory of adjudication as representation gives us reason to 
disfavor purely ideological plaintiffs even if Professor Tushnet's criticisms 
are valid. One concern of acljudication as representation seems indeed 
to be the adequacy of the litigants' participation at the precedentiallevel; 
recall our tentative third condition of acljudication as representation, ade-
quacy of participation.401 But even if this concern is misplaced with re-
spect to ideological plaintiffs, the problem of compromised interest rep-
resentation remains. Think back for a moment to Ms. Martyr's 
hypothetical predicament. She found herself constrained by the result of 
Watchdog v. Dullsville despite her manifest dissimilarity to the Watchdog 
plaintiff. But Ms. Martyr's constraint was illegitimate irrespective of the 
quality of Mr. Watchdog'S advocacy. Even if his advocacy was impeccable, 
Ms. Martyr still was constrained by a rule created by a non-interest repre-
sentative. Because the ordinance had not been applied to Mr. Watchdog 
personally, the Watchdog court was forced to reach a general, once-and-
for-all, "yes or no" decisiori about the constitutionality of the ordinance, 
without grounding its decision in the (nonexistent) particular facts of the 
case. Thus subsequent litigants like Ms. Martyr were prevented from dis-
tinguishing Watchdog on its facts, and Watchdog dictated the results of 
their cases despite their lack of simihUity to the Watchdog plaintiff. 
The theory of adjudication as representation, then, supports denying 
justiciability even to an extremely competent and motivated ideological 
plaintiff. Because that theory is concerned primarily with true interest 
398. Id. As support for this concern, Professor Brilmayer noted the example of Sierra 
Club v. Monon, 405 U.S. 727, 731-41 (1972), in which the ideological plaintiff 
"deliberately omitted from its complaint any allegation that its members had been injured 
in fact ••.. One suspects that its arguments would have been heard more sympathetically if 
it had adopted a less radical stance." Brilmayer, supra note 191, 'at 309 n.39. Brilmayer 
also cited several articles in which "[p]ublic interest lawyers [have] acknowledge[d] that 
these dangers exist." Id. at 309-10 & nn. 40-41; see Gary BelIow &Jeanne Kettieson, From 
Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B. U. L. 
Rev. 337 (1978); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest 
Litigation, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (1975); Michael Meltsner, Litigating Against the Death 
Penalty: The Strategy Behind Furman, 82 Yale LJ. 1111 (1973). 
399. See Tushnet, supra note 380, at 1708-11. 
400. See id. at 1711-21. 
401. See supra Part II.C. 
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representation through similarity of circumstances, it rejects judicial deci-
sions made "in the air"-without a foundation in specific facts applied to 
specific people, and thus without a basis upon which subsequent litigants 
can "choose" their representatives by the process of analogy and 
distinction. 
3. Justiciability, the "Passive Virtues," and Broad Participation. - The 
theory of adjudication as representation thus speaks strongly in favor of 
interpreting justiciability doctrines strictly, of requiring plaintiffs in most 
cases402 to have a personal stake in the outcome. This conclusion does 
not contradict my suggestion in a previous section403 that adjudication as 
representation disapproves the Bickelian "passive virtues." Justiciability 
should be denied when, and only when, a plaintiff does not have a suffi-
cient personal stake in the outcome to produce a legitimately binding 
rule. In judicial review and statutory interpretation cases, this inquiry will 
focus on whether the statute in question actually has been applied to the 
plaintiff in a detrimental way. The determination should be made only 
after the court has heard reasoned arguments and, if appropriate, taken 
evidence presented by the parties; it should be accompanied by an opin-
ion explaining the facts upon which it is based. The point is simply to 
deny adjudication in those cases where the lack of a personal stake pre-
vents the court from basing its substantive decision on facts particular 
enough to allow later litigants to distinguish them. 
But the passive virtues contemplate denials of justiciability on 
grounds of prudence, not on grounds oflegitimacy. They care less about 
whether the plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of a case than 
about whether the issue presented by the case is politically ripe for deci-
sion, or whether the case presents the ideal set of facts for determination 
of an issue, or whether deciding the case will have ramifications beyond 
the effects upon the parties in the courtroom.404 That is, the passive vir-
tues require the court to make the decision of whether to accept a case a 
strategic decision. This kind of strategic calculus undermines adjudica-
402. As Professor Brilmayer acknowledges, there certainly will be cases in which 
plaintiffs should be allowed to assert the rights of third parties, such as where the third 
party has no means of asserting the right, see Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) 
(white landowner permitted to assert equal protection rights of black purchaser of real 
property in defense to suit for breach of racially restrictive covenant); where the third 
party's rights would effectively be foreclosed by a judgment against the plaintiff, see 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (physicians permitted to assert privacy rights 
of patients to whom they had prescribed birth control); or where the assertion of the right 
by the third party would in effect render the right useless, see NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 
449 (1958) (civil rights organization permitted to assert First Amendment rights of 
members in suit to prevent disclosure of membership list). See Brilmayer, supra note 176, 
at 825-26. A similar example is the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception 
to the moomess doctrine. See, e.g., International Org. of Masters, Mates & Pilots v. Brown, 
498 U.S. 466, 473 (1991). 
403. See supra Part IV.B.3. 
404. See generally Bickel, supra note 307, at 111-98 (discussing the courts' options 
and considerations in deciding whether, when, and how much to adjudicate). 
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tion as representation because it is not truly based upon the proofs and 
reasoned arguments of the parties. -
So a call for strict enforcement of justiciability doctrines is not an 
endorsement of the passive virtues. Nor is it a renunciation of the re-
quirement that courts deciding constitutional cases liberally allow partici-
pation by affected parties and interest groups in addition to the original 
parties to the case.405 Adjudication as representation requires that a 
plaintiff have a personal stake in order to initiate a lawsuit; it does not 
require that eoery participant in the lawsuit have such a stake. As long as 
one of the litigants challenging a statute has a real personal stake in the 
outcome, the problem of deciding a case "in the air," with no particular 
facts upon which to ground the decision, should be averted, and subse-
quent litigants should be able to avoid constraint by non-interest repre-
sentatives. Ideally, every affected interest would be represented in the 
litigation by someone with a true personal stake in the proceedings; but 
this is probably too much to ask, and the practical remedy of allowing 
representative interest groups to participate even absent a personal stake 
is at least an improvement on the lack of any such participation at all. 
4. Justiciability, Separation of Powers, and Prudence. - The prevailing 
view, both in the commentary406 and in the case law,407 is that jus-
ticiability doctrines have two sources: (1) the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers as reflected in Article III; and (2) "prudent judicial 
administration. "408 But, as we have seen, the theory of adjudication as 
representation suggests a third justification for those doctrines: the pres-
ervation of democratic legitimacy in adjudication. The validity of this jus-
tification does not mean that justiciability doctrines cannot be traced to 
constitutional roots. As Professor Brilmayer has pointed out,409 the case 
or controversy requirement of Article III might be seen as a specific 
mechanism for ensuring that the general constitutional philosophy of 
democratic legitimacy applies to adjudication as well as to parliamentary 
lawmaking. But the doctrines have nothing to do with separation of pow-
ers, at least not as that concept traditionally is understood. Their purpose 
is not to prevent courts from deciding issues that should be left to legisla-
tures, but rather to ensure that whatever issues courts do decide are de-
cided in a democratically legitimate way. 
Nor, as I have suggested, are justiciability doctrines a matter of pru-
dence when seen from the perspective of adjudication as representation. 
405. See supra Part IV.B.4. 
406. See generally, e.g., Envin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction §§ 2.1-2.6, at 
41-166 (2d ed. 1994); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System 67-98 (4th ed. 1996); Martin H. Redish, Federal Courts: 
Cases, Comments and Questions 16-129 (2d ed. 1989); 13 Wright et aL, supra note 369, 
§§ 3529-3529.1, at 278-308. 
407. See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992); Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1984). 
408. Chemerinsky, supra note 406, § 2.1, at 42. 
409. See Brilmayer, supra note 191, at 310. 
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Indeed, denying justiciability for prudential reasons vitiates the operation 
of adjudication as representation; it binds parties to decisions that those 
parties have not substantially participated in creating. The theory of ad-
judication as representation implies that justiciability doctrines are best 
interpreted to ensure that cases are decided legitimately rather than to 
allow courts better to administer their dockets or shape the evolution of 
the law. 
CONCLUSION: ADJUDICATION AS REPRESENTATION 
AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM" 
Disguised or not, the habit of legislating policy from the bench, 
once acquired, is addictive .... The activist or revisionist judge 
... can no more restrain himself from doing "good" in constru-
ing a statute than when he purports to speak with the voice of 
the Constitution. 
Robert Bork410 
[T]he French jurist, Saleilles, [writes]: "One wills at the begin-
ning the result; one finds the principle afterwards; such is the 
genesis of all juridical construction. . . ." I would not put the 
case thus broadly. So sweeping a statement exaggerates the ele-
ment of free volition. It ignores the factors of determinism 
which cabin and confine within narrow bounds the range of un-
fettered choice. 
Benjamin Cardozo411 
I began this Article with an introduction to Robert Bork's under-
standing of the proper judicial role, an understanding in which that role 
stood in sharp contrast to the role of elected legislators. I hope I have 
shown in the pages since then that this understanding is somewhat my-
opic. What Judge ~ork and many others have missed is the operation of 
adjudication as representation and the significant measure of democratic 
legitimacy it provides. It is a process to which Judge Bork's antecessor oil 
a different bench, Justice Cardozo, was not entirely blind when he wrote 
of "the factors of determinism which cabin and confine within narrow 
bounds the range of unfettered Gudicial] choice."412 Cardozo, although 
certainly no believer in judicial impotence,413 at least perceived that the 
power of judicial decision was not quite the power of unbounded crea-
tion, divine or diabolical, that Judge Bork and many others have thought 
it to be. 
410. Bork, supra note 1, at 16. 
411. Cardozo, supra note 7, at 170 (citation omitted). 
412. Id. 
413. Indeed, most of The Nature oftheJudicialProcess is a testament to Cardozo's vision 
ofa powerful, self-directed judiciary. See Cardozo, supra note 7. 
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In this Conclusion, I will bring the theory of adjudication to bear on 
the idea that perhaps bothers Judge Bork the most in The Tempting of 
America, an idea that grows out of Bork' s fundamental distrust of a judici-
ary he believes to be constrained in practice only by its own conscience. 
The idea is judicial activism.414 As we have seen, Bork uses the phrase 
pejoratively, to refer to the phenomenon of courts doing what they 
should not be doing in a system of constitutional democracy. I want to 
suggest here that the idea of judicial activism, seen as a negative, is less 
about what courts do than about how they go about doing it-that is, that 
our concerns for the legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking should focus 
less on the substance of the decisions courts actually make and more on 
the processes used by courts in making those decisions. This suggestion 
should come as no surprise to the reader who has made it this far. 
Recall that the notion of judicial activism is animated by a fear of 
rule by judicial fiat, of government by Platonic Guardians.415 But the the-
ory of adjudication as representation suggests that this fear is largely un-
founded in the context of adjudication, because the premise upon which 
it is based-unfettered judicial power-is incorrect. In fact, as that the-
ory tells us, courts are constrained in making their decisions. They are 
constrained by the factual proofs and legal arguments that have been 
placed before them by the litigants; they are required to work with a lim-
ited number of decisional alternatives, each of which has been authored 
to a significant degree by the litigants themselves. As such, their discre-
tion is mostly confined within the realm of these alternatives and the rea-
sons that the parties have advanced for them. 
If courts are practically constrained by the mechanism of par-
ticipatory adjudication, then the central question asked by critics of judi-
cial activism like Judge Bork-"[W]ho is to protect us from the power of 
judges? How are we to be guarded from our guardians?"416-lo.ses much 
of its meaning. We need less protection from judicial power than anti-
activists think, because judges simply have less power than anti-activists 
assume. The real power, or much of it, resides in the litigants. And the 
litigants in precedential cases, as we have seen, are in a sense "[ ]elected, 
[ ] accountable, and [ ]representative"417 in a way that many judges41S are 
414. For my understanding of how the term "judicial activism" typically has been 
used, see supra text accompanying notes 15-2g. For some other understandings of the 
term, see the sources cited supra note 15. ' 
415. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text. 
416. Bork, supra note 1, at 5. 
417. Id. 
418. Not, apparently, most judges. Through a survey of state constitutional provisions, 
Steven Croley has found that "[m]ostjudgeships in the United States are elective offices." 
Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: ElectiveJudiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 689, 690, 725-26 (1995) (emphasis added). This fact should'mean that 
Judge Bork's fears about judicial activism do not apply to a significant portion of the 
adjudication actually occurring in the country today, since those fears are purportedly 
focused upon judges who are "unelected, unaccountable, and unrepresentative." Bork, 
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not. They are "elected" through the process of participatory adjudication 
that occurs in future cases, when future litigants determine whether and 
how a precedent will bind them by presenting proofs and reasoned argu-
ments to the court. And they are "accountable" and "representative" be-
cause, through the common law method, their interests in effectively liti-
gating the issues coincide with those of future litigants who will be bound 
by their actions. Adjudication-even adjudication that invalidates demo-
cratically enacted statutes, forces the restructuring of public institutions, 
or otherwise seems "activist" in some sense-therefore need not be "tyr-
anny." It can itself be democratically legitimate in a meaningful way. 
Herein, of course, lies a touch of myth. Judge Bork and others are 
not crazy to fear judicial discretion; no one seriously doubts that the per-
sonal values of judges sometimes do creep into the activity of judicial 
decisionmaking. The process of acljudication as representation cannot 
completely eliminate the risk of this occurring. But-and this is my key 
point-recognizing the existence of adjudication as representation can 
force us to rethink the questions of just what judicial activism means and 
precisely in what ways we do not want judges to be "active." 
What the theory of adjudication as representation suggests is that 
courts deciding cases are illegitimately active from a democratic perspec-
tive whenever they cause one or more of the necessary conditions of adju-
dication as representation to be vitiated. Recall those three condi-
tions:419 actual, meaningful litigant participation in the decision; 
constraint of only those litigants similarly situated to the participating liti-
gants in every material way; and effectiveness oflitigant participation. We 
can disregard the third condition for present purposes, since a court viti-
ating the first condition necessarily will vitiate the third as well. But the 
first two conditions together give us a standard against which we can mea-
sure illegitimate judicial activism. 
The first condition, that a judicial decision actually have been pro-
duced to a significant extent through the participation of the litigants, is 
vitiated to the degree that ajudge's decision is based on facts and reasons 
other than those offered by the parties. This will happen, for instance, 
when a judge takes an exceptionally active managerial role in the litiga-
tion by closely supervising discovery, encouraging the paring down of 
legal claims and theories, suggesting potential proofs or arguments, or 
the like. It also will happen when a judge, explicitly or otherwise, actually 
grounds her decision in some rationale not advanced by either party. In 
such cases, a judge can be said to have been active in a way that com-
promises the legitimacy of the decision. 
This first condition explains, in a new 'way, the anti-activist reaction 
to the idea of judges "imposing their own values" in adjudication. Judi-
supra note 1, at 5. But one senses that Bork's disregard for "the politicization of the law," 
id. at 2, would not disappear if it were elected judges doing the politicizing. 
419. See supra Part II.C. 
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cial imposition of values is indeed illegitimate, but not because it "makes" 
rather than "declares" the law. It is illegitimate because it is a judicial 
encroachment on lawmaking territory that properly is reserved for· the 
litigants-because it is the imposition of judicial values rather than the . 
values advanced by litigants, through reasoned proofs and arguments, as 
the interest representatives of future affected parties. 
The importance of the first condition also might help explain the 
typical anti-activist distaste for extensive court involvement in the over-
sight of public institutions like schools and prisons, what one judge ap-
provingly has called "remedial activism."420 Judges handling such cases 
tend to take a more active role in managing the progress of the case ~an 
is usual in so-called traditional litigation.421 This active role implies a 
reduced role for the litigants-a smaller percentage of actual litigant au-
thorship of the eventual decision. As such, democratic legitimacy in such 
cases is compromised. and charges of judicial activism have some sting. 
The second necessary condition of adjudication as representation, 
that judicial decisions bind only similarly situated parties, also suggests 
some kinds of judicial conduct that are illegitimately active from the dem-
ocratic point of view. That condition. as we have seen, will be vitiated to 
the extent that a court tries to broaden the binding scope of its decision 
beyond the mere result of the case. Thus, the judicial articulation of 
rules. multifactor tests, and even general principles can be viewed as ille-
gitimate judicial activism because it purports to bind future parties with-
out strict regard to similarity of situation.422 Likewise, as we also have 
seen. judicial willingness to expand traditional boundaries of justiciability 
can be viewed as illegitimately active because it can force broadly con-
straining "yes or no" decisions instead offact-specificjudgments.423 And 
failures of judicial minimalism-such as aggressive judicial invalidation of 
statutes in circumstances where invalidation is not absolutely necessary-
amount to improper activism for the same reason.424 
The force of the second condition, like that of the first, contributes 
to an explanation of the anti-activist attack on "remedial activism" in 
structural reform litigation. Not only do judges tend to act managerially 
in such cases, potentially violating the first condition. but the results of 
their decisions often have constraining effects on parties not adequately 
represented in the decisionmaking process. The primary effects of struc-
tural reform litigation tend to be relatively contemporaneous rather than 
intertemporal: They extend to a wide variety of existing nonlitigants but 
usually do not have strong precedential effects on future litigants. Thus, 
parties affected by a court decree reforming a prison would include pris-
420. See justice, supra note 15, at 2. 
421. See generally Chayes, supra note 373, at 1302-04 (describing the difference 
between the judicial roles in "traditional" private litigation and public law litigation). 
422. See supra Part N .A. 
423. See supra Part N.C. 
424. See supra Part N.B. 
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oners, guards, other employees, administrators, families of prisoners, and 
taxpayers, among others, many or most of whom will not actually have 
had the opportunity to participate in the litigation. This fact threatens 
legitimacy in light of the second condition of adjudication as representa-
tion, which demands that only represented parties be bound by a deci-
sion. If these difficulties are not remedied, structural reform litigation 
can indeed be seen as illegitimately "activist" in violating the second con-
dition of acljudication as representation. 
So the theory of adjudication as representation actually justifies some 
typical anti-activist positions, although it does so on reasoning different 
froJ!l that usually offered by anti-activists. But in another, fundamental 
sense, the theory threatens the project of anti-activism as that project 
most often is conceived, including by judge Bork. Bork and other critics 
of judicial activism typically focus on the substance of a judicial decision" 
on what a court has done. A decision is condemned as activist if it decides 
an issue the critic believes should be left to the legislature425 or if it seems 
to incorporate a particular viewpoint about what the "right" or 'just" (as 
opposed to the legally correct) resolution of an issue should be.426 A 
decision is activist, that is, if the decision itself is bad. But the theory of 
adjudication as representation does not ask us to focus on the substantive 
results, on the what, of adjudicative decisionmaking in this way. What is 
important to the theory of adjudication as representation is the how: not 
the actual result of a case, but the process by which that result has been 
achieved. As such, the theory provides no justification for criticizing the 
substance of a particular judicial decision as activist, at least not if judicial 
activism is thought to be about democratic legitimacy. It justifies only a 
critique of a court's process of decisionmaking. 
For example, charges of judicial activism are often leveled when a 
court strikes down a democratically enacted statute; this indeed is the 
most frequent target of judge Bork's criticism.427 But the theory ofadju-
dication as representation tells us that such an act is not inherently ac-
tivist on a scale of democratic legitimacy. Even the act of interpreting the 
Constitution incorrectly to strike down a statute is not illegitimate activism 
from a democratic perspective: If judicial minimalism has been adhered 
to and broad participation has been allowed, that incorrect interpreta-
tion is in fact the product of a democratic decisionmaking process. Such 
a decision may be illegitimate on other grounds-"metademocratic" rea-
sons of constitutional supremacy, for instance-but it is not illegitimate 
for the reason advanced by judge Bork and other opponents of judicial 
activism, that is, because it is performed by judges who are "unelected, 
unaccountable, and unrepresentative. "428 From the standpoint of de-
mocracy, such decisions are illegitimate only if they have been reached by 
425. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 1, at 3-4 (discussing Roe v. Wade). 
426. See, e.g., id. at 2-3. 
427. See id. at 17. 
428. Id. at 5. 
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some other process than adjudication as representation. InJudge Bork's 
own words, their "democratic integrity . . . depends entirely upon the 
degree to which [their] processes are legitimate."429 
Thus the theory of adjudication as representation suggests that the 
debate about judicial activism should be refocused. The substance of ju-
dicial decisions-what a court has decided-can, of course, be criticized, 
but grounding such a critique in charges of judicial activism misses the 
point. Judicial activism, if it is truly illegitimate from a democratic per-
spective, is illegitimate because it has compromised the process, not the 
substance, of judicial decisionmaking. Activism is a problem of how deci-
sions are made, not of what those decisions look like or what their effects 
may be. 
***** 
At bottom, what I have called the theory of adjudication as represen-
tation is remarkably elementary, even obvious-almost unworthy of the 
appellation "theory." It says simply that when adjudication operates as 
that process often, perhaps even usually does, according to the common 
law method that it has known for centuries, it brings with it the ingredi-
ents of a truly democratic legitimacy. And it tells us that all we have to do 
in order to sustain that legitimacy in adjudication is to preserve the com-
mon law features that produce it: resolution only of actual controversies; 
fact-specific, case-by-case adjudication; initiation and control of lawsuits 
by affected parties; and narrow application of stare decisis. 
My method in this Article has been a combination of description and 
justification, akin to John Rawls's technique of "reflective equilibrium."43o 
It has not been history. I have not tried to demonstrate that adjudication 
as representation has developed historically as a means of injecting demo-
cratic legitimacy into the adjudicative process, nor do I believe it is neces-
sary to demonstrate that. It may well be that our current process of aclju-
dication evolved, like democratic processes of parliamentary lawmaking, 
in continuing response to the liberal demands for ever-greater individual 
autonomy and involvement in government decisionmaking.431 But 
where adjudication as representation came from does not matter. What 
matters is that it exists and that it results in a measure of democratic 
legitimacy. 
Of course, democratic legitimacy may not be the whole story. We 
live not just in a democracy, but in a constitutional democracy; this fact 
implies a commitment to metademocratic rule on some issues, to deci-
sionmaking on another level entirely than the level of contemporaneous 
individual participation and majority rule. It is possible that the everyday 
429. Id. at 2. 
430. SeeJohn Rawls, Political Liberalism 8-9, 96-97 (1993);John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice 20-21, 48-51 (1971). 
431. Such an evolution is suggested by a reading ofYeazeII, supra note 190. 
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democratic legitimacy of adjudication may sometimes have to be sacri-
ficed in the name of metademocratic, constitutional legitimacy. Perhaps 
we do not want individual litigants to playa dominant role in determin-
ing what the Constitution means; perhaps we would rather have that role 
played by unelected judges. The theory of adjudication as representation 
cannot tell us how to resolve such a question. Nor can it tell us whether, 
or when, other considerations-pragmatic criteria like consistency, per-
haps, or a need to preserve democracy in the long run by sacrificing it in 
the particular case-might outweigh the value of democratic legitimacy 
in adjudication. 
What the theory can do is challenge the usual assumption that con-
straint by judicial decision is, inherently, a nondemocratic constraint. In 
doing so, it might also challenge other, more specific assumptions: that 
the debate over judicially articulated rules is simply a debate about utility, 
for instance; that justiciability doctrines have primarily to do with separa-
tion of powers or prudent judicial administration; and that judicial review 
ultimately means rule by an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary. And 
the theory might subtly change the nature of our anxiety about adjudica-
tion, causing us to worry a little less about the substantive legitimacy of 
judicial decisions and a little more about the legitimacy of the processes 
used to reach them. 
In short, if the theory of adjudication as representation tells us any-
thing, it is that a fundamental concern for process in adjudication, or in 
any kind of social decisionmaking, is not just an elevation of style over 
substance. Process is the engine of legitimacy in a democratic govern-
ment, even if process is viewed from a functionalist perspective, as the 
means to an end. It is the participatory process of decisionmaking in a 
democracy that makes that form of government distinct and gives it spe-
cial value. The fact that a government decision is made in a courtroom 
rather than an assembly hall does not exempt that decision from the ba-
sic democratic requirement of procedural legitimacy. 
